The Technical Escort Mission:
A Historical Look At How It Came To Be
In the years leading to World War II, the United States had a significant concern that the axis forces would likely use toxic gases just as they had during World War I. This fear drove the CWS to begin analyzing and adjusting the stockpiles of chemicals in their facilities. They came to the realization that they would need to have an aggressive plan in order to produce enough chemical weapons to initiate a significant retaliation if the time came. As the timeline progressed, CWS would reorganize their assets to meet the growing needs in production and distribution of chemical weapons.
Pre-World War II
The use of debilitating and deadly gases in World War I weighed heavily on the CWS in the years that followed. The lessons taken from the war forced CWS to the realization and likelihood of history repeating itself. Over the next 20 years, the CWS would fight its own battle for funding and existence due to the War Department’s issuance of General Order 26 of 1922. The order restricted research and development, as well as funding to CWS (Brophy & Fisher, 1959). During this time, the CWS evaluated its aging stockpiles. They knew that another war would require prompt production of chemicals in order to react to an attack on Americans. The CWS requested funding to perform research and initiate production, but the government felt it was unnecessary. In fact, officials questioned the existence of CWS. That would all change in the late 1930’s when the essence of a second world war would loom. The CWS received funding to initiate their plan of stockpiling chemicals weapons. In 1940, the CWS would receive a substantial increase in funding after Germany’s victory...
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Technical Escort Course. (n.d.). Retrieved from United States Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear School: http://www.wood.army.mil/3chembde/irtd%20web%20page/Tech_Escort.htm
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In 1968, the United States Army activated the 123rd Aviation Battalion, creating a remarkable unit that was comprised of several Army assets. The design of the battalion revolutionized how assets could be combined to complete many missions by mixing infantry, signal, aviation, and support units. The 123rd’s mission ranged from was to collect intelligence, deliver supplies, insert and extract infantrymen, and provide air support. In addition to their primary mission they also participated in medical evacuation, an invaluable asset on the battlefields of Vietnam.
Parsons, Othal T. Interview by author, 17 April 1995. Mail questionnaire. 12th Armored Division Historical Project, Abilene Christian University, Abilene, Texas.
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As we move into the Twentieth Century the similarities are almost identical. The First World War has shaped not only modern warfare but even produced global attention to the brutal and inhumane death toll of the war. As stated in the Geneva Protocol, which prohibited the use of chemical weapons in warfare, which was signed in 1925? While this was a welcomed step, the Protocol had a number of significant short comings, including the fact that it did not prohibit the development, production or stockpiling of chemical weapons.
I have organized this paper into five distinct sections; mission, task organization, capabilities, limitations, and finally the conclusion. After the reading and comprehension of this paper, you should have gained a basic understanding of the Special Forces (SF) Chemical Reconnaissance Detachments (CRD). The following paper is mixed with Unclassified (UCI) and For Official Use Only (FOUO) information. FOUO is annotated at the beginning of all For Official Use Only information, the rest of the paper is UCI. If you wish to share this information paper with others, please at a minimum; confirm identity of the person prior to providing (FM 380-5, 2000). For further handling instructions please refer to FM 380-5, or contact me, I will gladly answer all questions.
The Technical Escort Unit (TEU) now provides the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to include the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an immediate response capability for chemical and biological warfare material. Its mission is to provide a global response for escorting, packaging, detection, rendering-safe, disposing, sampling, analytics, and remediation missions. This does not only include chemical weapons for which it was originally created, but now incorporates biological weapons, state sponsored laboratories, small independent laboratories and small non-weaponized radioactive materials. Most recently, they have been task organized to assist Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as a force multiplier; the objective of this is to give the Battle Field Commander instant on the ground intelligence regarding Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) hazards within their Area of Operations (AO). With this new mission with the BCT, the TEU is becoming an expeditionary force.
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Though chemical warfare was proven effective and easily produced, the world council decided that it was inhumane to use. In 1972, chemical warfare was ban at the Biological Weapons Convention. At this convention, many country’s leaders voted that it was not right to use these weapons as a way to kill people. The leaders felt that a biological weapon was too dangerous to release. (opbw.org)
O'Shea, Brandon J. "ARMY.MIL, The Official Homepage of the United States Army." "OPERATION POWER PACK. N.p., 20 Apr. 2010. Web. 27 Feb. 2014.
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Poison gas was perhaps the most feared weapon out of all. Created to overcome the long stalemate style of trench warfare, its purpose was to draw out soldiers hiding in the trenches. One side would throw the poison gas into the enemy trenches and they would either wait for their enemy to come out into open fire or perish in the trenches. The first poison gas used in battle was chlorine at the start of the Second Battle of Ypres on April 22, 1915 by the Germans. Shortly after, followed the phosgene. The effects of these gases were ghastly. Chlorine was the most deadly as "within seconds of inhaling its vapor, it destroys the victim's respiratory organs, bringing on choking attacks" (Duffy). Phosgene had similar effects, except the fact that the effects started kicking in after 48 hours of inhalation. In September 1917, the Germans introduced the mustard gas or Yperite which was contained in artillery shells against the Russians at Riga. Those exposed t...
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.