Parfit’s view on the nature of persisting persons raises interesting issues in terms of identity. Though there are identifiable objections to his views, I am in favor of the argument he develops. This paper will layout Parfit’s view on that nature of persisting person, show support as well as argue the objections to the theory. In Derek Parfit’s paper Personal Identity, Parfit provides a valid account of persisting persons through time through his clear account of psychological continuities. He calls people to accept the argument that people persist through time but people do not persist or survive by way of identity.
Here is a brief summary of the argument of persisting persons. Parfit, with the help of the work of David Hume, believes that there is no enduring self. That is to say, that the person I am when I was born of the mother’s womb is not the person I am today, and the person I am today is not the same person ten years, ten days or perhaps ten minutes from now. Parfit argues for a perduring self. People are able to persist through time through overlapping psychological mental states. This is similar to Hume’s Bundle Theory, which argues that the self is made up of a bundle of overlapping experiences, conscious events, rather than a central person. When Parfit talks of persistence, what he means by persistence is these ongoing psychological states. For people seeking answers about the big life and death questions about identity, Parfit does not provide any answers here. In fact, he wants people to get over the idea of identity through time because it assumes that there is a right answer concerning identity. Essentially, it is a waste of time to worry if you are going to be the same person or not.
I was surprised b...
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... it’s not about the destination but the journey.
Works Cited
Parfit, Derek. "Personal Identity." The Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 3-27.
Hume, David. "6: Personal Identity." Treatise of Human Nature. 132-40.
Hestevold, Scott. Class Lecture. Metaphysics. University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Al. 23 February 2011
Parfit, Derek. "Personal Identity." The Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 3-27. 5.
Hestevold, Scott. Class Lecture. Metaphysics. University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Al. 23 February 2011
Parfit, Derek. "Personal Identity." The Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 3-27. 15.
Hestevold, Scott. Class Lecture. Metaphysics. University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Al. 25 February 2011
Parfit, Derek. "Personal Identity." The Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 3-27. 13.
Parfit, Derek. "Personal Identity." The Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 3-27. 27.
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Personal identity examines what makes a person at one time identical with a person at another. Many philosophers believe we are always changing and therefore, we cannot have a persisting identity if we are different from one moment to the next. However, many philosophers believe there is some important feature that determines a person’s identity and keeps it persistent. For John Locke, this important feature is memory, and I agree. Memory is the most important feature in determining a person’s identity as memory is the necessary and sufficient condition of personal identity.
The question ‘who am I?’ raises speculations about who we are as human beings and why we behave the way we do. This is of great interest to social psychologists. One particular theory about this social identity is that it is not fixed or innate but that it is something that changes over time and is constructed through our social interactions with other people. This essay will explicate the idea of socially constructed identities and consider the evidence for and against this view with examples of research studies from both social constructionism (Phoenix, 2007) and Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Turner and Brown, 1978).
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Among carpenters, it is a well-known fact that building a house upon a solid foundation is imperative. When beginning the construction of a home, the foundation is always the first step leading to success, for without it, the house will become unstable. During extreme weather, such as floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and other conditions, a slight fault in the foundation of a home will most likely guarantee significant damage, if not complete destruction. Similar to a house, a person’s identity must rest upon a firm foundation; otherwise, it may not be capable of withstanding the ominous conditions of the world. When trials and burdens threaten to crumble people’s identities, their foundations must stand their ground and overcome the various tribulations. Although there are billions of inhabitants of the world, no two people share the same identity; rather, each person has unique memories, stories, events, and artifacts influencing who they have become. Some people’s identities may reflect a difficult childhood of discrimination, poverty, and hatred similar to the one described by Malcolm X in his article, “Nightmare.” Other people may associate with Katie Pederson and her article, “Identity,” in which they are defined through a simple artifact such as an identification card. In addition, numerous unfortunate people may struggle from the devastating effects of memory loss similar to those Floyd Skloot experienced, and they are helpless as their memories and identity slowly slip away from them. Still other people may find themselves desperately searching for acceptance and identity similar to the homeless man in Gina Berriault’s article, “Who Is It Can Tell Me Who I Am.” Unlike the homeless man and Malcolm X, I was fortuna...
Philosophers have been pondering over the problem of personal identity for centuries and today we still have not completely figured it out. The body and soul theories clearly failed to answer that, so philosopher John Locke attempted to answer the question with his new theory, the memory theory. The memory theory states that an identical persons are equal to one another if they share at least one memory experience. This means that a present person that his past self are only identical person’s if they can both recall one memory. For example, Johnny at age 30 and Johnny at age 12 both remember their big birthday party when they were seven, so they are considered to be the same person. As stated in the claim, it only applies to memory experiences,
...e person themselves, and as such, lasts only as long as that identity as chosen by the individual.
This essay has covered the concept of practical identities and their unique characteristic of contingency as well as the foundation of all value in our actions that all rational beings have- moral identity. Reflecting on these ideas, one can relate to the conception of practical identities or moral identity. However, the suggestion of their contingency or non-contingency and their importance in one’s life is questionable. One is led to wonder what the real source of value in one’s action is and the real weight of practical and moral identities in one’s
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Personal identity or the identity of self is defined as the conditions under which a person can be considered to be the same at two different times. Locke bases personal identity or the idea of self squarely on consciousness...
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Personal identity is a persistent debate which plays a great role in modern philosophy, it centres around the concept of a consistent and continuous concept of self, which we as individuals identify with, it is the question of “what constitutes the persistence of personhood over time?” Hume’s theory of personal identity suggests that the term “self” is coined in a misleading manner, which assumes it to be an independent concept. His theory on personal identity, or namely the lack of it, argues that there is no concept of a self only a culmination of rapid successive perceptions. Hume develops this idea in his book Treatise, where he attempts to answer the question of what a personal identity is through criticism and analysis of the different