What will be Putin's Crimean War?

Alexander I triumphantly enters Paris bringing freedom (but not democracy) to Europe in turmoil after the Napoleonic Wars. Russian Empire emerges as one of the great powers.

However, with new political realities also new challenges arose. The Bourbon Restoration was not enough, and anxiety about political instability in Europe and further possible revolutions against European monarchies made the Russian Empire assume the role of what was later dubbed gendarme of Europe. This anxiety had a solid ground: in the coming years liberal revolutions occurred in Spain and Portugal. July revolution in France, uprisings in German states and Poland (the part of Russian Empire) reminded Nicholas I, Alexander’s successor, of the Decembrist revolt and the fact that his was not immune to the strengthening of liberal sentiment. His legitimacy being based largely on allegiance of the nobility, he found himself in a precarious position. Therefore, he had to simultaneously manage two tasks: hold Russian revolutionary movement at bay and maintain status quo in Europe, both its political and ideological aspects contributing to stability at home.

Military power alone was not enough: after all, Decembrist uprising was carried out by Russian officers infected with European liberal ideas. Thus the need for state ideology arose. This was supplied by Graf Uvarov. Assuming office of the Minister of Public Enlightenment he formulated a famous doctrine incorporating three fundamental pillars of Russian existence: Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality (pravoslavie, samoderzhavie, narodnost’). This was intended to mirror the ‘Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité’ of the Révolution française, and indeed had a comparably profound impact on the Russian culture and consciousn...

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...iss European culture which is ‘rejecting their roots, … denying moral principles and all traditional identities’, as Mr. Putin puts it, much like Nicholas I did. But the state is also eager to exploit nationalist sentiment proceeding from the spate of migrants. In the absence of a major military victory, like that over Napoleon, something else must fuel patriotism. Nationalism is exceptionally convenient.

As Judt argues, the state is indispensable to bind people together. The problem is particularly acute for Russia, where citizens have no confidence in government and much of the social networks are now with the Soviet Union. But this recipe—Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality tied with xenophobia and exceptionalism—we already tried. We must not deceive ourselves about our power and role in the international relations. Otherwise, what will be Putin’s Crimean War?