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Cultural differences in morals
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1. Rachels means that Emotivism claims that when speaking about morality, people only state their own personal opinions rather than verifiable facts. First, he notes that language can be used to make statements, issue commands or convey emotion. As an example of the latter, Rachels notes that someone stating “Way to go, Lance!” is not an order and is neither factually correct nor incorrect, they are simply making it known that they feel positive about Lance (36). He further argues that this “emotional language” is what is used in discussions about morality. So according to Emotivism, a person saying “All cows are evil” is not stating a fact about cows but rather “I personally disapprove of all cows”, they are putting forward how they fell …show more content…
Gould argues that humans should only preserve other animals for the sake of humanity because the sheer size of time and life makes it only reasonable for humans to base our morality around human lifespans and interests. Calling on his background in paleontology he states the jarring statistic that “more than 99 percent of all species ever living have become extinct”, and that this is simply the nature of life, it is effectively impossible for humans, or any other force, to preserve every species of life (29). It is more realistic for humans to preserve life in a human manner. Humans should preserve certain species only if they can benefit humans, a form of morality that, like all other systems of right and wrong, is based around humans. In contrast, Rolston believes that humans have a duty to protect all species because each species has intrinsic value. He argues that a species as a whole has a sort of intrinsic value separate from that of its members. He quotes Mayr is stating that “species are real units of evolution” that is, the changes in a species as a whole are the most basic changes in evolution that we can record, they are something of a lifeform of their own (721). And as such they deserve to be protected as a living being. Rolston believes that only preserving species due to their utility is hardly a form of morality at all, treating species as a resource rather than as beings, or even a collection of beings, completely ignores their own value to themselves in favor of exploiting them as resources for humans. Humans should not limit the diversity of nature or put any one species about another, but each species takes priority over each individual. He argues that the humans should not be preserving species only if there would be dire circumstances otherwise, such as the possibility of human
In the article of "Why do species matters?" by Lilly-Marlene Russow, the author establish the desire of species,, why individuals tend to treat living being (creature) distinctively in light of the fact that they are an alternate animal groups; and furthermore treat certain creatures of an animal groups with more thought. She additionally emphasize on the issue which is figuring out what commitments a man may have toward one creature over another.Russow argues that one commitment toward animals for some is to secure declining or endangered species, yet this does not really stretch out to the whole types of that animal. As indicated
In the introduction, Blackburn constructs a clear antithesis between absolutism and relativism, and illustrates their focuses with colloquial words like “bullshitting” and “fetish”. Although this way of expressing ideas is kind of rude, it makes audiences easily understand the ongoing conflict between these two ideas and intrigue them to read more. The rest of the article continues such fun style of writing until the part where the author begins to point out the problems within the prevalent idea, relativism. The author’s reasoning against relativism starts with an imaginary debate where pros and cons are discussing the validity of banning fox hunting. Then the author introduces a relativist, Rosie, who tells the pros and cons that “The truth you are holding is relative; what you believe is true may not be true for the other.” Since this point, the author’s reasoning begins to become intense. First, he argues that what Rosie suggests doesn’t contribute to the debate because with or without her intervention, the debate will remain controversial. Then he digs deeper by suggesting that Rosie may want to emphasize toleration is essential yet such claim is actually absolute, which contradicts the relativist value that Rosie believes. Finally, Blackburn states that in order to avoid such paradox, Rosie may assert that “You have your truth; I have mine”, yet it still doesn’t contribute anything to the
The long-term aim is to develop an approach to ethics that will help resolve contemporary issues regarding animals and the environment. In their classical formulations and as recently revised by animal and environmental ethicists, mainstream Kantian, utilitarian, and virtue theories have failed adequately to include either animals or the environment, or both. The result has been theoretical fragmentation and intractability, which in turn have contributed, at the practical level, to both public and private indecision, disagreement, and conflict. Immensely important are the practical issues; for instance, at the public level: the biologically unacceptable and perhaps cataclysmic current rate of species extinctions, the development or preservation of the few remaining wilderness areas, the global limitations on the sustainable distribution of the current standard of living in the developed nations, and the nonsustainability and abusiveness of today's technologically intense crop and animal farming. For individuals in their private lives, the choices include, for example: what foods to eat, what clothing to wear, modes of transportation, labor-intensive work and housing, controlling reproduction, and the distribution of basic and luxury goods. What is needed is an ethical approach that will peacefully resolve these and other quandaries, either by producing consensus or by explaining the rational and moral basis for the continuing disagreement.
... life. What we are able to do is treat all species with respect and do what we can so that they can thrive in a world that we have altered. We can preserve a species without alienating another. Preserving the Australian fauna at the cost of some feral dogs is the choice we have to make for the good of the biological make up of that region. Dogs themselves won’t go extinct and we’ve also eliminated a threat to other species including ourselves. Species egalitarianism is an easily outmoded form of communicating treatment of species because of all the questions and speculation it ultimately raises. The equivocation of animals is absurd. We can’t compare them because of all their fundamental differences and to do so is insulting to all species that fall below the parameters we instill. Ultimately there is no possible situation in which species egalitarianism is correct.
Although he believes that all beings have worth in and of themselves, Murdy does reject what he refers to as the “Franciscan” view that all types of life are equal. From a contemporary anthropocentric lens, to see the intrinsic value of all creatures does not mean that we as a species shouldn’t also interact with our environment by judging things in terms of instrumental value as well. In this line of thought, Murdy would likely approve of animal testing or the killing of a dangerous strain of bacteria, as while both non-human animals and microbes have undeniable value, these acts would be for the imperative benefit of humans. Here, Murdy expands on classical interpretations of anthropocentrism by not placing humans and nature in opposition to each other, and instead takes into account the complexities of life while still standing by his belief that anthropocentrism is a valid
In “Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments,” Thomas Hill tries to explain why destroying nature is morally inappropriate. His main argument is that rather than asking whether this action is wrong or right, we should ask what kind of person would destroy nature. Beforehand, one view is that since plants have right or interests, one should not violate their interest by destroying them. But Hill’s view is that we cannot address the interests of plants in order to criticize those who destroy the nature, because this approach is good for sentient beings. In this essay I am going to examine whether sentient is a necessary condition for interests to be counted? My upshot is that Hill’s view is correct.
In the spirit of Karen Warren, Gould's perspective on environmentalism 'feels right' to me, as I can connect with acts of respect and benevolence towards humans and can easily extend that feeling to the rest of the earth (especially on a personal level where I see the golden rule as the basis for my religious beliefs). However, upon closer examination, I find the suggestion to 'just follow the golden rule' as an environmental ethic problematic when examined in a practical, non-idealized light. Harkening back to the problems encountered in previous discussions of biocentric and ecocentric ethics, I am troubled by the potential outcomes of an environmental ethic such as this.
In accordance with the “rights view” moral theory, since human beings are capable of moral obligations, they have a prima facie moral obligation not to kill animals and since animals are incapable of understanding moral obligation, the animals have a prima facie moral right to live (Lehman). Prima facie is a term used when a view is considered as correct until proven otherwise. The “rights view” however does not say that humans can never kill animals. In fact, under certain conditions, prima facie moral obligations can be overridden making it morally permissible for human beings to kill animals.
Is he then saying that the animal’s interest in preserving its life should not be regarded as highly as the utility we derive from the animal’s death, as long as the animal does not suffer? It seems that to be morally consistent, Singer should similarly oppose the killing of animals, not just the deliberate causation of their suffering. Singer’s argument is certainly persuasive. However, his argument only goes so far as to say that speciesism is arbitrary and we should replace one arbitrary measure with another – that of sentience. I think that more needs to be done to show why sentience, not any other quality, should be the defining characteristic for moral consideration.
The fact that humans can take the lives of animals depicts their lack of moral value in relation to humans. However, if moral value is tied to moral rights, how does one compare the moral rights of humans and animals and why do humans possess more moral rights than nonhuman species? The main reason why some may say that humans possess more moral rights than animals is because they are not self aware and lack cognitive capacities. In Empty Cages: Animal Rights and Vivisection, Tom Regan states that those who deny animals of their rights usually emphasize on the uniqueness of human beings by stating that, "...we understand our own mortality and make moral choices. Other animals do none of these things. That is why we have rights and they do not (p. 100)." However, in The Mental Powers of Man and the Lower Animals by Charles Darwin, he states that animals, or at least nonhuman mammals, share the same cognitive abilities as humans. For instance, nonhuman mammals are able to "learn from experience, remember the past, anticipate the future (p.102)." Additionally, nonhuman mammals are also capable of experiencing fear, jealousy, and sadness. With these cognitive abilities, nonhuman mammals should then be qualified to obtain moral rights, which are
...e that animals do have the right to be treated ethically. This is what the three R’s are for. Humans however, need to continue to progress and need to think about the safety of our species. It is for this that an ‘on balance justification’ need be made where humans can maximize the utility and progress of our species.
Speciesists claim that this enables them to think and act morally, and so entitles them to a higher moral status. This argument, like many other speciesist arguments, fails when “the argument from marginal cases” is applied. The argument from marginal cases argues that if we treat beings based on traits, such as rationality, we must then treat all beings of equal rationality the same.... ... middle of paper ... ...
== = = Human beings are dependent on the Earth's diversity of species for our survival. Wild species play a vital role in the maintenance of the planets ecological functions, yet everyday on the planet 40-100 species become extinct.
Though Blackstone created these thoughts well over 200 years ago, they are more relevant now than ever before. He reasoned that “changing environmental conditions” require us to restrict traditional freedoms and property rights in the name of public welfare and equality (Desjardins, 104). Due to dwindling natural resources and rising concerns of pollution, those previous rights and freedoms can no longer exist if the welfare of posterity is to be protected. To say that millions of unborn humans have a right to anything, even before existing in our world, is an odd concept. However, this sentiment conveys perhaps the single most compelling argument for why an anthropocentric approach to environmental ethics is in fact, the most justified. It is the instinct of all living beings to prioritize oneself and ensure a future for those to come (Acari, 2017). Though this justification for protecting the natural world might seem selfish or short-sighted, it is in fact, the nature of all life to preserve self-interests. In response to the counterclaim that plants and animals should be regarded with natural rights like humans, Blackstone would rebut that these beings are incapable of “free and rational thought” (Desjardins, 103). This is most likely in part due to his purely anthropocentric perspective that human life alone is worth consideration. Thus,
According to the philosopher Peter Singer, speciesists treat human interests as more fundamental than other nonhuman animals interests; therefore, speciesists ignore the interests of other species where no great benefit to human interests is concerned (Singer 279). For instance, the BUAV claims that experiments like sewing kittens’ eyelids together to study amblyopia have been done many years ago, and yet no cure has been found (Hanlon 1). As a result, Singer argues nonhuman animals are regarded as only “an item of laboratory equipment” (281). Many of the experiments on animals are carried out for rather trivial interests such that speciesists give the weight of nonhuman animals less weight than the interests of human beings. Singer asserts that human beings need to apply the principle of equal consideration of interests to animals to give equal weight on them (Singer 277). Singer’s theory of equal consideration of interests is extremely useful because it sheds insight on vivisection since the fundamental issue in how human may treat animals is whether they suffer and such that pains of animals and humans deserve equal considerations (Singer 278). Whether it’s poultry farming or vivisection, sentient animals have interests of not experiencing pain or suffering (Singer 278). According to Hanlon, animal recruits lead better lives and better deaths in laboratory than in poultry