Introduction
After the major series of island hopping in the Pacific, it came down to the decision to invade Okinawa to support the overall strategic plan of tightening the noose and strangling Japan with the ultimate goal of Japan’s unconditional surrender. The Ryukyu islands were an integral part of the Japanese defenses and the seizure and operationalization of the airfields on the islands would allow for the possibility to strike Japan’s homeland with strategic bombing campaigns. Although the US had material advantages over the Japanese throughout the Pacific theater there were no guarantees that the US would be successful without detailed planning and analysis of the Japanese forces in the Ryukyus. This paper will analyze the important operational elements as they relate to the planning and preparation for the landing on Okinawa (Operation Iceberg)
Discussion
First, it is important to look at the time, space, force considerations of the Allied forces in the Pacific. The US wanted the unconditional surrender of Japan and in respect to time they preferred to end the war quickly. It was very important that the US forces continue to put continuous pressure on the Japanese and to maintain a constant blockade which gradually became tighter as the war continued. The US had plans to take both Luzon and Iwo Jima while leaping toward the Ryukyu island chain but must be able to give the forces enough time to regain composure and prepare the troops for another battle. The timeframe for the operation was set for March or early April which would give the troops adequate time to plan and prepare as well as mitigate possible weather concerns for the May typhoon season.
While looking at the space considerations, the two separate force...
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... distance, timeframes, and limited equipment in which to deliver the supplies across the AO. One of the most impressive pieces of the logistics planning is that the timeline for the supplies stretched out until 210 days after the initial landing.
Conclusion
It is clear to see that the efforts and time that was put into the planning process to invade Okinawa was a massive endeavor given the time, space and force constraints that were mentioned early in this paper. From the information gained from the readings and the outcomes from the battle of Okinawa, one can see that maximization of operational art in regards to all the planning was necessary to have a successful outcome.
Works Cited
Appleman, Roy E. 1948. Okinawa: The last battle. United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific. Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army
After a quick examination of the recurring theme of Japanese military arrogance, I will argue that the three most compelling strategies that the Japanese could have pursued in the spring of 1942 were, one – to consolidate the most important resource gains that were already made; two – commence immediate planning for a strong anti-submarine warfare campaign; and three – coordinate significant operations with Japan’s Axis partners, particularly in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Asia theaters of conflict.
Weigley, Russel F. History of the United States Army. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1st Edition, 1984.
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
Whitman, Edward C.. “Rising to Victory: The Pacific Submarine Strategy in World War II.” Accessed November 25, 2013. http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html.
In 1942, World War II had been raging for three years. The United States of America have declared war upon the Axis powers following the devastating Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor. At this point in the war the Allies are in a grave situation. German forces have pushed the British off mainland Europe, and the Japanese have conquered much of the Pacific region, coming increasingly nearer to the American mainland. In order to combat this rising threat, the American military headship began to search for viable alternatives to replace widely used established tactics. The motive for this search for irregular methods the fact that the Allied forces were not strong enough to meet the Axis powers on a conventional
“Pacific Situation Declared Eased by Battle of Midway.” Los Angeles Times 10 June 1942: 2 ProQuest. Web. 13 March 2014.
Unified Land Operations defines the army operational design methodology (ADM) as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. The operational design methodology incorporated into army doctrine serves as a method to compliment the military decision making process (MDMP). Although the ADM it is often confused with replacing MDMP, its purpose is to address complex problems from a nonlinear approach. ADM helps the commander to answer questions to problems. However, only a collaborative effort of an operation planning team (OPT) will achieve the approach to answering complex problems. Doctrine alone does not provide the answer to complex problems, but rather offers a guide to solve them. To conceptualize the MDMP, planners must incorporate ADM to provide a better understanding, visualization, and description of the problem. The purpose of this paper is to provide the framework to support why ADM is required in the MDMP.
Gailey, Harry. The War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay. Novato: Presidio, 1995.
Beginning on June 4th 1942, the Battle of Midway took place six months after the United States became involved in World War two due to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. After the French collapse in World War two, Japan seized the undefended territory of Indochina and also began moving into China. In response to these harsh moves, the United States and England placed oil embargos on Japan. Relying heavily upon imported oil, the embargos would ultimately cause Japanese industry to stop production. Japan’s response to these unwanted sanctions were moves to overtake various Pacific islands which could provide the mother country with oil. The Japanese knew that the American response to these actions would be war, so it initiated the impending war with an attack on Pearl Harbor in order to cripple the American fleet. As Japan gained ground in the Pacific early in the war, the Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto decided that the only way to win the war was to destroy the American aircraft carrier fleet. In order to destroy the American carrier fleet it would be necessary to draw the carriers into an all-out battle while staying away from the heavily fortified land defenses of most United States bases. The Japanese admiral decided that the island atoll of Midway would b...
Cressman, Robert J.; et al. (1990). "A Glorious page in our history", Adm. Chester Nimitz, 1942: the Battle of Midway, 4–6 June 1942. Missoula, Mont.: Pictorial Histories Pub. Co.ISBN 0-929521-40-4.
5. Margiotta, Franklin D., Ed. “Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Military History and Biography”, Washington: Brassey’s, Inc. 1994
The Battle of Midway by Craig L. Symonds is an in depth look at the events and decisions both before and during The Battle of Midway, which started on June 4th, 1942. Symonds uses a combination of words, pictures, and maps to drive home his message in a beautifully crafted work. Over all the book focuses on the war in the Pacific starting from just after Pearl Harbor and then focusing in on The Battle of Midway. The author uses the Americans, as well as the Japanese, point of view to portray the many factors of war at sea. Throughout his novel, Symonds investigates the many aspects that would lead to an American victory as well as a turning point of the war in the Pacific. “A history of what is perhaps the most pivotal naval battle in American history necessarily must explore the culture of both the U.S. Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, as well as the politics and technology of the age.” (Symonds 5).
Retrieved from http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/okinawa/chapter1.htm
The Battle of Midway came about when the Japanese wished to extend their Pacific control, broaching the idea to initiate a battle against the U.S. Navy. After the Japanese success at Pearl Harbor and their success coming to a standstill at Coral Sea one month earlier, Japanese commander, Admiral Yamamoto, had belief that it was necessary to hold a full battle at Midway as a deciding engagement. He thought that the Japanese had an increased chance of success, being that the U.S. had a certain disadvantage, only having two carriers since they had sunk U.S.S. Yorktown at Coral Sea, compared to the Japanese's 6 carriers, but the ship had been repaired. He also wanted to get revenge for the Doolittle Raid, an air attack on Tokyo performed by U.S. forces. To receive the Pacific gain Yamamoto so desired, he wanted to first attract a large portion of the U.S. fleet away from Midway, where they would attack, bringing the American Navy a fatal surprise. Yamamoto attempted to pull this idea through by launching an attack on the Alaskan Coast to drag the Americans North, then proceeding to attack on Midway. The Alaskan trap was just a waste of resources, the submarines sent to attack the U.S. were too late, the U.S. already knew of their plans. To the Japanese's surprise, U.S. forces were awaiting the Japanese arrival on June 4, 1942. Yamamoto had to con...
Leckie, Robert. Okinawa: The Last Battle of World War II. New York: Penguin Group, 1995. Print.