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The ethics of abortion
Ethics against abortion
Ethics against abortion
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Prompt #1: Right to Life vs Abortion Tooley argues, through the use of examples and refutation of objections, that the right to life is dependent on holding the concept of one’s self as a continuing entity and subject of experiences and other mental states, something which fetuses lack. In Tooley’s view, this makes abortion permissible. While I will not argue that abortion is impermissible, I will argue that the premises Tooley relies on are inconsistent. The argument Tooley presents focuses on what basic moral properties are necessary for a thing to have the right to life. Tooley believes that to specify a certain point in the timeline of development after which it is immoral to destroy a human being, there must exist a morally relevant …show more content…
These distinctions are important to his argument because they allow us to have a clear picture of what the properties for right to life might encompass. According to Tooley, the state of ‘being a person’ entails the state of ‘having a serious moral right to life.’ However, Tooley believes being a person is not synonymous with being a human being, as the interchangeable use of the terms can assume fetuses and newborns automatically have a serious right to life, which Tooley does not agree with, as well as make the disagreement about whether or not it is a fact that fetuses and newborns qualify as humans rather than the moral principles this would entail. The separation between right to life and other rights is one of these principles, and Tooley claims that having a right to something can also be stated in its most basic form as “If A desires x, then others are under a prima facie obligation to refrain from actions that would deprive him of it.” When expanded to clarify applicable circumstances and avoid objections, this statement comprises Tooley’s main argument, the self-consciousness
We can begin to see the error in this view by considering Thomson’s comparison of the right to life with the right to vote. Thomson fails to advert the fact that some rights vary with respect to place, circumstances, maturity, ability and other factors, while other rights do not. We recognize that one's right to life does not vary with place as does one’s right to vote…. But to have the right to life is have moral status at all (Lee and George 17).
In her essay, “A Defense of Abortion”, Judith Thomson argues that abortion is morally permissible in most cases even when the fetus is considered a person. She does this by claiming that the right to bodily autonomy supersedes the right to life in almost every case and that the intention of the mother is important in defining when an abortion is permissible. Through multiple thought experiments she shows that the Western perspective often places more importance on the right to autonomy than the right to life even though it is claimed otherwise, and that if a mother does not intend to become pregnant she is not morally obligated to carry the fetus to term in most cases. I will examine these thought experiments and their implications in Thomson’s argument, present a rebuttal and speculate on her response.
Thomson starts off her paper by explaining the general premises that a fetus is a person at conception and all persons have the right to life. One of the main premises that Thomson focuses on is the idea that a fetus’ right to life is greater than the mother’s use of her body. Although she believes these premises are arguable, she allows the premises to further her explanation of why abortion could be
The criterion for personhood is widely accepted to consist of consciousness (ability to feel pain), reasoning, self-motivation, communication and self-awareness. When Mary Anne Warren states her ideas on this topic she says that it is not imperative that a person meet all of these requirements, the first two would be sufficient. We can be led to believe then that not all human beings will be considered persons. When we apply this criterion to the human beings around us, it’s obvious that most of us are part of the moral community. Although when this criterion is applied to fetuses, they are merely genetic human beings. Fetuses, because they are genetically human, are not included in the moral community and therefore it is not necessary to treat them as if they have moral rights. (Disputed Moral Issues, p.187). This idea is true because being in the moral community goes hand in hand w...
In the article 'A Defense of Abortion' Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that abortion is morally permissible even if the fetus is considered a person. In this paper I will give a fairly detailed description of Thomson main arguments for abortion. In particular I will take a close look at her famous 'violinist' argument. Following will be objections to the argumentative story focused on the reasoning that one person's right to life outweighs another person's right to autonomy. Then appropriate responses to these objections. Concluding the paper I will argue that Thomson's 'violinist' argument supporting the idea of a mother's right to autonomy outweighing a fetus' right to life does not make abortion permissible.
Mary Anne Warren’s “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion” describes her justification that abortion is not a fundamentally wrong action for a mother to undertake. By forming a distinction between being genetically human and being a fully developed “person” and member of the “moral community” that encompasses humanity, Warren argues that it must be proven that fetuses are human beings in the morally relevant sense in order for their termination to be considered morally wrong. Warren’s rationale of defining moral personhood as showcasing a combination of five qualities such as “consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, capacity of communication, and self-awareness” forms the basis of her argument that a fetus displays none of these elements that would justify its classification as a person and member of the morally relevant community (Timmons 386).
In A Defense of Abortion (Cahn and Markie), Judith Thomson presents an argument that abortion can be morally permissible even if the fetus is considered to be a person. Her primary reason for presenting an argument of this nature is that the abortion argument at the time had effectively come to a standstill. The typical anti-abortion argument was based on the idea that a fetus is a person and since killing a person is wrong, abortion is wrong. The pro-abortion adopts the opposite view: namely, that a fetus is not a person and is thus not entitled to the rights of people and so killing it couldn’t possibly be wrong.
The standard argument against abortion claims that the fetus is a person and therefore has a right to life. Thomson shows why this standard argument against abortion is a somewhat inadequate account of the morality of abortion.
This essay examines and critiques Judith Jarvis Thomson’s, A Defense of Abortion (1971). Thomson sets out to show that the foetus does not have a right to the mother’s body and that it would not be unjust to perform an abortion when the mother’s life is not threatened. For the sake of the argument, Thomson adopts the conservative view that the foetus is a person from the moment of conception. The conservative argument asserts that every person has a right to life. The foetus has a right to life.
Many arguments in the abortion debate assume that the morality of abortion depends upon the moral status of the foetus. While I regard the moral status of the foetus as important, it is not the central issue that determines the moral justifiability of abortion. The foetus may be awarded a level of moral status, nevertheless, such status does not result in the prescription of a set moral judgement. As with many morally significant issues, there are competing interests and a variety of possible outcomes that need to be considered when making a moral judgement on abortion. While we need to determine the moral status of the foetus in order to establish the type of entity we are dealing with, it does not, however, exist in a moral vacuum. There are other key issues requiring attention, such as the moral status and interests of the pregnant woman who may desire an abortion, and importantly, the likely consequences of aborting or not aborting a particular foetus. Furthermore, I assert that moral status should be awarded as a matter of degree, based upon the capacities of sentience and self-consciousness an entity possesses. In a bid to reach a coherent conclusion on the issue, the moral status of both foetus and woman, along with the likely results of aborting a particular foetus, must be considered together. Given the multiple facets requiring consideration, I assert that utilitarianism (Mill 1863) offers a coherent framework for weighing and comparing the inputs across a variety of situations, which can determine whether it is ever morally justifiable to have an abortion.
Three Works Cited Many people believe abortion is only a moral issue, but it is also a constitutional issue. It is a woman's right to choose what she does with her body, and it should not be altered or influenced by anyone else. This right is guaranteed by the ninth amendment, which contains the right to privacy. The ninth amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." This right guarantees the right to women, if they so choose, to have an abortion, up to the end of the first trimester.
In the essay, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion” Mary Anne Warren provides an argument for the permissibility of abortions at any stage of a woman’s pregnancy. In the argument, Warren firstly states that the potential to become a human is not the same as being a human, and therefore is not deserving of the same rights. Warren then asserts that to be a human, a person must possess the following characteristics or traits: consciousness, self motivated activity, reasoning, awareness of oneself, and the ability to communicate.1 Furthermore, Warren then states that since fetuses, at their very early stages, do not possess these traits, they are not human.1 She then continues on to deduce, that if being similar to a person grounds a right
Over the duration of the last century, abortion in the Western hemisphere has become a largely controversial topic that affects every human being. In the United States, at current rates, one in three women will have had an abortion by the time they reach the age of 45. The questions surrounding the laws are of moral, social, and medical dilemmas that rely upon the most fundamental principles of ethics and philosophy. At the center of the argument is the not so clear cut lines dictating what life is, or is not, and where a fetus finds itself amongst its meaning. In an effort to answer the question, lawmakers are establishing public policies dictating what a woman may or may not do with consideration to her reproductive rights. The drawback, however, is that there is no agreement upon when life begins and at which point one crosses the line from unalienable rights to murder.
Does a mother have the right to take the life of her unborn child, never giving it a chance to walk this earth and fulfill its God given purpose? Or is it God’s will for that child to be taken at that time, to play an ever constant reminder to the mother of her past decisions, having God use that guilt or experience as a source to steer her life? We neither have the ability to create nor destroy life, as it is God who ultimately decides whether the person terminates that life. From a non-biblical standpoint, it is based on whether a woman finds it ethically right to terminate a pregnancy and what effect it would ultimately have on her happiness. Therefore, abortion is not philosophically incorrect. In this paper, we will discuss the cosmological argument, individual relativism, and act-utilitarianism, all as they pertain to abortion, and how natural law and ethical relativism cause opposition to these theories.
Article 3, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, states “everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of a person” (Goodhart, 379). This article creates cultural discrepancies that are rooted in interpreting undefined and ambiguous language. For example, there are cultural disputes concerning the definition of a “person”. In many monotheistic cultures, abortion is considered a crime. Advocates of this opinion support that a fetus is a human being from conception.