Against the Fission Argument
Introduction
Parfit defines fission as a process of transferring part of an individual’s brain into another body while the other half of the brain is kept alive and put in another body. He suggests that when this process takes place, an occurrence of three possibilities may take place: an individual may not survive; and individual may survive as one of the two individuals in two different bodies; or an individual may survive as both “in that the individual has two bodies and a mind that is divided” (Loux 375). Parfit thinks that each of these three possibilities should be rejected. Moreover, he wants to refute that for any question concerning the survival of personal identity in the fission process, there should
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be no answer that is true (Loux 375). He argues that after the fission process, the outcome where one or two personal identities are created may result in answers that are not believable (Loux 375). Parfit suggests that if individuals do away with this issue of believing the outcome of the fission process, as he thinks it should be, then the problem of providing answers to questions that are unbelievable will disappear (Loux 375). Parfit’s main use of fission process argument is to inspire the claim that identity of an individual does not matter in survival. Arguments Parfit is a philosopher whose work focuses on ethics, personal identity and rationality. It is his work in personal identity that focuses on people’s identity and whether a person’s brain can be put in another body, while the other part of the brain is kept alive in another person’s body. In his argument, he assumes the possibility of brain bisection or commissurotomy that is, the puncturing of the corpus callosum, i.e., the removal of the cerebral cortex surgically of one brain hemisphere. The use of commissurotomy was realized when it was utilized to treat epilepsy in the 1950s (Nagel 399). However, cases of fission additionally take on the likelihood, in some sense, of dividing the subcortical regions, and specifically the lower brain. This is not possible physically without causing damage to the upper functions of the brain. In causing damage to the upper functions of the brain, it simply implies that fission is impossible because the individual’s body will not survive the procedure. Therefore, fission can be conceived mentally but not physically. The fission argument can also be refuted through the psychological account of an individual’s identity which suggests that an individual’s existence just consists of occurrence of series of events that are mentally connected to each other (Parfit 207).
Direct connections include intention, memory, and continuity of desire and belief. The connection of “psychological continuity” and “psychological connectedness” provides a foundation for the psychological account of an individual’s identity (Parfit 207). The psychological connection can be explained in a simple way. Let us create two individuals called Y1 and Y2 from one individual called X. Individual X is psychologically connected to individual Y1 and Y2, where there connection is called …show more content…
C. The above psychological connection illustrates that as a consequence of fission, psychological continuity is not adequate for personal identity. Let us look at the illustration in detail. When an individual’s brain X is transferred to another individual’s brain Y1 and the other half of the individual’s brain Y2 is kept alive and put in another body, in essence, even though brain Y1 would survive in another body, it is hard to predict whether the death of brain Y2 will result in the death of individual X because the transferred brain Y1 will not have a connection with brain Y2. Let us further look at the flaw presented by the theory of fission using different scenarios. In one scenario, if one individual Y1 knocks down unconscious another individual Y2 and transplant one of the brain hemispheres of individual Y2 into another body Y3, and drops individual Y2 at home before individual Y2 wakes up, then, if the transplant was successful then individual Y2 will die and individual Y3 will survive. This implies that the personal identity of individual Y2 will not survive and continuity of the individual’s conscious will not survive. Therefore, the theory of fission overlooks the importance of survival of a personal identity. The problem occurs when the personal identity of an individual is transferred to another body does not bear any resemblance to the original body before transference. What does an individual call this new identity? It could be that this new identity in a new body lacks some of the personal identity from the original body. Hence, the theory of fission does not hold when looking at the transfer of brain. Views and Opinions The problem with Parfit’s fission argument is that personal identity of an individual does not have a substantial influence on the process of survival.
This implies that in case the process of fission is successful and part of a person’s brain is transferred to another body, the personal identity will disappear because part of the brain will not be present. However, personal identity is an important part of a human being’s life when it comes to survival because a person’s identity is made up of both part of the brain. His fission argument is unrealistic because transferring part of an individual’s brain into another body is medically impossible. Any attempt to transfer an individual’s brain to another body as seen in the discussion will cause damage to the upper functions of the brain. Also, if the procedure of transferring part of an individual’s brain into another body is successful, it is possible that the part of the brain left behind in the original body will not survive. What makes the loss of personal identity possible is the lack of psychological connectedness in fission. The two brain parts in different bodies are not connected to a single body that can make sense of the conscience that is left in an individual’s body or in the transferred body.
Conclusion
Parfit’s fission argument may be conceivable in a situation where an individual’s part of the brain is successfully transferred to another body. However, as seen in the discussion, the personal identity of an individual
does not survive because the transfer of the brain to another body renders the other body left with the other part of the brain unconnected and not survivable. Therefore, fission is not possible because it does not allow for personal identity to survive after a successful fission of a person’s brain into another person’s body has taken place.
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It is thus believed that the person has through this indoctrination process undergone a metamorphosis that has led to him/her becoming a “robot” like being that has effectively been stripped of the ability of independent functioning and the power of critical reasoning thereby effectively leaving hi...
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Valde, G. (1996). Identity closure: A fifth identity status. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 157(3), 245-254.
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