Marc Bloch's Strange Defeat

Strange Defeat was written in the summer of 1940, not long after the French defeat at the hands of the Germans in the Battle of France. However, the book was not published until 1946, two years after Marc Bloch's execution by the Gestapo for participating in the French Resistance. Marc Bloch was well experienced in the ways and means of war, having fought in the First World War; therefore it could be said his work is based upon his own personal knowledge and experiences. In Strange Defeat, Bloch questions where the blame should lie for French failure; the government of France, those serving in the military and the officials at the top, or perhaps even the British.
Aerial bombardment was developed by the Germans as a method of spreading material desolation and fear, breaking down the morale of civilians and soldiers alike. Marc Bloch considered air attacks to be far more effective, and more

damaging than that of an artillery attack. Marc Bloch was a veteran of the First World War, and was well vested in the ways and means of tactical warfare. However, the Second World War ushered in a new era of warfare; one not seen before, and the Germans were at the forefront of it. Bloch also notes that Hitler had hired experts is psychology; believing aerial bombardment to need an element of emotional and cognitive importance, "the Germans... testified to a deep knowledge of nerve sensitivity and means of shaking". Bloch also adds that the German air attacks had been designed as a "process of destruction and massacre", their sole purpose was, along with destruction, to strike fear - an element of war not seen or experienced before.
The British and their effort of cooperation and assistance is also blamed by the French. Though Marc Bloch takes quite a neutral, if not slightly positive view, towards the British war effort, mentioning that "they [the British] are, now more than ever, close to my heart." Bloch mentions that anglophobia and general anti British feelings and animosity became the subject of "miserable exploitation", not only for the fall of France, but even dating back to the many "historical reminiscences" between France and Britain. The British consequently became the scapegoat for French inadequacy; "what better excuse for our failures than the mistakes of others?"
The military officials had an attitude of defeatism and cynicism; his own commander, General Blanchard, was considering capitulation and surrender. The French High Command, in general, had a lack of fighting spirit, having encountered a new type of warfare "face to face and having been incapable of dealing with it." The French High Command suffered defeat by the "first unexpected blow, and they accepted it." Compared to the highest level of the British, who were "affable and confident", the defeat of France was almost expected and considered inevitable by Marc Bloch - he mentions that the French military officials, "at the bottom of their hearts, they were ready in advance to despair of the very country that they were to defend..."
However, the overall basis and most important factor for French defeat was the human element, and that of French society and culture. In the third and final chapter, A Frenchman Examines his Conscience, Bloch argues that the sources of defeat are found in every layer of French society; the workers, the businesses, the middle classes and the leaders are all partly responsible and should take equal blame. Bloch argues that the French officials and civilians alike were still in an outdated mindset; that of one which was stuck in the years of 1914 - 1918. But not only that, it was the interwar period of more than two decades which had left difficulties and divisions. The failure to modernise and industrialise, unlike their German neighbours to the east, whose country had become the industrial powerhouse of Europe, put France at the mercy of Germany, "the donkey car may be a friendly and a charming means of transport," Bloch compares to French industry, "but if we refuse to replace it by the motor car, where the motor car is desirable, we shall find ourselves stripped of everything - including the donkey." Bloch uses this analogy to partly the blame the swift demise of France on its failure to modernise. This was further impacted by the state of France and French society throughout the 1930s, the general feeling of despondency and malaise had, in a way, helped the French lose confidence. Therefore France was further weakened, psychologically, in the face of the German offensive in 1940.
Marc Bloch also compares the French psyche and feelings of patriotism to that of other countries, specifically that of Poland, Bloch remarks "no Frenchman in 1939 aspired to 'die for Danzig'".

He argues that there were general feelings of capitulation in France, and compares the lacklustre resistance effort to that of Poland's. One of the final lines written in Strange Defeat does include a sentiment of patriotism; Marc Bloch speaks of a Frenchman as a "civilised man", and speaks of the French Revolution and Montesquieu. Perhaps comparing the spirit of France as it once was, to how it was at the time of writing. Bloch writes, "how I prefer to evoke the image of an English victory. I do not know when the time will come when, with our Allies, we can regain control of our own destinies," now that France has fallen, as the book is being written in the summer of 1940, he argues that the French people have placed their fate in the hands of others; France's survival now depends on the efforts and strength of other nations, namely Britain, and not the French people themselves

anymore.
To conclude, in Strange Defeat, Marc Bloch argues that much of the responsibility lies at the feet of a nation's people, their collective psyche and general manner. Those in government, the generals and French civilians were complacent and careless regarding imminent and seemingly inevitable war. They made little preparation, little effort for armament and drafting, and there was very little feeling of civilian solidarity and unity. I find Marc Bloch's critique very effective; as he participated in the French resistance and assumed the roles of both a solider fighting for his country and an ordinary citizen. He had already fought in the First World War and found himself fighting for his country again. He analysed events and experiences from an historian's perspective, rather than an historian that is looking into the war, lacking personal experience. He argues that everyone in France is to blame for such a humiliating defeat.