Alexander Schmemann Symbolism

The understandings of “symbol” variously propounded by Alexander Schmemann, Karl Rahner, and Louis-Marie Chauvet have many points of commonality, though occasionally these are expressed so differently it seems they disagree. At other times, their wording is similar, but their meaning appears not to be.
Schmemann and Chauvet cover much of the same ground. Both bemoan the common usage of symbol that makes it synonymous with ‘unreal.’ Chauvet tells us how “the liturgy has paid a heavy price for such a semantic drift…In the end one is left with liturgies literally in-significant in which everything or nearly everything is ‘fake’” (Chauvet, 72). Schmemann notes that similar shifts have happened with other words, namely images and mysteries, and

says that the “transformation of these terms constitutes indeed the source of one of the greatest theological tragedies” (Schmemann, 139). Likewise, both seem aware of the original meaning of the word “symbol.” Chauvet goes into detail describing each aspect of ancient “symbols,” broken pieces joined together. He returns to this image many times to describe how his interpretation fits this example. Schmemann doesn’t describe this in the same way, but is clearly aware, at least, of the literal meaning of symbol, as his wording of “bringing together” appears quite deliberate. Both seem driven to revive a pre-Scholastic understanding, the one used by the early Fathers. But the similarities go well beyond this common enemy and the knowledge of historical usage.
Perhaps the most notable agreement between Schmemann and Chauvet is on the question of participation. For Schmemann, this is key, “for knowledge here depends on participation - the living encounter with and entrance into that epiphany of reality which the symbol is” (Schmemann, 141). For him, symbols are so critical because they allow participation in and that deeper sense of knowing that which is itself inaccessible. Chauvet also recognizes that symbols do this, and lists it among the major functions of the symbol, “it allows all persons to situate themselves as subjects in their relation with other subjects or with the worlds of these other subjects” (Chauvet, 73). Though they say it differently, both seem to be getting at the personal experience of encountering the symbol, the connection between the symbol and a human interpreter, such that they are understood as having a specific relationship.
What is harder to determine is the compatibility between Schmemann’s and Chauvet’s take on the relationship between the symbol and the symbolized. Their language is very similar, and seems very clear. Chauvet gives the example of the Berlin Wall. He reports that “the wall was Berlin, it was the Cold War, it was the communist regime of the Eastern European countries” (Chauvet, 69). Similarly, for Schmemann, though in more abstract terms, “A is B” (Schmemann, 141). But despite sharing an emphasized version of the verb “to be,” clearly equating the symbol with that which it symbolizes, what each actually means is more nuanced and perhaps less similar. Just in the statements above, there is tension. Chauvet speaks as though the connection between between the wall and Berlin was self-evident. However, strictly speaking, one is a city, and one is a part of that city. Schmemann’s use of letter designations to stand in for concrete examples does not rule out that he was thinking of this same relationship. He specifically rules out other relationships, such as “A means B,” and “A represents B,” but neither of these necessarily what Chauvet meant. Rather, the most logical meaning of Chauvet’s “was” is something along the lines of “was an expression of the essence of.” If this is what he intended, then Schmemann would agree, as he explains his equation, “‘A is B’ means that the whole of A expresses, communicates, reveals, manifests the “reality” of B” (Schmemann, 141).
Though it seems they might agree on the relationship between symbol and symbolized, Chauvet complicates his understanding further with another attempt at explaining his meaning:
The symbolic element represents the whole of the world to which it belongs; better it carries it itself.

This is why it is what it represents. Obviously, it is not ‘really’ but ‘symbolically’ what it represents, precisely because the function of the symbol is to represent the real, therefore to place it at a distance in order to present it, to make it present under a new mode.”
Schmemann may quibble over his wording if not the ideas behind them. As already established, he thinks “represent” is too weak a word, and likely, the idea of presenting something “under a new mode” would seem overly reminiscent of the discussions of “form” and “matter” associated not only with the medieval scholastics, but with the “Western captivity” of Orthodox theology that he denounces. Differing personal agendas, whether of distancing oneself from scholastic tendencies or of striving to display continuity with it, do not necessarily speak to the agreement of ideas. And here it does seem that the ideas of Chauvet and Schmemann are generally compatible, even if they exist with some

tension.
Rahner for his part goes about the discussion of symbols quite differently from the other two, though again, his thought is not without commonalities to that of Schmemann and Chauvet. For one thing, unlike the others, he does not consider ancient meanings nor does he complain about the unfortunate common usage. What he does do is acknowledge that he isn’t doing this: With regards to etymology and such, he says, “we must omit all such historical preparatives which lead up to the actual question” and with regards to the “lower order” symbols that merely represent, “we shall not discuss these matters further now.” Instead of drawing his argument to retrieve older definitions, he proposes thinking about things ontologically, a move that Schmemann would appreciate since “to be ‘symbolical’ belongs…to its ontology” (Schmemann, 139).
Another dissimilarity is on the question of participation, which seems less important to Rahner than it was to Chauvet and Schmemann.

Rahner seems to see the encounter with an interpreter as secondary in the characterization of a symbol. Rather, symbolism arises because things “necessarily express themselves themselves in order to attain their own nature” (Rahner, 224). Rahner understands symbols to be self-expression or manifestation, not unlike Schmemann who insisted that “the whole of A expresses, communicates, reveals, manifests the “reality” of B” (Schmemann, 141). Rahner’s contribution though is that this expression/manifestation is primarily an intra-symbol phenomenon. As he puts it “one reality renders another present (primarily for itself and only secondarily for others)” (Rahner, 225). This self-expression that is a symbol is “the way in which it communicates itself to itself” (Rahner, 230). Another being outside itself is not a necessary part of the equation, because the first being produces its own external, the Symbol.
However, Rahner does echo Schmemann’s comment regarding knowledge through participation. He writes, “the symbol is the reality in which another attains knowledge of a being,” (Rahner, 230) whether this ‘another’ is the source of the symbol or truly another. This is likewise similar to Chauvet’s insistence that all knowledge is mediated through language, or symbols, since he holds that the symbol “is in some way the original language of human beings”

(Chauvet, 77). Thus, all three agree in their own way that through encountering the reality inherent in the symbol, one comes to knowledge of that reality.
Many of the examples Rahner provides are of a type that highlight another connection with Schmemann, that symbols allow the “other” to be revealed “precisely as the ‘other;’” (Schmemann, 141). For instance, many of the things that are expressing themselves symbolically are themselves invisible. In the most primordial of all examples, Rahner explains how God does this through the Logos, “his perfect image, his imprint, his radiance, his self-expression” (Rahner, 236). And since “the Logos , as Son of the Father, is truly, in his humanity as such, the revelatory symbol in which the Father enunciates himself” (Rahner, 239), and this “symbol renders present what is revealed,” i.e. the invisible and transcendent God, it does seem that this such a symbol that “communicates…the visibility of the invisible as invisible, the knowledge of the unknowable as unknowable” (Schmemann, 141).
Thus, Schmemann generally agrees with Chauvet, Chauvet generally agrees with Rahner, Rahner generally agrees with Schmemann. Their arguments are all significantly different for sure, and their shared topic is one that is difficult to talk about without precise, well-defined terms, which each develops differently. Their insights though, regarding the nature and workings of symbols are remarkably similar.