Dangerous Driving Case Study

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Lee’s most likely charge would be of aiding and abetting his co-accused, Mark, of causing the death of Brian by dangerous driving. However Mark, the driver, would have to be found guilty of causing death by dangerous driving first before Lee is charged. This is because there can be no aiding and abetting of a crime that has not been committed.
The facts of the case are that Lee, his wife and friends were in a pub celebrating Lee’s recent promotion. The evidence shows that Lee was abstemious throughout the night however the others had been drinking a ‘great deal’ and for ‘several hours’. After celebrating in the pub, Lee and his wife offered Mark and Brian a lift home. Lee was driving at first but at some point during the journey Lee permitted …show more content…

The statutory definition of “dangerous driving”, is set out in section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 as:—
[(1) For the purposes of sections 1[, 1A] and 2 above a person is to be regarded as driving dangerously if (and, subject to subsection (2) below, only if)—
(a) the way he drives falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver, and
(b) it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving in that way would be dangerous.
(2) A person is also to be regarded as driving dangerously for the purposes of sections 1[, 1A] and 2 above if it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving the vehicle in its current state would be dangerous.
(3) In subsections (1) and (2) above “dangerous” refers to danger either of injury to any person or of serious damage to property; and in determining for the purposes of those subsections what would be expected of, or obvious to, a competent and careful driver in a particular case, regard shall be had not only to the circumstances of which he could be expected to be aware but also to any circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the …show more content…

At the hearing of the appeal there was a conflict of evidence as to whether the car was being driven by the appellant or by a lady seated by his side in the car. The quarter sessions, without deciding whether the appellant was himself driving the car, dismissed the appeal, finding as facts that if the lady was driving she was doing so with the consent and approval of the appellant, who must have known that the speed was dangerous, and who, being in control of the car, could, and ought to, have prevented

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