Cheap Talk Mediation And Diplomacy

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Cheap Talk, Mediation and Diplomacy
CASE 252: Coercive Diplomacy Before the War in Kosovo: America's Approach in 1998

Introduction

The concept of “cheap talk” focuses on the analysis of how much information can dependably be forwarded when the communication is direct and costless. Biased experts tend to share noisy information with the decision makers. One way in which the decision makers can enhance the exchange of information is to extend communication. Additionally, he or she must try to seek advice from additional experts. Ultimately, writing contracts with the expert can further increase the credibility of the informational transmission. Theoretically, cheap talk is costless and therefore is not expected to have a major impact on the outcomes of interstate communication. As opposed to the cheap talk model, standard “costly signalling” is predicted to provoke a more fluid transmission of information between two actors in the international system. It is precisely the cost of signalling what gives validity to the information provided. As suggested by Farrell and Rabin, authors of previous literature on cheap talk are divided in opinion. Some scholars argue that cheap talk is rather useless, while others believe that it it is helpful in interstate communication and can actually improve the advantages of both sides. While examining the literature on cheap talk, it is important to highlight additional tools of international communication, such as diplomacy and mediation. The analysis of these issues provides a close insight into the credibility of arguments regarding cheap talk. Several historical cases serve as examples of costly signalling and its outcomes, one of the most recent ones being NATO's show of strength prior to the...

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...heoretical arguments on cheap talk, mediation and diplomacy are applicable to the 1998 crisis in Kosovo. Prior to military intervention, the mediator that was NATO attempted to communicate a peaceful agreement between the Yugoslav government and the Kosovars. Following the failure of coercive diplomacy formulated by the U.S. National Security Council, we observed the defender who opted for military intervention in the Balkan region. In other words, after its willingness to use military capabilities had been perceived by Slobodan Milošević as bluffing, the U.S. executive led NATO into a violent campaign that was organized to end the Serbian aggression in Kosovo. Theoretically speaking, what caused the military intervention by NATO was the combination of the challenger's incredulity in the threats of the defender and the defender's bias position against the challenger.

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