At daybreak, August 19th, 1942, the Allies began their raid on the French coastal city of Dieppe occupied by Germany. The raid has extreme Canadian significance, as it pertains to 5000 Canadians involved in the campaign, 3,350 of which became casualties and 916 died on the bloodstained beach at Dieppe. The Dieppe raid is widely considered a failure on every level and has left a dreadful mark in Canadian military history because of how poorly it panned out. Operation Jubilee remains one of the most hotly debated Allied aspects of the war. Tactically, it was a complete failure as little to no objectives were attained. This essay will explain that Dieppe failed because of the tactical errors on the part of the Allies, in conjunction with the fact the entire operation was very poorly planned out. It will do so by discussing 4 major points: poor allied planning, how Dieppe was a difficult place to attack, that the assault was launched for political rather than military reasons and finally, how it failed to upgrade morale.
One of the reasons that Dieppe failed so miserably is that their leadership, Louis Mountbatten in particular, planned very poorly for the operation. Firstly, the attack failed to use strategies that had proved to be extremely effective, and that should have been logical. The attack took place in daylight, which was a product of the Allies woefully underestimating the German opposition. Mountbatten was quoted to calling Dieppe “a piece of cake” proving how aloof he was to the strength of the German opposition. On top of that, intelligence reports indicated that Dieppe was not heavily defended. They could not have been more mistaken. The Germans had copious advance notice about the raid, eliminating an...
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Neillands, Robin. The Dieppe Raid: The Story of the Disastrous 1942 Expedition.
Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2005. Print.
O'Keefe, David. David O’Keefe: Licenced To loot. National Post Full Comment David
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Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955. Print.
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Atkinson argues that the North African campaign was a "pivot point in American history, the place where the United States began to act like a great power militarily, diplomatically, strategically, and tactically" (3). More importantly, he believes that World War II was the "greatest story of the twentieth century, like all great stories, it was bottomless, [and that] no comprehensive understanding of the victory of May 1945 is possible without understanding the earlier campaigns in Africa and Italy" (655). He supports this argument well in over 500 pages of material.
One of Currie’s most impressive and important achievements had come during the winter or 1919-17, while he was still a divisional commander. By analyzing the fighting he had witnessed on the Western Front, Currie had drawn up what proved to be a blueprint for tactical success. In a paper, Currie synthesized the best of British and French concepts, and with many of his own beliefs based on personal experience. Under Sir Arthur Currie, the Canadian Corps emerged as an outstanding formation on the ...
With careful planning, co-operation, good leadership and courage, Currie managed to bring out the characteristics of a well thought out success at Vimy Ridge in April of 1917 (Dancocks, 1985). Sir Arthur Currie’s responsibility was to command the 1st Canadian Division (Hyatt, 1987). He pushed his troops to undergo rigorous training and to prepare themselves by using a life-size course, with every trench marked by tape and a flag (Dancocks, 1985). Currie designed very accurate maps and he had a small-scale plasticine model built so that it could be studied by all soldiers. Arthur Currie insisted that his division’s knowledge of the enemy was excellent (Dancocks, 1985).
In the study of Canadian military history the Avro Arrow has become a buzzword found on the lips of all technological, political and even airforce enthusiast. At the risk of seeming unoriginal in topic selection, this critique reviews the fascinating biography, Fall of an Arrow, by Murray Peden. Peden's historical biography accurately covers a variety of aspects of the A. V. Row Arrow, from specifics in military capability, to competing technological and political/economic significance. This critical evaluation of the mentioned secondary source sets out to evaluate the work as a historical source, focussing on evidence of bias, the apparent coherence of arguments and finally the effectiveness of Peden's underlying points.
2004 [9] The Loyal Edmonton Regiment Museum. 27 December2001 [10]Reid. Brian. Canada at war and peace volume 1. Esprit Dr corps Books [11] Canadians and Conflicts.
Before the General Strike, the Canadian government was fully invested in WWI, whereas most Canadian citizens were not; the dissonance urged industrial workers to unionize. From the beginning of Canada’s involvement in the Great War, their industrial complex mass-produced supplies and armaments for the Allied Powers. Most Canadian citizens had no qualms with the shift in the job market until there were not enough workers to produce the basic material goods necessary within Canada’s borders. The citizens began to form groups, seemingly in opposition of the government and its advocacy for war. To the Canadian government, this was incredibly concerning, presenting the possi...
Zuehlke, Mark. Terrible Victory: First Canadian Army and the Scheldt Estuary Campaign, September 13-November 6, 1944. Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2007. 15. Print.
Weigley, Russel F. History of the United States Army. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1st Edition, 1984.
Because of Canada’s boost in the industrial economy and its status in World War II, job options were abundant. By 1942 there was a full employment as hundreds and thousands of Canadian men and women found work in war industries.
When the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps was established in May of 1942,2 women were not conscripted like their husbands, fathers, and brothers;3 their service was wholly voluntary, and as such the WAC had difficulty acquiring its projected quota. A variety of theories had been proposed in an effort to explain this shortage of volunteers. For example, some presumed that since America, unlike Europe, was not being bombed, the women here did not feel a similar sense of urgency to join the Army. This excuse, however, was considered unacceptable because Canada, a country which also remained unscathed, seemed to have no problem with female recruitment. By the year 1944, more than 37,000 of the 12,000,000 Canadian women had joined the armed forces, as opposed to the 175,000 of the 135,000,000 American women.4 Others suggested that many women felt obliged to stay home in order to support their parents or friends whose sons or husbands had already gone to war.5 One Saturday Evening Post writer even bla...
Field, Frank. British and French Operations of the First World War. Cambridge (England); New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
One of the major historical events that strengthened Canada’s identity was World War II. About one out of ten Canadians served in the war and many sacrificed their lives for the freedom and the will to defeat the force of aggression (The Axis powers), in hopes of having a better world. Represented by the hard-fought battles of the determined citizens and heroic soldiers, Canada was able to make one of the most significant contributions towards the war. Utilizing each of the military branches effectively, Canadians were able to display their strength further than most of the countries. Especially in the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic and D-day, Canada showed their impressive and tactical demonstration of their ability. Not only
Works Cited Horne, Alistair. A.S.A. & Co. To Lose a Battle: France, 1940. New York: Penguin, 1990. Jackson, Julian.
It began to emerge the differences in tactics. The question was whether to continue so far the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Forces Europe, General Eisenhower’s tactics attacking on a broad front, or due to problems of supply to take just one mighty blow. In that period Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery developed a new operation plan, which would include the use of 1st Airborne Army (Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton), actually 1st Airborne Corps (Lieutenant General Frederick Browning). The Corps comprised of 82nd US Airborne Division (Brigadier General James M. Gavin), 101st US Airborne Division (Major General Maxwell D. Taylor), and 1st British Airborne Division (Major General Robert “Roy” E. Urquhart) supported with, under his command, 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade (Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski). These units should be dropped along the roa...
O’Neill, William L. World War II A Student Companion. 1 ed. William H. Chafe. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.