Thought Experiments In Judith Thomson's A Defense Of Abortion

In her essay, “A Defense of Abortion”, Judith Thomson argues that abortion is morally permissible in most cases even when the fetus is considered a person. She does this by claiming that the right to bodily autonomy supersedes the right to life in almost every case and that the intention of the mother is important in defining when an abortion is permissible. Through multiple thought experiments she shows that the Western perspective often places more importance on the right to autonomy than the right to life even though it is claimed otherwise, and that if a mother does not intend to become pregnant she is not morally obligated to carry the fetus to term in most cases. I will examine these thought experiments and their implications in Thomson’s argument, present a rebuttal and speculate on her response.

In this experiment, an innocent celebrity is dying of kidney failure and you are the only one with the correct blood type to save them. Therefore, you are kidnapped and your circulatory system is connected to theirs in order to save them. The question Thomson poses is whether you are morally obligated to remain connected to them or not. My intuition is that of course you’re not required to stay connected, regardless of the amount of time required of you. Thomson argues for the same position, with the obvious stipulation that the less that is required of you the more morally degraded you are for refusing to remain connected (184). This thought experiment is meant to prove that abortion in the case of rape is morally permissible. However, this begs the question on whether abortion in the case of conception resulting from consensual intercourse continues to be morally permissible based on the concept that the right to bodily autonomy trumps the right to