Buddhisattpa Model Of Pain

Pain and suffering are common sensations that all people will experience in today’s world. Most people would believe that there is a hierarchy to pain and that some individuals experience worse pain than others. This is not so with the Bodhisattva ideal where they have a belief that there should be no distinction between beings and ultimately, no distinction between pain (Jeffreys, April 12). I disagree with the Bodhisattva ideal because I stand with the opinion that suffering has a hierarchy and that pain has a subject.

The Bodhisattva ideal is that of having “... a compassion for all sentient beings without distinction” (Jeffreys, April 12). This would mean that there is no distinction between the pain and suffering of others. There is also no distinction between the people experiencing the suffering. This is also seen as being an extreme form of altruism, which is “an unselfish concern for the welfare of others” (Jeffreys, April 12). If one were to have this extreme unselfish concern for others, they must able to put someone’s needs

before theirs and would need to know the difference between their pain and someone which is a point that later on Paul Williams points out as contradicting.
This Bodhisattva ideal is following the idea in Buddhism that there is no self which is seen in this idea of seeing pain on a spectrum of events and not having happened to individuals. If one were to believe the no self idea that would mean that pain does not belong or happen to a specific person but simply happens in general. This idea is supported by humanitarians or people who want to think with a global viewpoint. Humanitarians might want all people to be seen on a single spectrum instead of differentiating by class or color. They would agree with this stance that instead of something bad happening to one person we would see it as happening to the whole human race. Another group that might agree with this line of universal pain would be vegetarians or animal rights activists. They work to have us see animals as fellow beings and not just animals. With the Bodhisattva ideal they would be put on the spectrum of suffering along with humans. That way their pain is not less than ours, it is equal.
As previously stated, there is no self in Buddhism, but instead they see a life, or a person as “a series of khandas” (Jeffreys, March 1). Due to this way of thinking, it is easy to see a connection between this thought pattern and the lack of distinction between beings and suffering. If there is no self then the pain cannot belong to one person or being. This idea of no self and pain is furthered in the work of Santideva stating, “the person who experiences suffering does not exist” (Santideva, 97). This would mean that suffering does not have a being or self associated with it but it simply happens. This also follows the idea of there not being a self in Buddhism, being if there was no self then pain does not inhabit one person. Santideva then states, “…without exception, no sufferings belong to anyone” (Santideva, 97). This would be an idea that humanitarians or animal rights would agree with. In this line of thinking pain could belong to everyone and everything. The point of pain not belonging to a self is something that myself and Paul Williams disagrees with.
Paul Williams argues that pain must have a subject and that pain should be related to a subject this is a disagreement with what the Bodhisattva ideal states. He argues that with altruism we need be able to define our pain versus the pain of others (Jeffreys, April 12). If we are to be truly selfish and put the pain and suffering of others before our pain; we must be able to define what their pain is. We must also know the difference between them.
If Williams believes in a self, it is hard for him not to see pain as not having a subject and belonging on a continuum as the Bodhisattva ideal states. I agree with Williams that there needs a subject and that pain cannot be on a continuum in contrast to the Bodhisattva ideal. I believe in a self, meaning that we are more than just a series of events and that we are a person with some form of a soul. Due to the fact that I believe in a self, I believe that pain must have a subject, the pain must belong to something.
In contrast to the Bodhisattva ideal I believe that pain is not on a continuum, but instead is in a hierarchy.

I see some events as being more catastrophic than others and that due to the face some events are worse than others, they need to be addressed in order of importance. Unless we can see some pain as being worse than others, we cannot understand an urgency in some issues. For example, you cannot compare the urgency of a house on fire and a someone getting a paper cut. If there is no hierarchy to pain, then these two issues would be seen as having the same importance and house might possibly burn down as a result of you bandaging up a young girl’s finger. Therefore, pain needs to not belong to a continuum where there is an order. Instead it needs to belong on a hierarchy where is there is an order. Williams says that pain requires a subject and that it is irrelevant to eliminate the self if we wish to address the

issue.
Another argument made against the Bodhisattva ideal is that by putting pain on a spectrum, it devalues the pain of others. An example of this would be comparing the suffering of those in The Holocaust to the pain of someone stubbing their toe. If there is no distinction between pain, then these two events would be seen as having the same effect. Obviously, this is not fair to see the pain of someone stubbing their toe to the pain of someone who had been through The Holocaust, clearly one of these is worse than the other. The Bodhisattva ideal would put these two together, making them an equal suffering. This is seen as devaluing their pain by putting someone’s lesser pain before theirs, which is what would happen if the pain was on a spectrum. All pain would be equal to each other.
Along with Paul Williams, I also believe in a self and additionally that people are generally going to choose to put their problems before others. Along this idea of pain having a hierarchy is the problem of the ego. Most people see their problems as being the biggest things in the world, even in comparison to someone going through a major trauma. It is of course hard to sympathize with someone if you haven’t experienced their pain. However, it is unfair to not recognize the pain that they are in and say that your problem is worse.
A way that we experience the ego is in local problems and international problems. There are major problems happening both nationally and internationally, but we typically choose to address the problems that are happening at home rather than trying to help across the seas. This is a result of us seeing ourselves as being a self and additionally that we see our problems as being more important than others. Another factor in this is due to the fact we have a self we have an ego, which makes us focus on ourselves.
Another reason that I see a problem with the Bodhisattva ideal is that it says that pain does not have a subject. I see this from the point of view of someone who wants to help. If I wanted to give monetary support to a child in Africa, I can’t write a check to pain and suffering. If pain has no subject that is what I would have to do. I would much rather give money to an organization that helps these people, but that is pain having a subject. If pain does not have a subject we cannot address it. On a personal level, if pain has no subject you cannot fix it internally or externally. If I go to the doctor and I say, I am in pain, but am unable to tell him where they cannot help me. This is why pain must have a subject and why we need to have a self. Without a self pain does not belong to one person, but as previously stated a spectrum.
As previously stated, one of the problems that I have is the lack of distinction of pain in the Bodhisattva idea. Firstly, if I want to be unselfish and help others how would I be able to discern the difference between the pain of myself and that of others. If we were to see pain on a continuum I would be unable to discern my problems with those of others and would be unable to put them first due to the fact that I would not know whose problem is whose.
The second problem that I see with the Bodhisattva ideal, is that it is not fair for me to believe that me stubbing my toe is as bad as a family losing their house in a fire. Clearly one of these problems are worse than another and with the Bodhisattva ideal there is no distinction between these pains. This is something that I am very against, some people have bigger and more important issues than others and it is unfair to say that our own problems are bigger than someone else’s, especially if it is something as serious as a family losing their house. How would they feel if I walked up to them and said that I knew what they were going through because I had stubbed my toe this morning? If pain is all the same this would be an interaction that would make sense because we have both experienced pain of some sort. However, it is a different type of pain.
Overall, I disagree with the points the that the Bodhisattva ideal makes. I am of the opinion that people are more than a series of events and that we are a being. I also disagree with the statement they make that pain is on a continuum and that there is no distinction between different pains. I believe that some people experience more pain than others and it is not fair to them to make their pain seem less.