Thucydides multifaceted yet thorough account of the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415 BC allows a modern strategist an opportune and relevant model for the application of the end-ways-means construct for analyzing Athenian strategy. Through insights gained reviewing this campaign’s planning and execution, I will illustrate and link justifications for the Athenian intended ends. I will similarly articulate their ways through their planning and methods, then their means through their resources and force composition and strength. Finally, an evaluation of risks ties these factors together and allows an assessment on overall failures.
As background to the expedition in 415 BC, Thucydides reviews colonization efforts and founding of at
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least 13 various cities by barbarian and Hellenes groups.1 His review of settlement, subsequent conflicts, and changing demographics illustrate a complex intermixing of peoples and loyalties on the island and the mainland of Italy. He also mentions two other relevant operations in Sicily in 427 and 426 BC. The first operation was Laches expedition in 426 BC with the objective to aid old allies, block corn exports that might aid the Peloponnese, and take any opportunities to expand their presence and territories.2 The second mention is the relief force under Eurymedon sent in 426 BE in order to reinforce efforts underway there. This second expedition, however, is diverted during storms and subsequently begins operations under Demosthenes at Pylos instead.3 While Thucydides does not layout a mission analysis or intelligence briefing in our modern sense, the fact that he highlighted these events as pretext goes a great way in showing that leaders and orators in Athens were perhaps out of touch with the current state of affairs in Sicily and Italy. As Athens was essentially at a stalemate with Sparta in the sixth year the Peace of Nicias, Athens felt it was in a position to press for any advantages that did not outright break its treaties.
The Athenians had essentially three desired ends for the 415 BC Sicily expedition; all were described by Nicias in his speech to the Athenian assembly and in Thucydides assessment of speeches. The first two objectives were clear; first to respond to the Alliance with Egesta and remove the threat from Selinus and second to restore Leontini. The third objective was less solid in that it was to take opportunities for the “conquest of the whole of Sicily.”4 These objectives were formulated based on pleas and evidence of funding from Egesta. Greed played its part in that Athens felt that Egesta would be covering the costs for keeping the navy in a state of readiness as well as justifying the opportunities for expansion. This in essence was also the same set of objectives as the 426 BC expedition but in a less resource-constrained environment than previously. This expansion was justified as an effort to continually tip any balance of power in its primary national interest against Sparta, even if preemptive actions (as advocated by Alcibiades)5 against powers like Syracuse were needed. Thus Athens, using the means of an idle yet powerful army and navy, could expand their influence at no cost to the greater war with Sparta. This theory had already been employed successfully against …show more content…
Melos.6 Nicias had made an entreaty that Sicily was too far away to maintain rule over and that Athens should focus on problems closer to home, however, the Athenian assembly favored moving on Sicily as they felt their objectives were suitably aligned. If there was a setback of any kind, Syracuse and thus their trade partner Sparta would at least be weakened.7 To meet their new objectives, the Athenians planned to employ their previously successful ways and methods with some minor revisions necessary due to the greater distance. First, they would deploy a massive naval fleet to establish dominance at sea and ensure mobility of any land forces. This fleet would also show Athenian power to unaligned cities with the intent to sway them into alliance. For the first year of the campaign, this fleet achieved its purpose, until continuous use started to take its toll on maintenance and then its numerical superiority was also challenged by Corinth and Sparta. Second, to meet the challenge of distance and related control concerns, the fleet would divide into three squadrons, resupply at friendly cities enroute past Italy, and convince those cities to join the alliance as well. Here they met significant disappointment enroute being closed out of cities (until arriving at Rhegium) and not rallying any to join them. Third, they would also send a heavy land force to capture Selinus and any other city of opportunity and also be large enough to counter the strength of Syracuse.8 Again, the army experienced mixed results employing indirect approach and mobility, as evidenced by successes at Hycarra, Catana, and Centoripa but not Himera, Hybla, Messana, or Megara, yet maintaining full mobility to position themselves twice for striking Syracuse.9 As the army was drawn into long sieges at Syracuse10 and its advantages were countered by the combined resolve of Syracuse and its allies, objectives were refined or narrowed and Nicias realized how much the mission was jeopardized. The lesser might of closer Syracuse had swayed the Sicilian cities more than the stronger but distant might of Athens. In enthusiastic preparations the Athenians were aware of the strength and influence of Syracuse and planned for overwhelming means to ensure success.
From Athens and its Aegean and Ionian allies, they would send 134 triremes with over 7100 hoplites and lighter infantry (not including crews) and an additional 130 merchant ships and boats of tools, equipment, and supplies to meet logistics and engineering challenges.11 To augment this they counted on whatever forces, particularly cavalry, Egara could provide. Egara was to fund much of the endeavor and went to great lengths to deceive Athens that they could.12 Finally, Athens would establish bases of support and add to its strength by bringing various cities in Sicily to its side.13 By my account this was a feasible list of resources (means) to support the intended courses of action (ways) as it provided potentially overwhelming force compared to any local forces singly and was at least a match for the combined efforts of a few of them. However, the failure to secure two of these major means - the required funds from Egara and the friendly cities as bases of supply and to maintain their fleet - immediately limited the flexibility of operations. Athens assumptions about Egara and other Sicilian cities had simply failed to become fact. Subsequently, the list of opposing cities and forces was longer than
expected. Fallacious Athenian assumptions throughout the planning and execution ultimately undermined the expedition, hence the strategy was flawed. In setting their objectives, the Athenians never considered the risks of their enemies operations and counter-moves. They relied on the existing peace treaty and Sparta’s limited naval capability into a mental trap that Athens could operate independently in this new western theater. Chance played an important but lesser part and as numerous present-day leaders say, “the enemy gets a vote.” This was particularly true as Athens fleet was defeated and Athenian forces were “…plunged ever deeper into bewilderment than ever.”14 While Nicias and Alcibiades had both spoken of the possibility of failure and withdrawal, neither had considered outright destruction of their forces. They had relied on Egara to fund the expedition and never considered the risk that without Egara’s contributions, the entire campaign’s resources were a sunk cost that would never be repaid. Finally, the Athenians believed Alcibiades notion that numerous local cities would come over to the Athenian side, never considering the risks of facing Syracuse and its allies alone. As I mentioned in discussing means above, this did not materialize and the Athenians subsequently did not achieve their planned force overmatch or have a reliable logistics and support network. Nicias spoke to the assembly before departing of the “folly to go against men who could not be kept under even if conquered.”15 He had felt the objectives too far reaching to begin with. Although Athens had ambitious objectives, they employed tried and true ways, and resourced themselves with unprecedented means to accomplish the campaign, in the end Nicias was proved right to fear the over-eagerness of the assembly and his fellow leaders to ignore risks of assumptions and never consider the effects of enemy actions or chance.
There is no coincidence that the rise of Athenian Democracy goes chronologically hand in hand with the rise of the Athenian Navy. Following the defeat of the Persians by the Greeks, Athens’ naval successes allow it to surpass the previous naval power of Corinth; create the Delian league to fund and support this navy; and eventually ruffle enough feathers with their fellow Hellenic neighbours that they inspire the Peloponnesian war. Overall their naval reputation and intimidation comes from the skill of the men who maneuver and command the ships, and the tool they use to wield their power, the Athenian trireme. By looking at the design of the trireme, and the work and numbers put both into the ship and the men that drive it, hopefully both the wealth and skill of the Athenian navy can be appropriately highlighted. In the end, it is this immense power and resources that allow the Athenians to overstep their limits and caused such demoralizing defeats such as the expedition at Syracuse and the eventual loss of the Peloponnesian war, after which they prove unable to grow to the same undefeated sea power they were.
Thucydides accounts that the allies saw this as a great advantage – ‘Because of their dislike for Pausanias, [the allies] were glad to see her [Athens] do so’. Yet this seems terribly ironic considering the events that followed Athens’ promotion of leadership. Athens first task as leader was to assess the various forms of finance that were crucial to the league. It required a strong fleet of ships and strong funds in order to function.
While the army reached Thermopylae intact, the fleet suffered at the hand of two storms, with Herodotus attributing them to God attempting to equalize the opposing forces . The disparity between the size of the Persian and the size of the Greek forces was huge – thus, the Greeks’ strategy relied on geography . Holding the narrows at Thermopylae and the concurrent straits of Artemisium meant that Xerxes’ numerical superiority was reduced. It was here, on land and sea, that Greece showcased the superiority of it...
1) According to Thucydides, during the civil war at Corcyra a re-evaluation of values took place in the populace (3.82). Explain the nature of these re-evaluations, and the reason(s) they took place.
In 480 and the years prior the Athenians and Spartans, banned together to defeat the Persian Army. The Spartans stand at Thermopylae, allowed the Athenians time to prepare, and ultimately allowed the victory. With both of these great city-states located so close together in Hellas, there differences would ultimately lead to dissension. Throughout the course of this paper, I hope to explain the reasoning behind the dissension between Sparta and Athens, made war between these former allies inevitable.
The main reason that the Greeks were able to win the Second Greco-Persian War was the fact that their victory on the sea dealt a crippling blow to the land army. The Greeks owe their naval success to a man named Themistocles. If it had not been for him then Athens would have not used some newly found silver to build 200 new ships for their navy. These ships were later used in the war against the Persians. The two forces were working in unison and they were dependent upon each other for victory. The Persian naval forces were there in order to protect the flank of the army's advance. If the Persian navy were not present then the Greeks would have been able to get on ships and sail to a spot behind the Persian lines and outflank them. They also delivered supplies to the armies that were necessary for its survival.
...s. Through the definition of Athenian nature, the Corinthian anticipate the inevitable conquest of Sparta. The differences between Spartan and Athenian character is meant to facilitate a new approach by Sparta for defending peace. The Corinthians argue that the Athenians by nature are dangerous and the Spartans must attack first. The Corinthians address the differences in Athenian and Spartan natures to depict the inevitable dominance of a single one. According the Corinthians, the “use [of] their power” invokes a preemptive attack. The preemptive attack is capable of deterring the Athenian interest in the Peloponnesus. The Corinthians imply an initial attack against Athens is capable of preventing the growth of Athenian confidence. The Corinthians imply preemptive attacks are justified if they prevent an aggressor from posing a threat to an empire or alliance.
The book written by Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, contains two controversial debates between distinguished speakers of Athens. The two corresponding sides produce convincing arguments which can be taken as if produced as an honest opinion or out of self-interest. The two debates must be analyzed separately in order to conclude which one and which side was speaking out of honest opinion or self-interest, as well as which speakers are similar to each other in their approach to the situation.
As can be expected from pioneer governmental institutions, Athenian democracy was not perfect. In fact it was far from it. It resulted in the establishment of poor policies by aggressive populists who sought "...private ambition and private profit...which were bad both for the Athenians themselves and their allies." (Thucydides). These self interested populist leaders with personal gain in mind established extensive internal political instability "...by quarrelling among themselves [and] began to bring confusion into the policy of the state." (Thucydides). Repeated opportunities to accept terms of peace after the battles of Pylos (425), Arginusae (406) and Aegospotami (405) were ignored by the inefficient Athenian demos eventually resulting in the devastation of the once dominant city-state. Internal political strife can also be attribu...
There was lots of debate between all of the Greek military leaders about whether they should go with Themistocles plan or not. Luckily, they went with it because who knows what would have happened if they did not. This was the last chance for Greek survival, and everyone knew that. Attica was already under attack by the Persian land force, which was commanded by Xerxes, Darius’s son. The bay of Salamis was also a convenient battle location because, if needed, the Greeks could draw the Persian fleet to the Peloponnese where the Greek reinforcements would meet them....
In the years following the Persian Wars in 479 B.C., Athens had come out on top being the most dominantly powerful of any Greek city with a navy that had superior strength that increased day by day. The Athenians “ruled with heavy-handed, even brutal force as well as with reason” (Kagan 2). This was due largely to the fact that Athens had a stable and effective government, which only increased their advantage in proving themselv...
Works Cited: The Melian Dialogue, Thucydides
Robert B. Strassler (80) is President of Riverside Capital Management and General Partner of Weston Associates. He is also self-described “unaffiliated scholar,” a viola da gamba musician, a collector of musical instruments and Secretary/Treasurer of The Barrington Foundation, where his brother David is president. He has been an AJWS major gift donor since 2004.
The battle demonstrated that the Athenian-led Delian League could accomplish its objectives (“Battles”). In the Aegean Sea, the Persian fleet was no longer a real threat to the Greeks (“Battles”). A year after the battle, Cimon invaded and defeated the remaining Persian forces in the Thracian peninsula (“Battles”). This victory acquired the Greek fleet's definite control of the Aegean Sea and allowed the Athenians freely to follow their broader political motive; making the Delian League allies tributary states in an Athenian empire and challenging for the supremacy in the Greek world (“Battles”). This situation lasted until the annihilation of the Athenian expeditionary force in Egypt, probably between 460 BC - 456 BC, which contributed that the Persians became a major naval power in eastern Mediterranean again
The ends for the Sicily campaign went awry due to Athens greed for expansion spurred by false claims of war financing from the Egestaens and the assumption that the Peace of Nicias would endure, thus reducing the Spartan threat to the homeland. Athenian leaders were lulled initially into the expedition due to the fallacy of appeal to fear by the Egestaens. Athens should intervene otherwise the Syracusans would conquer Sicily, reunite with Sparta, and become a formidable future threat to Athens . The Sicily campaign was an attractive offer to Athens, an outside party financed the war effort and success would reduce a future threat. These ends were wholly unachievable because they were based on two fatal flaws, the Egestaens did not truly have the financing available to fund additional triremes and hoplites, and the fragile Peace of Nicias would not hold due to its fallibility to return cities to Sparta and Athens . Although the ends were clearly defined, to acquire Sicily to expand the Athenian empire, they were derived under false pretenses and required considerable means to