How Successful Was The Marshall Plan

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Introduction

The European Recovery Program (ERP), also called the Marshall Plan was a plan for foreign aid announced by Georges Marshall (Secretary of State of the US, 1947-1949), in June 1947 at Harvard University to help rebuild Western Europe largely destroyed by World War II (Holm, 2017, p. xv). Under the presidency of Harry Truman, the recovery program was designed in 1947 and adopted by law in April 1948. Thereafter, US$13 billion financial support, food aid and technical assistance were provided to Western Europe between 1948 to 1951 for the reconstruction of its economies and polities (De Long & Eichengreen, 1991. pp. 2, 14). Despite this act of generosity, the Marshall Plan was regarded as a political weapon used by the US to establish …show more content…

Though, the most significant results of economic recovery appeared towards the end of 1949 when farming and manufacturing outputs reached pre-war aggregates (Arkes, 1972, p. 76). This was largely possible because, in the general interest of the whole Europe, the Marshall Plan had supported bilateral and multilateral relations between OEEC members and their former enemies such as West-Germany and Italy.

In four years, the Marshall Plan achieved remarkable success. By 1950, industrial production had expanded to 40% above the pre-war amounts. Inflation was constricted and trading relationships, whether domestic or foreign were more satisfactory than projected (Hogan, 1987, p. 430; Shultz, 1987, p. 14). OEEC members’ aggregate Gross National Product (GNP) increased by more than 32% between 1948 and 1951; farming production also grew by 11% (Hogan, 1987, p. 431). All of this helped to significantly raise living standards” (Shultz, 1987, p. …show more content…

Notwithstanding antipathies among OEEC members, sporadic political bickering and selfishness were subjugated by the cooperation. The Marshall Plan facilitated political stability, and eased social unrest that Truman said was potential vacuum for the USSR and the communist ideology. Mee (1984, p. 90) acknowledged that, “the real value of the plan was its psychological and political by-products”. The aid also strengthened democratic values and activities in Europe, preventing thus the USSR’s expansion. In this regard, Shultz (1987, p.114) asserted that, the Marshall Plan had primarily "created a sense of indebtedness and a reservoir of goodwill among Europeans towards America" on which was laid the groundwork of a political and military

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