Values in Metaethics
In John Ludwig Mackie’s book Inventing Right and Wrong, he claims that “in making moral judgments we are pointing to something objectively prescriptive, but that these judgments are all false”. By saying this, he supports his main point that there are no objective values. However, John McDowell will be against Mackie’s argument, for he suggests that besides primary qualities, there are also secondary qualities that can be objective. I hold the same viewpoint as McDowell’s. In this essay, I will firstly explain Mackie’s argument, then illustrate McDowell’s objections, and finally explore some potential responses by Mackie.
In the quote, Mackie argues that there are no moral obligations that are objectively prescriptive. He explains that his claim is based on a second order sense, which means that he does not
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According to Mackie, objective values are considered as primary qualities, which are independent. Objective values are queer because they are not connected to the natural world. Thus, they do not exist in the world. Nevertheless, McDowell argues that values are actually secondary qualities. Specifically, secondary qualities are connected to observers, and depend on observers’ perceptual sensations, while primary qualities such as shapes can be described without any perceiving agent. Although objective values cannot be described by some sort of entities or qualities, they can be perceived by suitably sensitive observers in suitable conditions. Hence, objective values do exist when there are perceivers of these values. Again, take cruelty as an example. Mackie claims that cruelty and wrongness are not connected. However, McDowell would say that since people perceive cruelty, through their sensitive perceptions, they interpret cruelty as wrong. Perceivers act as an interpreting agent, thus giving objectivity to moral
Finally, in Beckwith’s fourth point, he evaluates the absurd consequences that follow moral relativist’s arguments. In his final critique, Beckwith uses typical philosophical examples that Mother Teresa was morally better than Adolf Hitler, rape is always wrong, and it is wrong to torture babies. Beckwith argues that for anyone to deny these universal claims is seen as absurd, yet it concludes with moral objectivism that there are in fact universally valid moral positions no matter the culture from which those individuals
Rossian Pluralism claims that there are multiple things that we have basic, intrinsic moral reason to do, which he names as the prima facie duties. These duties are not real, obligatory duties that one must follow under all circumstances, but are “conditional duties” (Ross 754) that one should decide to follow or reject upon reflection of their circumstances. This moral theory has faced criticisms, most strongly in the form of the problem of trade-offs. However, I will demonstrate that the problem of trade-offs is an issue that can be neglected as a valid objection to Rossian Pluralism because it is applicable to other theories as well and it is a factor that makes a moral theory more valuable than not.
Take for example giving a performance report for a subpar employee. Do you give that person a stellar performance report because you like them as a person? Or are you up front with them and tell them their performance is lacking and needs to improve? To follow the Categorical Imperative, you give them the poor report because it is the right thing to do to help that person succeed in the future. It explores the idea that an act or a decision can still be morally good as it follows the guiding rules of the universe, even if that act does not produce maximized good (Barlaup, 2009).
Monistic theories have failed to be sufficiently broad to provide an adequate answer to any moral scenario they are given. Furthermore, of the main Pluralistic theories, Rossian Pluralism 's inclusion of weighting rules makes it a better candidate for a moral theory than Virtue Ethics, which is far too relativistic to be viable. Finally, although Rossian Pluralism 's weighting rules cannot give an adequate answer to all moral conflicts, one must accept that this is simply the nature of morality itself. It seems unlikely that we will ever find the answer to all conflicts between moral duties, just as it is unlikely that we will find out whether or not paintings by Michelangelo are objectively better than paintings by Picasso, or whether or not one should save ten burning Picasso paintings instead of three burning Michelangelo paintings. Because morality is subjective, we will never find answers to questions that require one to draw meaningless lines where one thing becomes more important than another. Therefore, despite this universal issue, Rossian Pluralism still seems to be the most sensible moral
Sally’s prescriptive moral theory “picks and chooses” from other existing theories and combines them to make a hybrid theory. Doing so creates difficulties as the overlap reduces clarity and limits the strength of any individual argument. This is a challenge that cannot be overlooked; Sally’s theory fails to show structural reliability and is hence too problematic to have sound moral value.
Now, against Unger’s Pretty Demanding Dictate, there might be conflicting views proposed by the defenders of Murphy and Cullity. Murphy and Cullity would both agree that Unger’s Pretty Demanding Dictate is too demanding on us and therefore should have a limit at which point we become free from moral obligations. However, each author holds a different reason for supporting this over-demanding objection; Murphy argues for fairness as a constraint on moral obligation while Cullity argues for self-interest as a constraint.
The question of what constitutes morality is often asked by philosophers. One might wonder why morality is so important, or why many of us trouble ourselves over determining which actions are moral actions. Mill has given an account of the driving force behind our questionings of morality. He calls this driving force “Conscience,” and from this “mass of feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right,” we have derived our concept of morality (Mill 496). Some people may practice moral thought more often than others, and some people may give no thought to morality at all. However, morality is nevertheless a possibility of human nature, and a very important one. We each have our standards of right and wrong, and through the reasoning of individuals, these standards have helped to govern and shape human interactions to what it is today. No other beings except “rational beings,” as Kant calls us, are able to support this higher capability of reason; therefore, it is important for us to consider cases in which this capability is threatened. Such a case is lying. At first, it seems that lying should not be morally permissible, but the moral theories of Kant and Mill have answered both yes and no on this issue. Furthermore, it is difficult to decide which moral theory provides a better approach to this issue. In this paper, we will first walk through the principles of each moral theory, and then we will consider an example that will explore the strengths and weaknesses of each theory.
In the end I see Mackie saying that there are no morally good people, however that is only because there is no such thing as morally good or bad people.
In Phillipa Foot’s article, Moral Beliefs she goes through a lot of discussion and thinking to answer the statement “a great deal hangs on the question whether justice is or is not a good to the just man” (101). This discussion begins with Foot attempting to refute two assumptions about ‘evaluations.’ According to Foot, assumption (1) is the view that one can commend or express his pro-attitude towards a man clasping and unclasping his hands (85). In assessing assumption (1) we question the meaning of the word ‘good’ and the elements it withholds.
J. L. Mackie is an error theorist, who believes that moral values are not objective. He believes that most people have false views about morality, because they have made an invalid assumption that moral values are objective. Mackie makes two main arguments. The first one is the argument from relativity. Mackie argues that moral views differ based on culture, which are influenced by various internal and external variables, which affect the way people live. Mackie uses the example of monogamy. If the culture accepts it, then the individual will because they go along with what their culture accepts.
There is a logical distinction between first and second order moral views. In a first-order moral view a person who adopts either negative or positive is taking a practical, normative, stand. While, second-Order moral view is a view a view about the status of moral values and the nature of moral valuing, about where and how they fit into the world. Example, of a first order moral view, ‘Abortions are horrible’ and second moral view ‘ Even if abortions are horrible it doesn’t give people the right to not perform it’ I believe that Mackie’s
In David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, he divides the virtues of human beings into two types: natural and artificial. He argues that laws are artificial and a human invention. Therefore, he makes the point that justice is an artificial virtue instead of a natural virtue. He believed that human beings are moral by nature – they were born with some sense of morality and that in order to understand our “moral conceptions,” studying human psychology is the key (Moehler). In this paper, I will argue for Hume’s distinction between the natural and artificial virtues.
Philosophy has been a field of study for centuries. Some philosophers have developed ways to determine what is ethical and what is not. This has led to several normative ethical theories describing how people are ought to live a moral life. Some of the most prominent of these theories have set the criteria for morality in very unique and peculiar ways. Two of which are the ethical egoistic theory and the utilitarian theory, each seeing morality in its own distinctive way. By comparing and contrasting the view these theories pose on morality and by analyze how each stands in some of the world’s most modern day issues, one can understand why utilitarianism is a
Harman, G. (2000). Is there a single true morality?. Explaining value and other essays in moral philosophy (pp. 77-99). Oxford: Clarendon Press ;.
HIS essay presents the key issues surrounding the concepts of partiality and impartiality in ethical theory. In particular, it argues that the tension between partiality and impartiality has not been resolved. Consequently, it concludes that the request for moral agents to be impartial does demand too much. To achieve this goal, this essay consists of four main parts. The first part gives an overview of the concept of impartiality. The second deals with the necessity of impartiality in consequentialism and deontology. The third deals with the tension between partiality and impartiality (Demandingness Objection). Specifically, how a duty to perform supererogatory acts follows from impartial morality. The fourth and final part refutes positions that maintain that partiality and impartiality have been reconciled. Therefore, it demonstrates that current ethical theories that demand moral agents to behave in a strictly impartial fashion are unreasonable.