Question D The story of the defeat of the League of Nations in the United States Senate is by now legend. The story is often told as a failure of compromise: it was not Wilson’s staunchest opponents but his firmest supporters who defeated the League Covenant by refusing to support it in its amended form. However, the nature of this failed compromise is revealing. As McDougall writes, “the familiar dichotomies between an old and new diplomacy, isolationism and internationalism, idealism and realism, distort our image of the debate over the League of Nations” (McDougall, 124). Though Wilson was surely a headstrong character, his supporters were not simply stubborn in refusing to compromise, given that the nature of the compromise determined …show more content…
whether or not the treaty was enforceable. The ambiguity about the legal nature of the commitment of the United States to support League Nations in Article X struck to the very core of the difficulty of creating such a treaty of international cooperation. Article X required that all League Nations come to the aid of any member nation experiencing external aggression. The legal, practical, and moral implications of such a requirement were not adequately discussed or debated by the Senate and the President. If the meaning and viability of a treaty are determined by its enforceability, then the confusion around the meaning of Article X posed a fundamental challenge to the adoption of the treaty. The failure to resolve the question of America’s obligations in the case of a foreign war prevented the United States Senate from ratifying the Treaty of Versailles. The seeds of the League of Nations were sown long before the Treaty of Versailles.
Wilson desired to improve the global order before the United States’ entry into the Great War. In fact, U.S. entry was in part delayed because Wilson “believed that remaining above the battle was the only way that he, Wilson, could exert the moral authority needed to end the war on terms that would make for a lasting peace.” (McDougall, 132). In 1916, Wilson articulated a doctrine of international relations that set aside the policy of non-intervention established by Washington. Wilson called the United States “participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world.” He claimed that the fate of the United States was intertwined with the fate of other nations: “The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest…must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy…” In this 1916 speech he already laid out the idea of an “association of nations” and said that “the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and make them safe against violation….God grant that the dawn of that day of frank dealing and of settled peace, concord, and cooperation may be near at hand!” (McDougall, 123). When it came time to make the peace agreement at Versailles, Wilson insisted on the idea of a League of Nations along with the British ambassador and the representative for South Africa. …show more content…
At the drawing up of the Treaty of Versailles, Wilson submitted his draft proposal along with Lord Robert Cecil and Jan Smuts. Wilson showed great foresight when he complained in his 1885 book Congressional Government about the frustrating obstacles produced by what he considered to be an overly conservative system of checks and balances.
He complained in particular of the need to have the Senate ratify treaties, arguing that the president’s only means of “compelling compliance on the part of the Senate lies in his initiative in negotiation, which affords him a chance to get the country into such scrapes, so pledged in the view of the world to certain courses of action, that the Senate hesitates to bring about the appearance of dishonor which would follow its refusal to ratify false promises” (McDougall, 127). Wilson was not able to bully the Senate into ratification of the treaty, regardless of the impression this made on the world stage. Wilson’s opponents in the senate fell into two camps: the “Irreconcilables” and the “Reservationists”. The “Irreconcilables” categorically opposed the League Covenant. Led by old Progressive Republican senators like William Borah of Idaho and Hiram Johnson of California, “They opposed membership in any kind of organization resembling the League. This group especially feared being drawn in to defend the interests of such colonial powers as Great Britain and France. Instead, most Irreconcilables wanted to focus on problems at home and, when they did act abroad, to show sympathy for revolutions in Russia and China” (LaFeber, 325). Hiram Johnson articulated “I
am opposed to American boys policing Europe and quelling riots in every new nation’s backyard” (LaFeber, 326). On the other hand, the “Reservationists’’ did not categorically oppose the League of Nations but had reservations about the treaty. Led by Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the group also included Hughes, Taft, and Hoover. The main reservation of the “Reservationists” focused on Article X of the Treaty, which required that all League Nations come to the aid of any member nation experiencing external aggression. The ambiguity in Article X was whether it committed the U.S. legally to go to war if one of the nations in the League was attacked. This was a particular problem because generally the decision to go to war is made by the U.S. Congress. Article X of the treaty reads: “The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.” (Covenant of the League of Nations). LaFeber argues that Article X seemed to “[lock] the United States into having to act with the weakening European colonial powers.” (LaFeber, 327). Those opposing Article X believed that it would force the United States into supporting failing imperial projects. Wilson tried to defend the flexibility of the commitment, saying it “constitutes a very grave and solemn moral obligation. But it is a moral, not a legal obligation, and leaves our Congress absolutely free…It is binding in conscience only, not in law.” (LaFeber, 327). Both LaFeber and McDougall describe WIlson’s response as noncommittal and unconvincing. He did not seriously answer the question as to the legal ramifications of the Treaty. Senators were not convinced by Wilson’s argument and were concerned, for instance, that they would be forced to support Japan in keeping Shantung from the Chinese. Senator Root said in criticism of the ambiguity of Article X “If it is necessary for the security of western Europe that we should agree to the support of France if attacked, then let us agree to do that particular thing plainly…But let us not wrap up such a purpose in a vague universal obligation.” (McDougall, 143) Senator Lodge proposed the amendment of Fourteen Points to the Treaty to remove any automatic commitment for the United States. The reservations undid many of the treaty’s provisions. The reservation which dismissed Article X says: “2. The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between nations -- whether members of the League or not -- under the provisions of Article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide.” The amendment meant that the United States would not be obligated to protect a nation being attacked. Since this was the main mechanism of the treaty to maintain peace, Lodge’s amendment took away the force of the treaty. (http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=3909) Wilson refused to accept Lodge’s reservations, as they took the teeth out of the treaty. “I shall consent to nothing, Wilson said. “The Senate must take its medicine.” (McDougall, 142) It was therefore not the “Irreconcilables” who were to blame for the final failure of ratification, but Democratic supporters of Wilson’s original vision who refused to vote for a treaty with Lodge’s reservations. On November 19, the treaty (which contained Lodge’s 14 additions) was defeated 39 to 55, both by the opponents of the League and by Democrats loyal to Wilson who voted against Lodge’s amendments. On March 19, 1920, the Senate voted again. They had a majority (49 to 35), but did not have the necessary two thirds. It was 12 Irreconcilables and 23 Wilsonian Democrats who refused to compromise because of the reservations amended. The Treaty of Versailles was never signed by the United States. In 1921, the U.S. signed separate peace treaties with Germany and Austria. Many blame the failure of the U.S. to sign the Treaty of Versailles on Wilson’s stubbornness and egotism. After Wilson’s death, Lodge wrote that “Mr. Wilson in dealing with every great question thought first of himself. He may have thought of the country next, but there was a long interval…Mr. Wilson was devoured by the desire for power.” (McDougall, 145). It is possible to interpret the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles as a consequence of Wilson’s egotism. And yet, this misses the very real problems posed by Lodge’s amendment. If the U.S. was not bound to protect the territorial authority of other League Nations, what would its ratification of the treaty have amounted to? At the same time, Lodge’s reservations were warranted. A commitment to defend against aggression is a commitment to war. As McDougall writes, “Senators concerned that the League Covenant contradicted existing U.S. policy: “Wilson’s League “(a) would not work without force, in which case it was a league to make war, not peace; (b) was futile, since, like the Holy Alliance, it implied an attempt to freeze the global status quo; (c) was imprudent, since it would involve the United States in conflicts where its interests were not at stake; (d) violated the power of Congress over war, immigration, and tariffs; or (e) contradicted the true meaning of Exceptionalism, Unilateralism, and the American System.” (McDougall, 141) The senators worried that the League would involve the United States in foreign wars rather than serve as a mechanism of peace. McDougall claims that Wilson’s “own project for perpetual peace…was keenly provincial, since it presumed to transcend all the clashes of interests and values and the different historical experiences of every nation on earth. Serious people like Lodge, Root, and Hughes took those facts as their starting point for devising a prudent American role in the world. By contrast, Wilson’s millenarian dream could never have converted the world to a new diplomacy because it depended on the world’s having already been converted.”(McDougall, 147) It is not a surprise that Article X was the battleground between Wilson and Lodge. To Wilson, a commitment to protect territorial authority was the only way the League might seriously protect peace. To Lodge, the commitment was potentially a commitment to involvement in any war the Europeans might start. In that sense, McDougall and others are right to call Wilson an idealist. What he considered to be a mechanism to ensure peace might instead have ensured war. At the same time, however, we can understand why, without Article X, the League was meaningless to Wilson and his supporters. It was not simply egotism that caused Wilson to refuse to compromise. To sign a treaty that had nothing to enforce it would have been worse than having no treaty at all.
Basing his diplomatic action in his very American democratic and Christian values, his intentions were misinterpreted by nations globally, as his basis of morality differed from the nations he attempted to deal with. Governments were taken over on Wilson’s basis of morality and those views were impressed and forced upon them. In addition, forced was resorted to, although on a much smaller scale than previously exercised. Wilson’s brief instance in which Mexico was not recognized as a country displayed the gap between his moral foreign policy and actual foreign necessary for global relations. All in all, Wilson gained a “preachy” reputation that was not well received, and followed him into the drafting of the Treaty of
As part of his fourteen points, Wilson proposed formation of a body that will be assigned to handle international disputes which was later named League of
Between 1895 and 1920, the years in which William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, William Taft, and Woodrow Wilson reigned in the presidents, the United States struggled for not only justice at home but abroad as well. During this period policies such as Roosevelt’s Big Stick diplomacy, William Taft’s Dollar diplomacy, and Woodrow Wilson’s Moral diplomacy were all used in foreign affairs in hopes of benefit for all involved. However, it would be appropriate to say that self-interest was the most important driving factor for American policy and can be exemplified through economic, social, and political relations.
The most powerful tool an American citizen have is their power to vote. The ability to vote allows a citizen to be heard and allows them to make a change in the government. By, casting your vote you are electing a person to stand up for you and your values and speak on your behalf. This ability to vote came from the 15th amendment which states “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” The amendment was designed to protect the rights of the newly freed slaves after, the Civil War. Unfortunately, this amendment failed in different ways that lead to the oppression of minorities in America for almost 100
When World War I broke out in Europe, Woodrow Wilson announced that the United States would stay out of European affairs and remain neutral. Wilson was aware that the United States had no interest in the matters that did not directly affect the interests of American citizens. He hoped that the United States would remain neutral and continue to trade with warring nations. The American view of neutrality meant we were entitled to safely and freely trade with either side at war as long as it was out in the open seas. The United States hoped to stay out of the way because war was viewed as wasteful, irrational, and immoral.
Following World War I, President Woodrow Wilson became the mastermind for the creation of an international organization (Dudley 72). Eventually he was successful in the creation of the League of Nations and fighting for it to become a part of the Treaty of Versailles (Dudley 72). Although the League became a point in the Treaty of Versailles, the United States still had to ratify the Treaty to become a part of the League themselves (Dudley 76). Americans became split about whether the United States should have a place in the League or not, and the U.S. Senate had a decision to make (Dudley 76). On one side of the argument was a Democratic senator of California, James D. Phelan (Dudley 74). Mr. Phelan believed that the United States should join the League of Nations because it is the duty of the U.S. to uphold our ideals and support Democracy (Dudley 76). However, on the opposing side of this argument was people like Lawrence Sherman, a Republican senator from Illinois (Dudley 76). Mr. Sherman felt that the United States should not join the League of Nations because that would go against the policies of isolationism he felt the U.S. should follow, and he believed that the League of Nations would bring America too much into the conflicts of Europe (Dudley 76).
As he sat down to compose his congressional address proposing war, the uncertainty of his decision. overwhelmed him. He confided to a member of his cabinet, Frank Cobb, that He had never been as unsure about anything in his life as the judgment he made for the nation (Baker 506). Through a rhetorical analysis of Wilson’s points of argumentation and his style in the presentation to the war. congress, we can gain a better understanding of the president’s purpose.
Link’s book was published in 1979 and was written based upon privet manuscript collections, government archives from the U.S, Brittan, France and Germany, as well as newspapers. Link also reaches from monographs, biographies, and articles from numerous colleagues. (Link.pg 129) Each of these sources are solid and reliable sources, and were well used to put together a book packed with information on Woodrow Wilson’s life. Link uses many firsthand accounts from Wilson himself, but seems almost suspicious of accounts that were not presented first hand. Though Link is extremely selective in what he chose to present, the book clearly presents these facts, but has a very bias opinion of Wilson as discussed earlier. Link’s evidence, though selective, fits nicely in the monograph and makes the aspects of Wilson that he does cover clear and easy to read
World War I, or the Great War, lasted from 1914 to 1918. In harsh battles between some of the world’s strongest economic powers, millions of people were killed and wounded. Woodrow Wilson was the President of the United States during these years, and he yearned for peace. Towards the end of the conflict, Wilson delivered a speech called “Fourteen Points” on January 8, 1918. His goal in doing so was to create some stability in a time of crisis. Even though the leaders of some countries did not jump on board right away, they eventually agreed to signing the Treaty of Versailles, officially ending the war. Through emphasizing peace, security, and freedom, President Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” paid off overall, ultimately revealing that
The progressive era was a period of social activism and political reform in the United States. The political climate was ripe for reform and America was seeking leaders who could provide a new, more beneficial direction. Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson were two of the most renowned presidents of this era. One kindred goal of both of these presidents was to monitor and rectify large trust and monopolies in the U.S. Despite the fact that Wilson and Roosevelt’s domestic policies were correlative of each other, their foreign policies were very different from one another. Roosevelt tended to become more involved with foreign events. On the other hand, Wilson favored remaining impartial in foreign affairs. Wilson didn’t want to become entangled in World War 1 until the United States had been directly stricken.
In 1919 Woodrow Wilson wrote a statement to Henry Cabot Lodge the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in order to convince him to be in favor of the League of Nations. Woodrow Wilson believed, that the League of Nations was the best way for achieving an equitable peace for all the nations in the world. He said, that the United States should not interfere in any case, where one nation has their own restriction. In addition, Wilson mentioned that the United States is not going to be involved with immigration, tariff or naturalization of other nations, because each country have their own rights to deal with those question. Moreover, Wilson established that the United States will have to agree to “respect and persevere as against
Woodrow Wilson, our 23rd president, became involved in a war that he did not want any part of. Wilson wanted to remain neutral and have peace as in his first term of office. During World War I Wilson’s roles in the war became well known in all countries. Wilson wanted peace more than anything else. In seeking for peace Wilson asked Congress for the U.S. to enter World War I. which may not sound like a peace strategy but Wilson felt it was the only way to stop Germany and gain peace. Wilson wrote his speech for world peace, Fourteen Points, that he was probably most famous for. He attended and played an integral part in The Treaty of Versailles. He was the founder of the League of Nations, which he talked about in his Fourteen Points speech. .
There were four main ideas present about the treaty at the time: irreconcilables, reservationists both strong and mild, and those who accepted the treaty as is, like Wilson. The first group, the irreconcilables, consisted mainly of conservative and isolationist Republicans. They opposed the treaty mainly because of proposed membership in the League of Nations. The US Constitution gives no explicit power to the federal government to enter into an empowered international organization, since such an action without amendment to the Constitution would either give away powers of the federal government that are in its constitutional purview, thus sacrificing national sovereignty illegally, or would allow such international organization powers in the US not claimed by the federal government, an act unconstitutional under the tenth amendment, which states that all powers not enumerated to the federal government are possessed by the people or their state governments in such fashion as that state's citizens in convention deem appropriate. Since states are constitutionally blocked from entering agreements with foreign nations, joining the league would require a federal constitutional amendment. Other than constitutional arguments, they also thought joining the League was bad policy, as it would permanently entangle the US in the affairs of other nations, as well as allow some foreign oversight over domestic affairs. This sentiment is expressed in a cartoon from the era, which shows the Senate, with the Constitution in hand, halting the marriage between Uncle Sam and a woman labeled "foreign entanglements". (Document E)
Although his intentions were in the best interests of the world’s nations, Wilson’s method of getting the Versailles Treaty ratified ultimately led to its failure of passage by his own country. Not consulting the Senate during treaty negotiations was a terrible first step, but the president’s subsequent hard-line stance and unwillingness to concede anything left no chance for the doctrine to be passed. President Wilson is solely to blame for the Versailles Treaty’s failure. How prophetic he was in September of 1919, when in a pro-treaty speech he said, “I am obliged to come to you in mortification and shame and say I have not been able to fulfill the promise. You are betrayed. You have fought for something that you did not get.”
United States President Woodrow Wilson was horrified by the crimes committed by “civilized” nations and set idealistic goals for peace in his “Fourteen Points Address” (which included the League). President Wilson was willing to bargain with hostile Great Britain and France to ensure that the League would be created, resulting in the War Guilt Clause (Germany would take blame for the War and would pay a debt of thirty-three billion dollars). Ironically, the United States would vote against entering into the league.