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Schlieffen plan failure
Schlieffen plan intended to work
The schlieffen plan
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“One either lets me do as I want or one gives me concrete orders,” General Donrad Krafft von Dellmensingen, German Sixth Army Chief of Staff responsed when it was suggested he suspend offensive employment of his army.
The First Battle of the Marne, also classified as the most, “significant land battle of the twentieth century,” impresses one for its scale, decisiveness, and devastating use of rapid small arms fire, machine guns, hand grenades, and artillery. From 5 through 11 September, Germany and France each fielded over 2 million men (British 130,000) between Paris and Verdun. The most modern military technology to date was brought to bear by both sides to terrible effect. During the month of August, each country suffered 200,000 casualties with an additional 300,000 casualties occurring during early September near the river banks of the Marne. Also called the most decisive land battle since Waterloo in 1815, The First Battle of the Marne had immediate operational and strategic impact on World War One. Operationally, the German occupation of Paris was halted, France’s armies avoided destruction, and the British maintained their position on the European continent. Strategically, both armies were doomed to trench warfare and thus a murderous four year stalemate where international casualties would be counted in the tens of millions. The person most responsible for Germany losing the First Battle of the Marne is General Helmuth Johannes Ludwig Von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff and senior member of the Oberste-Heereslieitung (OHL), German Army Supreme Command. Moltke failed to effectively lead the German Army, understand the operational environment, assess the battle, describe clear directives, and to direct his ...
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... History. London: Octopus Publishing Group Ltd, 2003.
U.S. Army. Army Doctrine Reference Publication: The Operations Process. Washington D.C.: U.S. Army, 2012.
2. Journal Articles
Groß, Gerhard P. "There Was a Schlieffen Plan: New Sources on the History of German Military Planning." War In History (EBSCOhost ) 15, no. 4 (2008): 389-431.
Mombauer, Annika. Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War. London: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Mombauer, Annika, and Richard Spall. "Battle of the Marne: Myths and Realityof Germany's “Fateful Battle." Historian (EBSCOhost) 68, no. 4 (2006): 747-769.
Zuber, Terrence. "Everybody Knows There Was a 'Schlieffen Plan': A Reply to Annika Mombauer." War In History (EBSCOhost ) 15, no. 1 (2008): 92-101.
Zuber, Terrence. "The Schlieffen Plan--Fantasy or Catastrophe?" History Today (EBSCOhost ) 52, no. 9 (2002): 40-46.
criticized for this, he stood by his decision stating that he knew the Russians would force the army into the cold harsh, Russian winter, such as the case of Napoleon. Even though Schlieffen came up with this wonderful and well thought out plan, his successor, General von Moltke, changed the plans entirely.
"Queen's University Archives - World War I." Queen's University Archives - Home. Web. 23 July 2010.
The First World War witnessed an appalling number of casualties. Due partly to this fact, some historians, developed the perception that commanders on both sides depended on only one disastrous approach to breaking the stalemate. These historians attributed the loss of life to the reliance on soldiers charging across no-man’s land only to be mowed down by enemy machineguns. The accuracy of this, however, is fallacious because both the German’s and Allies developed and used a variety of tactics during the war. The main reason for battlefield success and eventual victory by the Allies came from the transformation of battlefield tactics; nevertheless, moral played a major role by greatly affecting the development of new tactics and the final outcome of the war.
Bard, Mitchell G. The Complete Idiot's Guide to world War II, Macmillan Publishing, New York, New York, 1999
Treitschke, Heinrich. “History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century and Historical and Political Writings.” The Human Record. By Alfred J. Andrea and James H. Overfield. Vol. 2. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2011. 2 vols. 292-295.
Martel Gordon. The Origins of the First World War. Malaysia: Pearson Education Limited, 2003. Print.
Grayzel, Susan R. The First World War: A Brief History with Documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2013. Print.
O'Neill, William L. World War II: A Student Companion. New York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print.
The Origins of the Second World War, by A.J.P. Taylor, proposes and investigates unconventional and widely unaccepted theories as to the underlying causes of World War Two. Taylor is British historian who specialized in 20th century diplomacy, and in his book claims that as a historian his job is to “state the truth” (pg. xi) as he sees it, even if it means disagreeing with existing prejudices. The book was published in 1961, a relatively short time after the war, and as a result of his extreme unbias the work became subject to controversy for many years.
Von Der Porten, Edward P. The German Navy in World War II. New York: Thomas Y.
Failure of the Schlieffen Plan This has been a question discussed many times. Well, one problem that was
Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen was a German field marshal who served as the Chief of the Imperial German General Staff from 1891 to 1906. He is known for the Schlieffen Plan, a strategic plan designed to defeat Russia and France, which involved fighting both fronts at the same time.
Zink, Harold. (1957) The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 [online]. Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand [cited 12th September 2011]. Available from:
Rickard, J. "Barthélemy Catherine Joubert." History of War. 27 Jan. 2009. Web. 15 Apr. 2011.
Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.