Comparison Of The Theaetetus And Skepticism: Mercedes Dreyer

The Theaetetus and Skepticism

Mercedes Dreyer The Theaetetus is composed of three main parts, each part being allotted to a different definition of what constitutes as knowledge. While the Theaetetus is focused primarily on how to define knowledge, the arguments faced by Socrates and Theaetetus greatly resemble arguments made by different later theories of knowledge and justification. I will argue in this essay that due to the failure faced by Socrates and Theaetetus in their attempt at defining knowledge, the conclusion that would be best fit for their analysis would be that of skepticism. In doing this I will review the three main theses, the arguments within their exploration that resemble more modern theories of knowledge and justification, and how the reason for the failure of the theories presented in the Theaetetus are strikingly similar to those that cause later theories of epistemology to fail.

(160d) Socrates points out the contradicting beliefs that Protagoras would have had in maintaining relative truths, for to do so would be to remove the ability for one man to know more/better than another (161). It seems strange to say then, again coming from Protagoras, that one is more knowledgeable than another, and is worthy of payment to teach men who are less knowledgeable. In addition to this, as discussed above, Protagoras’ account is based on future possibility and thus has no place in discussing what actually is or in the process of becoming. To claim truth based on a future event (that which has not yet come to pass) fails requirement (1) of any definition of knowledge. Similar issues are faced in theories of knowledge and justification that rely heavily on probability. Mainly that the probability of a claim being true cannot provide actual, instant, justification for a belief (which in turn makes the theory that K=JTB