CBRNE Warfare Threats

CBRNE Detection
A WMD attack is arguably the single greatest threat to the United States homeland. One of the primary reasons that is so is because CBRNE weapons are difficult to respond to and are even more difficult detect. CBRNE weapons can come in many different shapes, sizes, and consistencies. The weapons can be in a liquid, solid or gaseous state and the technologies needed to detect and respond with are very expensive. Each individual threat that comprises the term CBRNE is very different. Therefore, each threat requires a different type of detection equipment. A basic piece of chemical detection equipment needs to be able to detect nerve, blood, blister, lewisite, TICs, TIMS, Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), and Hydrogen Sulfide

(H2S). Every chemical weapons agent has its own characteristic chemical properties but a generalization can be made. Overall they are sufficiently stable to survive dissemination and transport. The reactivity and the stability of agents can vary greatly from agent to agent (Win & Al Masum, 2002). The onset of symptoms take place in a matter of minutes and quite possibly seconds if the chemical is in its purest form.
The characteristic of biological are low visibility, high potency, easy delivery, and the accessibility are the ideal characteristics of biological weapons. To be useful as biological weapons, diseases must be highly lethal (if delivered efficiently), and robust (making aerosol delivery feasible) (Win & Al Masum, 2002). Biological agents consist of either a virus, toxin, fungi, rickettsia, and chlamydia. All of which are extremely effective because they can take up to days and weeks for the symptoms to take effect. This is effective for a terrorist organization or lone wolf because it allows plenty of time for the terrorist to exit the area. The spread of contamination would be vast because the exposed would not know they have been exposed until it’s too late. Rademaker (2006), “ Bioterror attack, unlike other forms of WMD attack, could mimic natural occurring disease, potentially delaying recognition of the attack and creating uncertainty if an attack even occurred” (p.48).
For this reason, many experts believe it’s the perfect weapon. Fortunately, the United States Department of Homeland Security has already installed biological detection equipment in several major cities across the nation, such as the biowatch program. However, the program is not that effective because detection equipment does not simply sound an alarm. The filter has to be removed and sent to a lab for testing, which again prolongs the detection and allows plenty of time for the contamination to spread.
Radiological and explosive weapons are also a concern to the homeland. Radiological materials and explosives can be combined to create what is called a “dirty bomb” or Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD). If a weapon of this caliber were to be used, the after effects would be devastating because the contamination could spread as far as the wind blows and the entire contaminated area would have to be vacated until the radiation levels are decreased, which could take months to years depending on the amount of radiological material and weather effects. Fortunately most ports of entries into the United States have radiation detection equipment at the border crossing.
Nuclear weaponry is not a major concern compared to the other threats because of the non-proliferation efforts across the world, but the effects would be absolute catastrophic if used. Needless to say, the CBRNE detection equipment needs to be utilized in all ports of entries and every major city or tourist attraction nation-wide in order to have a successful detection prior to an attack from taken place. Detection equipment is the first step in preventing or mitigating an attack because it could be the forewarning that is needed to minimize casualties. However, unfortunately, the detection abilities are lacking greatly so the response capabilities need to be strong and adaptive.
CBRNE Response
As one can imagine, the response procedures for a CBRNE attack would be very difficult to manage because of how hazardous the material could be.

The response capabilities of the United States government agencies and Department of Defense is relatively diverse and capable. Most federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, and non-governmental organizations have some sort of hazardous materials (HAZMAT) or CBRNE team established. However, not all of the HAZMAT and CBRNE teams are created equal and have plenty of room for improvement. According to Mauroni (2010), “in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the former Defense Secretary William Cohen’s intense interest in consequence management led to the concept of National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams to assist state and local emergency responders” (p.60). The National Guards Civil Support Teams are the subject matter experts in CBRNE detection, response, and decontamination and they devout a lot of time, energy, and resources into training the first responders on the proper response procedures for a CBRNE terror

attack.
While most United States government agencies and Department of Defense response capabilities are strong and adaptive, in contrast, the response capabilities of our health departments are not quite up to par and are arguably the greatest weakness in CBRNE response. The health departments need to improve their understanding of CBRNE response or they could potentially contaminate their entire hospitals and staff, which would make an already catastrophic attack much worse. The paramedics and hospital staff need to understand and practice decontamination measures in order to ensure that the casualties are treated properly and have minimized the overall contamination. According to Ziskin and Harris (2007):
The public health community is not in a position to prevent acts of terrorism, but it is in a position to prepare for public health emergencies. Being unprepared for any public health emergency, including an act of terrorism, is no longer an option for responsible public health leaders (p. 1587).
CBRNE response in general is far more difficult, time consuming, resource exhausting, expensive, and inherently more dangerous. Over all the response capabilities have improved drastically since September 11, 2001, but there is plenty of room for improvement.

Proposed Solutions
The proposed solution is a multifaceted approach to CBRNE defense, detection and response. First being, The United States needs to secure its borders to prevent terrorists and WMDs from entering the country. The government needs to increase funding to the Department of Homeland Security in order for the agency to secure the borders and increase the detection capabilities at all ports of entries into the country. Securing the border will prevent and or deter terrorists from trying to sneak themselves or WMDs into the country. The government needs to find a way to screen all immigrants that are coming into the country in hopes of preventing radical persons that could be terrorists from infiltrating the country to cause harm to innocent civilians.
Secondly, The United States needs to increase CBRNE detection in all major cities and tourist attractions nationwide. Currently there are biological detection equipment in several cities across the country and in most postal service warehouses. However, that does not protect against the use of chemical, radiological, or explosive weapons, which is huge vulnerability that a terrorist organization could easily exploit and plan their attack accordingly. The detection assets that are currently in service across the nation need to be monitored more frequently and upgraded as needed. A more superior detection capability nationwide is absolute paramount because it would ensure the first responder community has the earliest detection possible so that they can respond quickly and efficiently in order to save lives without putting more unnecessary lives at risk.

The third proposed solution would be too ensure the first responder community has the ability to build breadth, depth, and knowledge in WMD and CBRNE response.

The first responder community as a whole needs to understand how to properly identify the difference between a CBRNE incidents as opposed to a normal incident. The health departments across the nation also need to increase their knowledge of how to properly respond to a CBRNE incident because if they do not they could worsen or spread the contamination. The Department of Defense assets should continue to be called upon to support and train civil authorities in CBRNE defense, response, and

detection.
The best way to ensure the first responder community to include the health departments are ready for proper WMD and CBRNE response is by conducting annual, all-hazard training exercises that stretch the first responder community to the brink of failure. The exercises need to overwhelm the first responders and need to focus specifically on CBRNE. The National Guards, Civil Support Team could be the trainers and evaluators that ensure the procedures are done in accordance with the proper tactics and techniques used to respond quickly and proficiently. Finally, the United States needs to work with its allies across the world to maintain and build a stronger non-proliferation efforts worldwide. According to Rademaker (2006), “Multilatteral cooperation among partner nations in order to builda layered defense in depth is a hallmark approach” (p. 50).
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is imperative that the United States government makes every effort within their power to continue to build a strong and adaptive Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive (CBRNE) detection and response framework in order to be able to prevent the use of CBRNE weapons against the homeland. Throughout the paper the term WMD was defined, and was put into perspective as to why this type of threat should be approached with caution and taken more seriously than it has in the past. Each element of the United States CBRNE detection and response framework was analyzed and during that analysis, it was determined that chemical detection and the medical field response were the weakest links. In order to ensure the United States citizens are protected from such a grave threat, the found weaknesses need to be trained on and strengthened. Moreover, the United States government should continue with multi-agency and mass casualty exercises that test the nation’s incident command system, and the CBRNE detection and response framework, which needs to include the medical field response. This type of exercise will help to identify the strengths, and more importantly, exploit the weaknesses so that they can be overcome.