Moral Beliefs By Phillipa Foot Summary

In Phillipa Foot’s article, Moral Beliefs she goes through a lot of discussion and thinking to answer the statement “a great deal hangs on the question whether justice is or is not a good to the just man” (101). This discussion begins with Foot attempting to refute two assumptions about ‘evaluations.’ According to Foot, assumption (1) is the view that one can commend or express his pro-attitude towards a man clasping and unclasping his hands (85). In assessing assumption (1) we question the meaning of the word ‘good’ and the elements it withholds.

Foot argues that the term ‘good’ has nothing laid down but the evaluative meaning is ‘internally’ related to its objects. She describes her point by saying how one cannot hold their belief that

something is dangerous unless he or she is supposedly threatened by a serious evil such as an injury or death; and unless the action is approved or believed to be in connection to human good or harm. In relevance, the discussion of virtue arises in Book I of the Republic, when Cephalus talks about pleasure. Cephalus states that it’s a question of character that we are orderly and content with ourselves (329d). Aristotle continues this conversation with Plato’s insight that happiness is connected with goodness when we consider the afterlife. Tales of Hades have been told that – the one who has done unjust deeds/injustice must pay the penalty there. It is said that man who have committed misdeeds in his life would often find themselves waking from their sleep in fright, of the anticipated evil. However, to the man who is conscious in himself of no unjust deed, sweet and good hope is ever beside him – a nurse of his old age (330e-331a). In regards to this, it can be supposed that justice is a good to the just man and we must be ‘just’ in order to be happy.
Previously, Foot argued how one cannot hold their belief that something is dangerous unless he or she is supposedly threatened by a serious evil such as an injury or death; and unless the action is approved or believed to be in connection to human good or harm. In discussion of this, Foot points at the oddity of the suggestion of how the clasping of the hands can be called a good action, without reference to any special background. This is because ‘this is a good action’ covers a diverse range of cases. However, in this case the clasping of the hands cannot be considered as a good action. Since, Foot ultimately states that a moral virtue must be connected with human good or harm for it to fill in the special background. In summary, Foot believes that she has refuted assumption (1) that just anything can be commended, because in order for something to be commended it must be believed to fit into some pattern of justification, like falling under a virtue or fulfilling a duty.
In reference to this, the idea of conventional justice comes into play. In the Republic, Cephalus is the image of conventional decency. He states that, “the possession of money contributes a great deal to no cheating or lying to any man against one’s will, and, moreover, to not departing for that other place frightened because on owes some sacrifices to a god or money to a human being” (331b). He says that we are just when we tell the truth and pay our debts, as he does. Socrates calls this a “fine sentiment” but he points out that there are some cases when it seems unjust to tell the truth or to pay a debt (331c). According to Cephalus, when a person is unjust, “he often … awakes from sleep in terror, and lives in anticipation of evils to come” (330e). Note that Cephalus is not claiming that if we are unjust, we will suffer crude punishments in the afterlife which is uncertain. But what is certain is that there is the fear of such punishments and this fear is already a punishment. Not only does it keep us awake at night but makes us miserable. Cephalus suggests that the only way to avoid this, is to live justly. His idea of justice is conventional in that he believes justice is treating other people appropriately, which is subjective because what does it mean to treat people appropriately?
Glaucon points out that justice stems out from human weakness and vulnerability.

Since we can all suffer from each other’s injustices, humans create a social contract agreeing to be just to one another to keep everyone in check. Justice is not something we practice for its own sake but something one engages in out of fear and weakness. He uses the example of the ring of Gyges to prove his point. Glaucon claims, that even the most just man would behave unjustly if he had this ring (359d). This tale proves that people are just only because they are afraid of the punishment and not that justice is desirable in itself. Following this, Plato states that “justice is only a social contract” and is to the advantage of the strong (362b). However, Socrates proves that justice is the best sort of good like

knowledge.
According to Socrates virtue is knowledge in that it has “external goods” and “qualities of the soul,” that will benefit us if we make good use of it. This good use of everything is guided by knowledge. In order to prove that justice is the best sort of good, Socrates explains what justice is by providing an example with the idea of the city. He questions why cities exist and Plato answers that every human has certain needs. He uses the example such as the unequal distribution of talent and expertise. He states that the best way to exploit this distribution is to form a city where together the citizens are able to develop a simple economy in which each produce is enough for all and is provided for all. However, justice and injustice can be found within the city in that

According to Foot, while prudence, courage and temperance are qualities that benefit the man who has them, justice seems to benefit others and work to the disadvantage of the just man himself (99).

She states that justice is treated like one of the cardinal virtues and covers all the things that are owed to people. This can be seen in Socrates’ example where he explains about justice. Foot continues on about how man who avoids injustice will find themselves unable to obtain an advantage by cheating and lying which can be seen described by Thrasymachus in the first book of the Republic, in order to show that injustice is more profitable than justice to a man of strength and wit (99). As Foot continues, she states that we should consider the possibility that justice is not a virtue if justice cannot be answered as to whether they need the use of their hands and eyes, or needs prudence, courage and temperance. This suggestion was taken by Socrates in the Republic, where it was assumed that if Thrasymachus had established his hypothesis more firmly that injustice was more profitable than justice, his conclusion would’ve been that “man who had the strength to get away with injustice had reason to follow this as the best way of life”

(100).