Operation Anaconda Essay

Abstract

In this paper, I will review and analyze a case study on an operation that took place in March of 2002, titled “Operation Anaconda”. The case study was written by Richard Kulger. The operation utilized a collaboration of multi-national elements which comprised of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), other U.S. military units, friendly Afghan troops (mainly consisted of Pushtun militia), and SOF units from other nations to rid the Shahikot Valley of the Taliban and al Queda in the valley. In analyzing the case study I will reference the Army’s six principles to mission command (Build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create a shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission

orders, and accept prudent risk) to discuss and show where the senior leaders utilized these principles to plan the operation and discuss some potential lessons learned from this operation to better prepare for future operations.

Were the six principles of mission command utilized in the planning of Operation Anaconda? In reviewing the case study we will be able to provide clear and concise evidence that will show that the principles of mission command were used. Operation Anaconda was an operation that was deemed a success, but not without its setbacks. Originally the operation was planned and expected to cover a length of three days. Due to the lack of solid intelligence the operation, in fact, covered a span of 17 days.
Build cohesive teams through mutual trust
“Mutual trust is shared confidence among commanders, subordinates, and partners” (Headquarters, 2014).

The SOF units of both the U.S. and other participating nations, U.S. military units, and friendly Afghan troops were not allotted sufficient time to build the cohesiveness that’s is required for a high-level operation of this magnitude. Although the U.S. is formalized and standardized throughout every branch, the friendly Afghan troops that took part in the operation weren’t of the “Northern Alliance, whose forces were battle trained, tested, and capable of serious operations” (Kugler, 2007); but instead were from the Eastern Alliance. The Eastern alliance was a collection of individual locals Pushtun militia. The local militia was led by Zia Lodin who was a local warlord. Respected and eager to assist, “he and his subordinate commanders lacked experience in big battles” (Kugler, 2007). For this reason in the preceding weeks of the operation, the U.S. SOF advisors began to train and organize the militia in combat operations. Typically, training two to three months is required to train individuals for an operation of this magnitude, but the SOF Advisors were only provided a month. Will this in mind the SOF Advisors felt that the militia still wasn’t ready for the battle ahead, which didn’t allow for a cohesive

team.
Create a Shared Understanding
In building a cohesive team through mutual trust, commanders must create a shared understanding. “Shared understanding and purpose form the basis for unity of effort and trust” (Headquarters, 2014). Though the cohesiveness was diminished due to insufficient time to fully train the friendly Afghan forces and Coalition and Joint Task Force Commanding authority, a shared understanding of the overall goal of the operation was developed by all participating elements. Even though the original plan for Operation Anaconda was an unsatisfying plan for General Frank, but as time went on and the plan was enriched; he and LTG Mikolashek became satisfied. MG Hagenbeck, Commander of the Army’s 10th Mountain Division (and later on Commander of the Coalition and Joint Task Force), issued formalized orders for the operation. With the orders issued, that allowed each Task Force involved the understanding of the “hammer and anvil” plan and what their specific role in the plan was.
Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
In order for a shared understanding, commanders must provide a clear commander’s intent. A clear commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command. The commander’s intent was clear and concise in stating that the overall objective of the mission was to “root out enemy Taliban and al Queda forces that had gathered in this valley” (Kugler, 2007) and furthermore the commander’s intent was elaborated more so when General Hagenbeck issued out the orders for the plan, which explained each Task Force’s objective roles in detail.
Exercise Discipline Initiative
With the commander’s intent clearly understood, situations may arise in that require changes to be made. That brings in the next principle of mission command, which is exercise discipline initiative. Exercising discipline initiative means taking “action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise” (Headquarters, 2014). The intelligence provided was faulty in estimating the number of enemy troops, enemy armor, civilian population in that valley, and enemy available weaponry; in the earlier days of the operation, changes were needed. “On March 2, Task Force Mountain issued a call for help from U.S. air forces, which were not originally viewed as an integral part of Operation Anaconda, but now had become vital” (Kugler, 2007). It was learned that the operation would have to transition from a mainly ground focus operation to an air fires focus operation. Adaptations during the course of battle proved vital to saving of friendly forces lives and accomplishing the overall mission of Operation Anaconda.
Use Mission Orders
“On February 20, General Hagenbeck issued his formal order for the plan” (Kugler, 2007). Mission orders are utilized by commanders direct and guide the forces focus on achieving the main objective of the mission. General Hagenbeck’s formalized orders provided the information needed so that all participates were aware of the plan for conducting the operation. Although the plan changed due to unforeseen situations on the ground; utilizing the initial mission orders that provided a baseline for the operation to adapt to the changing situation on the ground enabled a successful operation.
Accept Prudent Risk
Though the plan for the operation had been established and orders were issued out, accepting prudent risk is something that commanders must do in order for operation or missions to undergo. “Prudent risk is a deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss when the commander judges the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment as worth the cost” (Headquarters, 2014). The prudent risk was accepted when the number of enemy troops, enemy armor and weaponry, and civilian population in the valley were uncertain. Additionally, the number of troops and armor needed for an operation of this magnitude was an acceptable risk, based on the intelligence that was provided.
Conclusion
After reviewing the case study on “Operation Anaconda”, we were able observe how the six principles of mission command (build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create a shared understanding, create a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk) were utilized in the planning of the operation.