Volkswagen Case Analysis

This paper will illustrate the moral, social, and factual implications of the Volkswagen scandal regarding the case dealing with emission standards of the diesel Volkswagen vehicles. The reader should note that this analysis will be given from two different philosophical points of view. Namely from the Kantian and Rule-Utilitarian perspective. The paper will attempt to demonstrate the moral implications of the case at hand, and how this applies to Mr. James Liang’s actions. As the reader may know Mr. James Liang worked for the Volkswagen Company for more than 30 years. He and his colleagues worked on creating a low emission diesel engine. In the course of this project, it became apparent that the emission goal could not be achieved with respect

This maxim must be able to project to all other rational beings, and as such should become a universal law. Kantian law requires that whatever the case, one must act in accordance to the end goal, and not treat others as a means to an end. According to this principle, being a rational being implies will, and will is the substance of moral objectiveness. This moral objectiveness requires the ability to define a maxim. Simply put, a maxim is a predefined criteria to decide the moral basis of a given moral dilemma, which in its essence must not be hypothetical, and can be generalized. As such, one must decide if this maxim can be rationalized, and then, perhaps generalized, according to the categorical

Liang did in fact act accordingly to a point of view which gives the most happiness to society. He and his peers devised a plan in which masked the inherent flaws of the diesel motor implementation of Volkswagen. For the greater good of the mechanized world it can be argued that this decision was a clear solution; regardless of the ties of the company. The writer’s perspective is that many like to argue about human progress and ecological damage, but no one wants to give up progress for the greater good. In any case, Rule-Utilitarianism is somewhat objective. This means that perhaps Mr. Liang acted according to his own rule concept of rule, which perhaps was implied upon him by superiors, and perhaps was not. This may imply that as a 30 year veteran of the field he succumbed to error on the side of supererogatory objectives. Nonetheless, it is clear that Rule-Utilitarianism leans in the direction that perhaps Mr. Liang did what was required of him. To the reader it should be clear that Mr. Liang’s approach to the problem was indeed a means to the end and not a means in and of itself. This of course violates Kant’s concept of dignity and autonomy. Yet from the Rule-Utilitarian point of view perhaps he responded as he should for the greater good of the industrial