This paper will provide a battle analysis of Operation Market Garden. Included will be a summary of the Allies forces and Axis Forces prior to the operation. Also covered will be the battle in a brief overview and an alternate ending for the battle. Operation Market Garden should have been a success if the Allies would have supplied ground with the proper support and XXX Army Corp had been able to destroy German opposition. The Allied operation consisted of two separate parts. Operation Market had the airborne units consisting of 1st British Airborne Division, 1st Polish Parachute Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, and 101st Airborne Division. Operation Garden was responsible for the ground forces 21st Army Group, XXX Corps, XII Corps, and …show more content…
The two Panzer divisions operating at fifty percent strength were able to react effectively to the airborne drop. During this early part of the battle the Germans were able to maneuver the 9th Panzer division to cover the Arnhem and Nijmegen bridges. The 9th Panzer Recon Battalion was able to destroy three of four British units attempting to secure the Arnhem Bridge. Airborne units began to dig in and prepare defensive positions in anticipation of the next day airdrops and XXX Corp armored forces. XXX Corps was able to push north to within 6 miles of 101st positions near Eindhoven. XXX Corp received heavy fighting from German forces and therefore was unable to breach German lines. On the 18th of September the XXX Corp, the 101st, and British engineers were able to secure the canal near Zon. British engineers began to conduct a bridging operation over the canal. Upon completion of tank capable bridges the road was clear all the way up to Nijmegen. XXX Corp continued towards the 82nd positions at Grave. 1st Airborne division was getting situation was getting worse as the German commander was able to gather enough combat power at Arnhem to bottle up the British …show more content…
The operation should have commenced with elements of the 101st Airborne evenly distributed among drop zones surrounding the objectives. This would lead to quickly securing the bridges and enable 101st to send reconnaissance elements south to support the XXX Corps effort to link up with forward elements. The 82nd would conduct air drops evenly distributed among objectives that would enable them to quickly secure bridges and would be able to support 1st British Airborne units to the north. The 1st British Airborne division would make their air drops south of the Neder Rhine River with the elements securing the corridor for XXX Corp. Based on the logistics capability this is the best option as it gives the Germans less time to react to the initial attack. The 1st British Airborne could then provide XXX Corp the support by fire positions needed for a break through German lines. XXX Corp would be able to flank the weak side defenses of the Germans and secure the bridge at Arnhem. This would draw the Germans to move reserve forces north to protect the homeland and the industrial section of the German war production. Operation’s main goal would be to secure and defend the bridge at Arnhem, provide the Allied forces to conduct a two prong attack into Germany and to destroy Germany's production of war equipment. Securing and defending the bridges would be the limit of advance until combat power and
Unfortunately for the entire army group, Operation Market Garden was to be planned in 7 days. Major General Urquhart’s report on Operation Market states that there was adequate time for the planning of the mission but that due to the necessary risk of multiple airlifts over three days led to the divisions fighting strength to be that of a brigade. In his planning of this Operation, Major General Urquhart had requested more Allied gliders and planes, but seemed content enough to go ahead with the
The purpose of this paper is to perform a mission command analysis of the Battle of Gettysburg, honing in on Pickett’s Charge. The Battle of Gettysburg took place on July 1st through July 3rd in 1863 in the town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The belligerents were the Army of the Potomac, led by MG George G. Meade and the Army of Northern Virginia, led by GEN Robert E. Lee. The goal is to analyze the decisions of GEN Lee using the six mission command principles described in the Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 and then assess the outcome of those decisions.
At daybreak, August 19th, 1942, the Allies began their raid on the French coastal city of Dieppe occupied by Germany. The raid has extreme Canadian significance, as it pertains to 5000 Canadians involved in the campaign, 3,350 of which became casualties and 916 died on the bloodstained beach at Dieppe. The Dieppe raid is widely considered a failure on every level and has left a dreadful mark in Canadian military history because of how poorly it panned out. Operation Jubilee remains one of the most hotly debated Allied aspects of the war. Tactically, it was a complete failure as little to no objectives were attained. This essay will explain that Dieppe failed because of the tactical errors on the part of the Allies, in conjunction with the fact the entire operation was very poorly planned out. It will do so by discussing 4 major points: poor allied planning, how Dieppe was a difficult place to attack, that the assault was launched for political rather than military reasons and finally, how it failed to upgrade morale.
During the World War II there was many different aspects on the Allies side that helped them defeat the Axis Powers. One crucial aspect for the Allies was the well-built airborne divisions. The 82nd Airborne Division, from the United States Army, was considered to be the firmest and most successful division during the Second World War. After being reactivated for World War II, the men of the 82nd Airborne division took on intense training to later on take part in some of the most dangerous missions of World War II.
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
Cameron, R. S. (2003). The army vision: The 4th AD in world war II. Military Review, 83(6), 59-68
...route called for them to cross the river at Gemund, but the bridge was heavily guarded. CPT Baum sent for a recon of the bridge; and while waiting, they were attacked. In a matter of seconds, they lost three tanks and several men were injured or missing (himself and LT Nutto were amongst the injured). This forced CPT Baum to order the task force north to find an alternate route. Heading north, they found a crossing point to cross the Sinn River at Burginissm. Once across, they headed east towards the town of Grafendorf. At Grafendorf, the task force found approximately 700 Russian laborers being guarded by 200 German soldiers. They liberated the Russians and transferred the German Soldiers to them. They crossed the Saale river and employed (captured) two locals to help them find and navigate to their objective—this was the final stretch to their destination.
In this paper, I will provide a Battle Analysis and outline the events leading up to and surrounding the Battle of 73 Eastings (refers to a north-south grid line). In addition, I will describe how the United States Army’s (USA) 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment (ACR) defeated forces from the Iraqi Republican Guard (IRG) using speed, technology and superior combat power. Although some consider the Battle of 73 Eastings extremely successful, some consider it a failure due to the large amount of Iraqi forces that retreated towards Bagdad. Lastly, I will analyze how each side used their intelligence assets and what they could have used to change the outcome.
"War Memories: Plotting the Battle of Britain." Letter. 9 Dec. 2003. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. BBC WW2 People's War.
O'Neill, William L. World War II: A Student Companion. New York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print.
Field, Frank. British and French Operations of the First World War. Cambridge (England); New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Warfare was in a state of transition. Older commanders and generals in the French and British militaries were very cavalry and infantry focused. These commanders believed that cavalry, infantry, and artillery would assure victory in any circumstance, against any foe. They clung to the static tactics of the bygone World War I era. World War I had been fought primarily on French soil, and the military as well as the government never wanted that to happen again, therefore they wanted to reinforce their main border against any future German. Little did they know that only twenty two years later they would be bested by German forces in a way that would shock the world. This research will be analyzing many important assumptions, oversights,...
The largest airborne operation ever organized, Market-Garden cost the Allies between 15,130 and 17,200 killed, wounded, and captured. The bulk of these occurred in the British 1st Airborne Division which began the battle with 10,600 men and saw 1,485 killed and 6,414 captured. German losses numbered between 7,500 and 10,000. Having failed to capture the bridge over the Lower Rhine at Arnhem, the operation was deemed a failure as the subsequent offensive into Germany could not proceed. The failure of Market-Garden has been attributed to a multitude of factors ranging from intelligence failures, overly optimistic planning, poor weather, and the lack of tactical initiative on the part of commanders. Despite its failure, Montgomery remained an advocate of the plan calling it "90% successful."
O’Neill, William L. World War II A Student Companion. 1 ed. William H. Chafe. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
After assuming leadership of Germany’s airborne development, Student quashed this concept immediately. He stated “I could not accept the saboteur force concept. It was a daredevil idea but I did not see minor operations of this kind as worthwhile. In my view airborne troops could become a battle-winning factor of prime importance.” The distinction to be made here is that these raids or saboteur missions are conducted as strategic harassment, not in support of another operation. Examples of this would be destruction of bridges to harass supply chains, destruction of radar stations, or any other small action which does not directly contribute to an offensive. The “raid” on the Eben-Emael fortress in Belgium, one of the most famous German airborne successes of the war, would therefore fall under the second category of close-in direct tactical support rather than a