Essay On Animal Rights And Vivisection

Vivisections, medical research that harms the research subject without providing any benefits to them, is supported by philosophy professor R.G Frey on the basis that the using and killing of animals is morally permissible because humans' quality of life exceeds animals' quality of life. Frey does not disregard the fact that vivisections harm animals, he sees no difference in the pain felt by humans and animals; nonetheless, Frey does not believe that all members of the moral community have lives of equal value. He believes that sacrificing the lives of those with less value is better than sacrificing the lives of those with higher values. Therefore, Frey defends the act of vivisections on the basis that humans' lives are of greater moral value

than animals'.
Frey defends the act of harming animals on the basis that humans' lives are of higher moral value, which can suggests that humans have more moral rights than animals.

The fact that humans can take the lives of animals depicts their lack of moral value in relation to humans. However, if moral value is tied to moral rights, how does one compare the moral rights of humans and animals and why do humans possess more moral rights than nonhuman species? The main reason why some may say that humans possess more moral rights than animals is because they are not self aware and lack cognitive capacities. In Empty Cages: Animal Rights and Vivisection, Tom Regan states that those who deny animals of their rights usually emphasize on the uniqueness of human beings by stating that, "...we understand our own mortality and make moral choices. Other animals do none of these things. That is why we have rights and they do not (p. 100)." However, in The Mental Powers of Man and the Lower Animals by Charles Darwin, he states that animals, or at least nonhuman mammals, share the same cognitive abilities as humans. For instance, nonhuman mammals are able to "learn from experience, remember the past, anticipate the future (p.102)." Additionally, nonhuman mammals are also capable of experiencing fear, jealousy, and sadness. With these cognitive abilities, nonhuman mammals should then be qualified to obtain moral rights, which are

possessed by human beings. If animals have the same moral rights as humans, then they should also be of equal moral value because humans will have no rights to degrade an animal's moral value. Moreover, the same can be said for disabled beings because they also lack the abilities to make good moral choices, which would suggest that they lack moral rights. Furthermore, Frey stated in his article that not all human beings are of equal moral value so since the disabled are of lesser moral value and moral rights, is it morally permissible to perform vivisections on them? The obvious answer would be that no one will ever agree to the performance of vivisections on the disabled because they are of the same species, regardless of their lack of moral rights and moral value. Therefore, nonhuman species, who share the same cognitive abilities as humans, and the disabled human beings, who actually lack cognitive abilities, are both of lesser moral value in the moral community but not for the same reasons. This distinction illustrates that one cannot determine the difference in moral values between humans' and nonhuman species' lives.
When deciding rather to support or be against vivisections on nonhuman species, one has to consider and weigh the pros and cons of using nonhuman species to benefit their own species. Some would agree with Frey on his belief that humans are simply of greater moral value than animals. However, one would have to think about the reasons as to why humans are of greater moral value than animals. One also cannot ignore the fact that not all humans are of equal moral value but why is it okay to selectively sacrifice the lives of animals who are of lesser moral value but not humans that are of lesser moral value? Moreover, one may not agree with Frey's statement of "the threshold for taking lives of lesser value is lower than it is for taking lives of higher value (p.113)" because that statement is open to all lives of lesser value and not just to nonhuman species. Frey specifically states "when I speak of not all lives being equally valuable I am not referring only to the difference between animal and normal adult human lives; I refer also to human lives themselves (p.113)." Because of that statement, it seems as though not only is Frey supporting vivisections on animals but he is also supporting vivisections on not "normal adult" beings. Therefore, to avoid criticisms, Frey should simply state that animals have lesser moral value than humans rather than opening the comparisons to all human lives. Consequently, with the revised argument, one may support vivisections on nonhuman species if they solely believe that the lives of all human beings are of greater moral value than animals.
As mentioned above, if moral value ties in with moral rights, one cannot have moral rights without having moral values. To elaborate, if humans have more moral rights than animals, then obviously humans have the right to degrade the life of an animal, which then suggests that the animal has no moral value, or at least less moral value. However, in Animals and Their Medical Use, Frey does not mention moral rights at all. All he talks about is moral values and how they are dependent on ones richness and capacities in life. Richness and capacities can determine moral value for how capable one is at succeeding in life can determine their value. However, moral rights, in my opinion, is the main argument against vivisection because essentially, ones richness and capacities in life also determines their moral rights for the more powerful one is, the more rights one possesses. Therefore, if Frey was able to defend why violating nonhuman species' rights is acceptable as opposed to violating humans' rights, then he might be able to persuade many opponents of vivisections as to why vivisections is morally permissible.