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The use of counterintelligence against terrorism
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Is Counter Intelligence Equally Effective Against Internal and External Threats? The focus of this essay will be on whether or not Counter Intelligence (CI) is equally effective against internal and external threats. The question has been deconstructed in order to comprehend how it has been interpreted by the author. The term ‘equally effective’ does not refer to a comparison of various intelligence agencies and whether or not they are equally effective as agencies; it refers to the effectiveness of any one particular agency in dealing with an internal threat in comparison to how it deals with external threats.
The answer to the question is a resounding ‘No!’; CI is not equally effective against external and internal threats. This answer, the conclusion, was reached by gaining a greater understanding of what CI is and its role, followed by making a comparison of external and internal threats.When one understands the concepts and frameworks surrounding CI as well as limitations placed upon it, one appreciates that currently, CI is not ‘equally effective’ . Providing empirical evidence and comparing those events to current events indicates that not much appears to have changed re CI admitting to, let alone dealing effectively with internal threats. In discussing the two types of threats, the author has been as general as possible
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Not so; the following statements highlight this: ‘Even within the US intelligence community, however, some confusion and disagreement about counterintelligence persists. For example, it is often misunderstood as another name for security’. (Wasemiller, A. C.,1969)
‘Unfortunately, as I watch US CI today, I am increasingly concerned that the principles I consider fundamental to effective CI are not being followed as carefully and consistently as they should be’.( Olsen
Since, as he establishes, leadership’s political priorities were critical to the ultimate decision in the CIA’s actions, the degree to which the CIA actually concentrated on this mission of collection and analysis depended on the perceived threats from the top. Consequently, the actual level of reliable analysis deteriorated as demonstrated by the example of ORE analysists who were “normatively risk averse” and trying to “get it right,” and provide analysis that fit into the view of their leadership. Lacking trust in their analysists’ conclusions, the CIA proved unable to supply reliable intelligence and forge “collaboration and integration.” Rather than addressing institutional problems the CIA developed a pattern that continued throughout its entire history. Even though it refers to the Reagan era, Immerman’s conclusion that in a time of crisis the CIA deemed that they “required a change in leadership more than an institutional adjustment,” could easily apply to any other period. This application of psychology to history while enlightening does detract from the reader’s understanding of a formation of a CIA “culture” that limited its intelligence analysis efficiency. Without this fundamental comprehension of a CIA “culture,” some of Immerman’s later
For the American intelligence community, George Washington is considered the father of intelligence. The introduction of the intelligence concept and its application in some missions during the early days of America helped America’s Founding Fathers to succeed against t...
In times of great terror and panic, the citizens of a nation must decide what they value most: their right to privacy or the lives of the innocent. Government surveillance is criticized, however there are times in a nation’s history where, in order to ensure the safety of their citizens, they must surveill the country for potential hazards that might exist in the world. The government-issued program, COINTELPRO--a series of illegal projects during the twentieth century organized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation--while heavily criticized for its unconstitutional grounds--was justified because it benefitted the nation during a period of upheaval. COINTELPRO is popularly condemned by historians and professors such as Brandeis University Professor of Sociology, David Cunningham, who asserts that the FBI counterintelligence program was only a form of repression that allowed for the government to suppress matters that they consider bothersome (234) This however was not the case. COINTELPRO was necessary because of the great social unrest, individuals posed threats to society, and creating operations that were beneficial to the United States.
One of the main failures of law enforcement and intelligence agencies identified by both the authors of “The Cell” and Senator Richard Shelby was that the F.B.I. and C.I.A. acted in competition with one another to produce results, as opposed to in centralized collaboration. Gladwell points out that the intelligence community was structured in this manner in response to the failures of the Bay of Pigs operation, which had been based on highly centralized intelligence gathering. In turn, the structure of intelligence agencies at the time of the Bay of Pigs was in response to the failure of decentralized intelligence to identify the threat of an attack on Pearl Harbor. The iterative cycle of intelligence failures and subsequent reform efforts ignores the premise that the failures do not represent evidence of the limitations of intelligence agencies, but rather the limitations of intelligence itself. As Gladwell states, “in our zeal to correct what we believe to be the problems of the past, we end up creating new problems for the
An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case and Its Implications for U.S. Intelligence. (1994, November 1). Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved May 28, 2012, from www.fas.org/irp/congress/1994_rpt/ssci_ames.htm
In this paper, I will do a case study on the Bay of Pigs and why the United States tried to conduct this attack. I will find out what intelligence led to this invasion attempt as well as what intelligence failures were made which resulted in the failure of the invasion. I will discuss what impact the Bay of Pigs had on the United States Intelligence community and what changes was made. I will end this paper with any findings I have concluded to if the failure has any affect on how the U.S. conducts intelligence in today’s world.
The essay will define, compare and contrast the Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) roles, responsibilities and current accountability mechanisms.
Nedzi (D-Mich.), Luclen N. “Oversight or Overlook: Congress and the US Intelligence Agency.” A Congressman talk to the CIA senior seminar, November 14, 1979, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol18no2/pdf/v18i2a02p.pdf (accessed January 7, 2014).
National Counterintelligence Center (NCC). 2010. Chapter 2: Magic. Volume 2: A Counterintelligence Reader – Counterintelligence in World War II.
The United States has endured numerous security breaches and high security threats over the past two decades. After the attacks on 9/11, the office of Intelligence became a vital source in retrieving sensitive data and tracking down potential terrorists and their networks which could pose a threat to the American people and then forwarding that vital information to the Department of Homeland Security and other government agencies. Intelligence became a key role in “assessing threats to critical American infrastructures, bio-and nuclear terrorism, pandemic diseases, threats to the borders to the nation, and radicalization within American society” (Randol, 2009, p. 7). The sharing of homeland security intelligence has become a precedence for Congress and the government. Our nation must be one step ahead of any potential terrorists that want to harm our turf. Within this text the capabilities and limitations of both domestic and foreign intelligence in supporting homeland security efforts will be explained;
...nt: the U.S. still has enemies and threats, so how could the intelligence agencies go about in confronting them? Attacks or cyber threats cannot be prevented without some capabilities to pierce communication.
Throughout the years most country's governments have established some sort of secret police. No matter what the government called it, whether it is the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or her Majesty's secret service (MI6), whatever name the government used, the international term of "secret police" could always be applied. Many agencies of secret police have had their success and failures, some more than others. The KGB, which in English means "the Committee of Public Safety," has had their share of both successes and failures. Most secret police agencies have been used primarily to obtain information from other countries. This was also a primary goal for the KGB, but one of their other goals, which was just as important, was to keep unwanted outside information from the Russian people. This was only one out of many the KGB's objectives. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to prove that the actions of the KGB were, all in all, a success.
Tidd, J. M. (2008). From revolution to reform: A brief history of U.S. intelligence. The SAIS
Today, war on terrorism relies heavily on covert operations conducted electronically or through HUMINT. Assessment of the concepts of this paper will have to address specific situations when unilateralism , bilateralism or multilateralism have impacted covert operations in areas such as ; The Use Of Drones, Hot pursuit , Attacking Terrorist Sanctuaries , Attacking Rouge States
... have to be surreptitious since much information is readily available i.e. the internet. Firms and individuals can also simply request for general information through the phone or e-mail or even approach foreign companies as potential business partners in hopes of gaining access through business relationships.58 Corporate espionage is undoubtedly a growing threat for organizations and not much can be done since intellectual property is intangible. The best proven weapon against this cybercrime is to protect information assets well since an organization with a responsible attitude towards information security and proactive measures to implement it will find its forts strongly built.59 To quote Sun Tzu: “The ultimate in disposing one’s troops is to be without ascertainable shape. Then the most penetrating spies cannot pry in nor can the wise lay plans against you.60