Human Extinction And The Value Of Our Efforts By Brooke Alan Trisel

In “Human Extinction and the Value of Our Efforts,” Brooke Alan Trisel writes on the relationship between the meaning of life and the existence of future generations. He states that we do not need future generations in order to have meaningful lives. I will argue in support of Trisel’s position by stating his views and discussing the various objections that he raises and dismisses. First, I will address an objection that Trisel proposes and refutes on the relationship of importance and long-lastingness. After, I will propose my own follow up response to Trisel’s reply and dismiss that. Then I will discuss and refute another objection that the challenge and exclusivity of becoming important is what gives meaning. After reviewing the arguments

If we cannot change our misguided yet ingrained desire to want our works to be appreciated forever, we should at least “refrain from turning these desires into standards for judging whether our efforts and accomplishments are significant” (Trisel 391). Trisel suggests that we should not use long-lastingness as a criterion for judging the importance of our goals. He believes that goals and achievements have intrinsic value, and that is enough to provide one with a satisfying life. Since achievements are events, which cannot be undone or reversed, the fact that these events occurred should be enough to make our lives worthwhile. Therefore, the solution for these people is to change the standards for what is important. Instead of thinking that importance is given only to those accomplishments that are admired by many and persist a long time, we must see the value in all of our achievements, regardless of their impact on future generations. Meaning is not exclusive to only those whose achievements are remembered by future generations. We must recognize this fact and see our lives from this perspective in order to achieve meaning. Trisel recommends that we remember why we set out to accomplish our goals in the first place. If that goal is to influence future generations, then one must reassess it in terms of the root of the desire, which Trisel points out is usually not altruistic. In the case of the writer who wants his works to be appreciated by future generations, Trisel argues that the goal is “less about wanting to help them and more about wanting to have our works and our lives be considered important” (Trisel 389). He gives the example that if these people knew that future generations would destroy our works, then they would not care about future generations (Trisel 389). Since the root of our