Spartan Expedition Analysis

When embarking upon an expedition for war certain preparations should be made to guarantee success of the expedition. We, as formidable senior leaders and strategic military planners evaluate criteria as we plan for these “expeditions” using a system to assist us in satisfying the political objective (ends), devising the method for achieving the objective (ways), and gathering resources (means) to meet that objective. Upon close examination of the Athenian Sicily Expedition during the Peloponnesian War (431 BCE- 404 BCE), Athens experienced severe difficulty in astutely applying the ends-ways-means construct. Senior Athenian leaders hastily framed the political ends and largely succumbed to the appeal to fear fallacy of Spartan expansion to

garner public support for the Sicily campaign. They wished away certain consequences if the expedition failed. Neither did Athens wholly assess risk in defining the ways of the campaign, as there were three differing strategies from the Athenian generals in prosecuting the campaign. Finally the means were severely overextended to defeat Syracuse abroad and protect the homeland from Spartan attacks. The Sicily campaign would ultimately fail because of these flaws and became the turning point for Athens’ demise in the Peloponnesian War.
The political objectives of Athens for the Sicily campaign began much in the same way as their entrance into the Peloponnesian War, to form alliances and protect a weaker ally from an aggressor.

The ends for the Sicily campaign went awry due to Athens greed for expansion spurred by false claims of war financing from the Egestaens and the assumption that the Peace of Nicias would endure, thus reducing the Spartan threat to the homeland. Athenian leaders were lulled initially into the expedition due to the fallacy of appeal to fear by the Egestaens. Athens should intervene otherwise the Syracusans would conquer Sicily, reunite with Sparta, and become a formidable future threat to Athens . The Sicily campaign was an attractive offer to Athens, an outside party financed the war effort and success would reduce a future threat. These ends were wholly unachievable because they were based on two fatal flaws, the Egestaens did not truly have the financing available to fund additional triremes and hoplites, and the fragile Peace of Nicias would not hold due to its fallibility to return cities to Sparta and Athens . Although the ends were clearly defined, to acquire Sicily to expand the Athenian empire, they were derived under false pretenses and required considerable means to

succeed.
In crafting military ways to achieve political ends, other variable must be considered, chiefly the enemy, terrain and sustainment for a long campaign.

In this regard, Athens failed. Athens was not prepared to conduct warfare against an unknown opponent. Athens was unsure of how fervent the Syracusans would fight having never faced them in battle. Little was known about the terrain of Sicily and where it was vulnerable . In the face of uncertainty, a sensible military leader would heavily weight his attacking force. Mass becomes the crucial factor to ensure victory is achieved. Athens had trouble in formulating a military strategy to guarantee success. The three Athenian generals had differing opinions in dispatching Syracuse. Alcibiades pursued a path of alliance followed by attacking the dissenters, Lamachus favored a surprise attack on Syracuse to crush political will, and Nicias preferred a demonstrative show of force to deter Syracuse from further action . Each of these actions required varying levels of means from lowest to highest concentrations of military force. An unclear, disjointed strategy cannot be adequately resourced. Nicias realized this early on in preparing for the Sicilian campaign, and had thus heavily weighted the Athenian military in the pursuit of the campaign . The military was appropriately resourced to execute each of the three Generals’ strategies, but at a great cost. For success and holding Sicily, the Athenian military would most likely

have to garrison there and leave the Athenian homeland unprotected from Sparta during a time of fragile peace. There simply were not enough resources to prosecute a two-theater war.
Athens failed to protect the homeland by sending her entire military to wage the Sicilian campaign. She had left herself greatly exposed as the Peace of Nicias was beginning to splinter. Both Sparta and Athens realized that they did not have the power to return former states to one another that now preferred autonomy. This failure renewed the war effort. Athens and Sparta were again engaging in conflict, now with the Athenian military in far away Sicily. The Sicilian campaign was resourced for success according to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, but now had no means left behind to protect Attica. Athens had undertaken a huge risk that was not adequately evaluated by the state. What if the Sicilian campaign failed?
The Athenian leadership assumed tremendous risk in executing the Sicilian campaign without logically analyzing the consequences. Nicias raised several points to the democratic assembly warning of the magnitude of the Sicilian campaign and the consequences if it failed . He questioned the necessity to pursue the campaign when war still waged at home. He was leery of the means it would take for success and how that would leave Athens exposed. He urged the state to continue this time for respite, so the military could be replenished and that its people heal from the previous plagues it experienced. All of these claims were accurate and valid but were swayed by Alcibiades persuasive oration in turning the state towards the Sicilian campaign . This would be an easy win against Sicily. Sparta’s navy would never be a true threat to Athens. Athenian leadership had become increasingly arrogant, foolhardy, and dismissive of their enemy’s capabilities, both in Sparta and Syracuse. Further, the leadership failed to grasp a critical factor and plan accordingly. A complete Athenian Naval failure at Sicily would mean that the empire would fall and smaller states would side with Sparta to survive. A failure at Sicily would be a complete failure for Athens.
The Sicilian expedition was doomed for failure at the outset. Success of the Sicilian campaign hinged on several consequences that were dismissed, chiefly the enemy strengths of Sparta and Syracuse and the legitimacy of the Peace of Nicias. Political ends were unfounded, and difficult to achieve with the means available. In pursuing the Sicilian campaign, Athens began a war with a new enemy before the current enemy was defeated. The Athenian military could not conduct expeditionary warfare and protect the homeland simultaneously. Perhaps the Athenians should have paid more attention to the omens that would have saved them from bad decisions such as the desecration of Hermae before military deployment or the eclipse before their epic naval defeat at the Syracusan harbor. Limiting the scope of the Sicilian expedition might have produced a vastly different outcome as well a different future for Athens. If anything, the expedition teaches us to carefully consider political ends, clear ways, and the consequences of resourcing.