Apollo 13 Failure Essay

Though there have been many successes in human endeavors into space, success does not come without failure. Apollo 13 is the most famous mission next to Apollo 11 but for all the wrong reasons. It is most famously known for not landing on the moon due to complications mid-journey. Though technically the issues faced by Apollo 13 are a result of hardware malfunction, that malfunction can be attributed to issues within the decision making process involved.

After about two and a half days into the Apollo 13 mission, and shortly after their television broadcast, one of the oxygen tanks exploded and caused the other oxygen tank to fail. This resulted in the crew losing access to their water, electricity, and light sources. Fortunately, the mission was not a complete failure as the crew were able to

avert any fatal disasters and return to Earth. Though they missed their intended goal of landing on the moon, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA) considered it a “successful failure”, for the knowledge they acquired through the rescue of Apollo 13’s crew gave them substantial experience, should the need for crew rescue arise in the future.

Though this may seem like a simple malfunction, the outcome could have been avoided. Something that the movies do not illustrate is the way that government institutions like NASA operate outside of just launching rockets and landing on the moon - or not landing. Rockets, lunar landers, rovers, and other vehicles are not produced from thin air; people have to build them, they have to be planned, and they have to be within budget. The oxygen tank initially compromised during the Apollo 13 mission was essentially recycled from the service module of Apollo 10. NASA does a large amount of testing and retesting to minimize the risk of hardware failure but when money and time are a constraint, this can lead to oversight. The tank in question was removed from the Apollo 10 service vehicle and was damaged in the process. Unsurprisingly it was tested afterwards and although it was fixed, it still did not behave as intended. It was retested with

the same result and then, using a different technique, it behaved on par with NASA’s expectations. However, the method that they used to test the tank that provided the result that they were looking for was not without consequence. This test ended up causing damage to an essential piece of the equipment, specifically the heating element contained within the tank. If a piece of equipment is going to be reused, it is imperative it works as well as if it was just manufactured. Surely, putting an older and more worn tire on a brand new car would force the expectation that that part may not function at the same standard as the newer parts. When human lives are at stake, there is no room for error and every necessary steps should be taken to eliminate all risks. Unless there are engineers that worked on Apollo 13 that operate with extreme malice, Apollo 13 is the victim of shortcomings caused by constraints brought on by budget and time. Had NASA acquired a new oxygen tank rather than recycling one from Apollo 10, this crisis may have been avoided. However, that is not what was done. For an administration with such high standards, NASA chose to cut corners. The constraints that must have been placed on Apollo 13 - whether they be financial or otherwise - pressured the NASA engineers into reusing a piece of equipment that had only succeeded testing through a unique circumstance.
Mission planning on a space program scale is a highly complicated process. It involves the effort, cooperation, and consideration of several large groups of people in different departments with many roles. One major obstacle for any organization to mount is a safe design. Without a comprehensive design, the most inconsequential omission of detail can lead to the ultimate consequence.
In 1971, after successful operations between Soyuz 11 and Salyut in Earth’s orbit, the Soyuz crew prepared for descent into Earth’s atmosphere. During this period, a warning light came on indicating that the hatch that connected the orbital and the descent modules was not pressurized. After contacting ground control and being directed through the steps to resolve the issue, it seemed to only have been a small hiccup. The crew even performed tests to ensure the hatch was sealed. Once everything was in order, the crew began their descent. It was not until rescue crews arrived at what appeared to have been a “flawless landing”, that the fate of the three cosmonauts aboard Soyuz 11 became apparent. From the conditions of the three men as made evident by autopsy, all three perished due to suffocation. What caused these men to suffocate was a pressure equalization valve that malfunctioned. The valve was originally designed to separate the orbital module from the descent module using pyrotechnics in a sequence at an altitude of about two and a half miles. Instead, the valve fired all the pyrotechnics at once and did so at more than 100 miles above its intended altitude. The force created by the pyrotechnics opened the valve in question and caused the descent module of Soyuz 11 to depressurize at an unprecedented rate; depressurization at that speed starved all three men of oxygen.
Though the cause of the tragedy was a consequence of an unintended failure, it was not the only issue with the design of the Soyuz. One glaring issue was that the seal between the orbital module and the descent module had not only a visual indicator showing it was not secure, but also a mechanism for closing the connecting hatch. In the descent module there were ventilation valves that also provided a route from the vacuum of space to the crew; these valves did not have any visual status indicators and they had no means of controlling whether it was open or not. Not only that, the noise of transmissions aboard the descent module would have obscured the sound of a pressure leak.
When accidents like this occur, it draws into question the factors that must be considered in the design of equipment used on space vehicles. Is the consideration of every possibility enough? Is it even possible to account for everything? The answer is no, every consideration is not enough because unfortunately, it is impossible to account for everything. Even if every possible scenario in which something fails is taken into account - again strained by time, budget, or both - there will still be the possibility for risks unforeseen. This incident drove teams to make design and procedural revisions for future missions but in the fickle environment of space, no implementations are fail-proof. Because not everything can be predicted, there will always be a risk. There is a point where designers have to decide that their design is suitable and that success is now largely determined by the capabilities of the operators, and even that has its risks.

Bibliography
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Lilley, Steve. “Descent Into the Void.” System Failure Case Studies Volume 4 Issue 9(2010): 2-4.

Dennehy, Cornelius J. and Orr, Jeb S. and Barshi, Immanuel and Statler, Irving C. A Comprehensive Analysis of the X-15 Flight 3-65 Accident. Hampton, Virginia: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2014. Accessed March 19, 2017. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20140013264.