Pros And Cons Of Rationalism

Rationalism has had it's fair degree of criticism throughout it's history and some have been stronger than others. One of these objections highlighted is that rationalism is prone to ultimate disparities: contrasting a priori insights can and do lead to a stalemate. The second objection is that there must be some form of metajustification for a priori justification. While strong rationalism seems to run into difficulties with these objections, BonJour's moderate rationalism manages to deal with them. This essay will analyze both of these objections and highlight BonJour's effective moderate rationalist responses.

The first objection to rationalism raised in Chapter 5 is that rationalism is prone to ultimate disparities. This means that two

people do not agree on a rational insight. It could be the case that one person holds an a priori insight that another person is simply doubtful of it or it could mean that two other people have completely contrasting a priori insights. Both of these situations are dangerous to the rationalist as there does not seem to be a clear resolution to this conflict. The two parties could either admit a stalemate or use non-rational means of persuasion. An objector could argue that a priori insight itself could be compromised by this kind of conflict: a priori insights do not seem epistemically valid if contrasting ones are honestly held by different people. This objection highlights the danger poised by disparities in a priori insight.

This objection is inherently problematic for strong rationalism. This is mainly due to the premise that strong rationalism rests upon the infallibility of rational insight (BonJour 142). While the strong rationalist could argue that these situations do not happen, the case remains that this empirical case is at least possible. While simply being doubtful of another's a priori insight may not necessarily undermine it, genuinely conflicting a priori insights do seem to be a reason to give up the insight's necessity (BonJour 142). After the various means of clarifying the meaning, clarifying the issue and talking around the issue have been expended, there does not seem to be another choice. Strong rationalism faces this crucial problem when facing this epistemic objection.

BonJour's moderate rationalism is perfectly capable of dealing with this issue. A good analogy to draw is to that of sense experience; simply because sense experience is not infallible, does not mean that it should be abandoned as a source of epistemic justification (BonJour 142). There is obviously disagreement among people when it comes to issues of sensory observation (even contrasting observations), this does not mean sense observation should be abandoned; the same applies to rational justification. The second defense BonJour offers is that this argument of contrasting subjects itself presupposes a priori insight itself. To throw the baby out with the bathwater would undermine the very process of argumentation itself. This is because an a priori justification is needed for a conclusion to follow from a set of premises (BonJour 143). This would mean that the objector would be self-defeating if trying to undermine rational insight entirely. BonJour makes an admirable defense of moderate rationalism against this objection

The second objection to rationalism highlighted is that there seems to be a demand for some sort of metajustification for a priori insight. There needs to be an external criterion that guarantees that the a priori insight is something that is epistemically valid rather than a simple psychological reason. This would be an overarching premise or principle that the beliefs which are the result of a priori insights are likely to be true (BonJour 143). The impetus for this claim is that one who appeals to rational insight must be tacitly appealing to this metajustification in order for his insight to have any validity at all (BonJour 143). This objection demands that a priori insight be backed up by a metajustification.

The problem with this demand for metajustification is that it seemingly undermines rationalism entirely. A metajustification for a priori insight would either be circular or empirical. If the metajustification for a priori justification is dependent on itself or on a priori insight than it is circular. If the metajusticiation depends on empirical reasoning than it is clearly not a priori but an a posteriori justified claim (BonJour 142). Rationalism is put into a difficult scenario; either it does not have a metajustification or it is undermined if it does. Rationalism risks being undermined by the process of metajustification.

The strong rationalist attempt to provide a metajustification for rational insight fails. The strong rationalist attempts a metajustfication by claiming that all a priori claims are infallible. The basic problem with their metajustification is that it is circular; the strong rationalist can only justify their metajustification on the basis of a priori insight (BonJour 144). Ignoring this, there is the issue on how this metajustification of infallibility could be reognized from a subjective standpoint (BonJour 144). It could not possible be argued as metaphysically necessary that finite beings like ourselves never make mistakes (BonJour 144). This would demand an empirical metajustification; beings like ourselves more likely are accurate than inaccurate (BonJour 144). The strong rationalist attempt to provide a metajustification on the basis of infallibility fails.

BonJour's moderate rationalism overcomes this objection by arguing that the demand for metajustification is a question-begging one.

By not holding a priori justification to be infallible, the moderate rationalist can get away with this claim. The objection presupposes that the proposition being justified is held as necessary or evident is not a reason to believe that it is true (BonJour 145). The objection assumes that rational insight has no epistemic justification in itself. Moderate rationalism holds that a priori justification is entirely possible to justify in an atomistic, autonomous sense; each insight is dependent upon itself (BonJour 146). These intuitive reasons could be false but the falsity must be shown rather than assumed (BonJour 146). BonJour's moderate rationalism manages to avoid this objection.

BonJour's moderate rationalism manages to deal with ultimate disparities in insight and the problem of metajustification in a way that strong rationalism could not. By arguing a more modest approach, BonJour has the benefits of the rationalist position without any of its faults. BonJour's moderate rationalism breathes new life into a previously outdated philosophy and brings it into modern relevance and importance. Rationalist epistemology is no longer something of mere historical

value.