A hundred years ago, on 6 April 1917, the United States joined in World War I and General Pershing led American soldiers into the European battlefields. This war also revealed initial airpower capabilities and a few years later General “Billy” Mitchell wrote, “with us air people, the future of our nation is indissolubly bound up in the development of air power.” With the introduction of airpower into military operations in the beginning of the 20th century, a new era of warfighting emerged in conquered the air domain. Traditional land- and sea- warfare was challenged by airpower´s famous characteristics: speed, range, mobility, and perspective. The definition of air power has eluded theorists, strategists, and advocates since the invention …show more content…
The most important aspect of theorizing airpower is to avoid conflation with capabilities, missions, or detailed processes for its application. Colin Gray contends, that “airpower has never been driven forward by a strategic and militarily mindless technological momentum. Ideas, theory, and doctrine have always been in the cockpit .” This paper will mirror the following definition against Winton´s five function of theory: Airpower contributes lethal and non-lethal effects in and through the air domain for the joint force to achieve national security objectives by compelling an enemy to do our own will. Firstly, this paper will present main characteristics of former airpower theories. Then, it will categorize the provided theory according to the purpose of airpower. Furthermore, the advantages and limitation of airpower will be …show more content…
They sought to develop eternal principles that would apply to all aspects of air warfare, regardless of time and actual capabilities. Especially the early airpower theorists focused on just one part of airpower capabilities and made overpromising predictions about what strategic bombardment could deliver. Furthermore, with the observation of trench warfare in their minds the bomber seemed to be the final solution: fly over the enemy and attack vital centers, fielded forces, cities or industrial complexes for the production of military goods. They emphasized unilateral action against an enemy without imaging anti air countermeasures like anti-aircraft artillery. Furthermore, those airpower theorists had different notion about how to convince an enemy to abandon their political will and objectives. Douhet was convinced, that attacking the civilian population, even with gas, would people lead to overthrow their government. Mitchell was more focused on industrial centers as promising strategic targets. For all those reasons, Tamy Davis Biddle proves in her masterpiece Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare that allied strategic bombing did not result in in a decisive airpower victory. Wishful
In today’s world, the use of airplanes in wars or in everyday life has become a part of how we live as human beings. Removing the air forces of the world is like taking a step back in time when wars were only fought on land or sea. WWI began only eleven short years after the Wright brothers achieved powered flight in 19031 and yet aircrafts were being used for surveillance and eventually combat purposes. It is understood that these aircrafts were primitive, but they laid down the foundation for what we know today as fighter jets. The Fokker Eindecker “revolutionized air combat by successfully employing a synchronized forward -firing machine gun mounted on the engine cowling”2. Because this airplane became the first to successfully use a synchronized machine gun, it allowed its pilots to become the first aerial combat tactitions3.
1. What do you think of when you drive by that big B-52 at the museum? Being the history buff that I am, I think about Vietnam, where that old “Buff” was used the most. “Why should I care about Vietnam?” you ask yourself. Well, last time I checked there’s a history section in the PFE guide, so there might be a test later! The intent of this paper is to inform you about Operation Linebacker II. I’ll explain the events leading up to the operation, discuss the strategy, and finally I’ll sum up the results of a bombing campaign Sir Michael Knight characterized In the book Strategic Offensive Air Operation as “...may have played a role not unlike two B-29s over Japan 27 years earlier”. (Knight: 77) I’ll start by explaining why President Richard Nixon gave the order to begin this new bombing campaign.
Thesis. Air War College, 1987. http://www.airwar.edu//a>. Maxwell, Alabama: United States Air Force, 1987. DTIC Online -.
...et. If a bomb hit anywhere near a target, it was good luck over anything else. Towards the end of the war, aircraft that would be recognized as long-range bombers had been created. More larger than fighters, and way less maneuverable, their task was simple to carry toward a target as many bombs necessary and to drop them on the certain target with a degree of accuracy. The Germans had produced the Gotha bomber while the British had developed the Handley Page bomber. Even though the deliberate targeting of civilians wasn't a new military tactic, bombers made an aerial attack possible. Airplanes could also attack even a nation’s means of war production, mostly factories. Such an idea would have been impossible in 1914, but by 1918, it was a reality.
The Anglo-American bomber force was divided in terms of strategy. Bomber Command believed it was too risky to bomb by day, while the Americans believed it was too difficult to bomb by night. Initially both forces lacked accurate navigational equipment, which deterred them from precision bombing.
The United States of America is a powerful and well known force throughout the world. It has become a superpower of nations in just about three hundred years, being one of the newest nations in existence today. Its military reaches out into several countries in the globe and holds a presence as a peacekeeper and wielder of democracy. Of the US military’s five branches, the Air Force is the ruler of the skies, keeping control of the earth’s aerospace. Without the Air Force Special Operations, the military could not complete operations as effectively or efficiently as it potentially could. The United States Air Force is a key part of America’s mission to spread and assist democracy throughout the world.
Johnson, David E. Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1998. Print.
Occasional Paper 36. Lexington: Combat Studies Institute, 2011. Westermann, Edward B. & Co. The Limits of Soviet Airpower: The Bear versus the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, 1979-1989. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air Force University, 1997.
Unikoski, Ari. “The War in the Air - Summary of the Air War”. First World War.com. 2009. http://www.firstworldwar.com/airwar/summary.htm
Aerial bombardment was developed by the Germans as a method of spreading material desolation and fear, breaking down the morale of civilians and soldiers alike. Marc Bloch considered air attacks to be far more effective, and more
Lawson, Robert L., and Barrett Tillman. U.S. Navy Air Combat: 1939-1946. Osceola, WI: MBI Pub., 2000. Print.
Following the devastation of trench warfare during World War I, early airpower theorist believed strategic bombing could be the new way to win wars and reduced the number of lives lost. Theorist like, Guilio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, and William “Billy” Mitchel became pioneers and advocates of strategic bombing. They believed striking the enemy’s troops, war-marking industry, and vital centers would produce a decisive victory. The airpower theory would be a key element to the Allies strategy in Second World War (WW2). Leaders in Britain and the United States believed Germany was a greater threat than Japan. Thus, the airpower strategy of the European theater of operation became the primary focus. Allied airpower was decisive in the European theater of WW2. The combination of strategic and tactical airpower produced the defeat of the Luftwaffe and the Third Reich.
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
Unfortunately for contemporary U.S. strategic military planners the most powerful side in war does not always win. Defeat is a real possibility; even in a unipolar world. While the combination of a variety of strategic factors can lead to the defeat of a superior force, four stand out as the most likely explanations for why less powerful actors can, and do, win wars. These four are; the fundamentally unpredictable nature of war, a fatally flawed military strategy adopted by the more powerful adversary, an unforeseen and therefore decisive technological advantage by the less powerful side, and a sheer lack of military effectiveness of the greater power. This paper will analyze these four strategic characteristics in an effort to persuade
Tice, Brian P. (1991). Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – The Force Multiplier of the 1990s. Airpower Journal.