Three Strikes Law Essay

One of the most popular strategies imposed for habitual offenders came in the 1990s, known as three strikes laws. These laws stipulate that if an offender commits a third strike felony, they will be locked up for an extended amount of time, even including life in prison without parole. Three strikes laws are long prison sentences given to repeat offenders for serious violent crimes. Three strikes refers to the popular baseball term “three strikes and you’re out.” With three strikes legislation, offenders with two prior violent felony convictions convicted of a third felony, will receive a 25 year to life sentence. What sounds like an appealing get tough strategy, may in fact do the reverse of its intended result. The three strikes law is an attempt to reduce crime by isolating habitual criminals from a society in which they obviously cannot control themselves in. Recidivism refers to committing the same crime repeatedly, despite having been found guilty and serving the punishment. In this literature review, empirical evidence provided by respected criminal justice

journals, looks whether three strikes laws reduce recidivism. This review found conflicting conclusions on the effects of this policy. Implications of these laws indicate a disproportionate term of sentencing with the get tough on crime provisions. The three strikes laws were intended for habitual violent offenders. While most think offenders have no reason to change, but simply have the motivation not to get caught again, may be incorrect in their assumptions. This paper shows that punishment does not work, but perhaps a need of more rehabilitative policies.
Key words: recidivism, repeat offenders, deterrent, criminal justice policy, three strikes laws

Introduction
Inevitably, when dealing with criminal justice policy, there are conflicting views on the effects of a policy. One particular policy that brings about much disarray is the admissibility of a get tough strategy for repeat habitual offenders—three strikes laws. Three strikes policy and its effectiveness on recidivism is conflicting based on the fact that some research finds it to deter crime, some research finds it failing to reduce crime, some research finds an increase in crime, and some research finds other non-related mitigating factors. The idea of three strikes laws is based on the fact that an offender will be less likely to commit a crime based on two crime reduction strategies—deterrent or incapacitation effects, and predictably, lowering the rates of recidivism. The undeniable question is whether three strikes laws reduce recidivism.
Current State of Three Strike Laws
Studies that found crime to be deterred, and ultimately reducing recidivism were studies by Joanna M. Shepherd (2002) and Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok (2007). Joanna Shepherd (2002) conducted the study immediately following the recent three strikes legislation, thus deterrence, or recidivism would be at. Using a baseball analogy, Shepherd (2002) concludes an offender is deterred from crime like a baseball player. If the baseball player only has three strikes compared to one with unlimited strikes, they would be more cautious in fear of striking out. Thus, an offender would be more hesitant to reoffend. Shepherd (2002) arguably believes that an offender can be deterred based on the fact of their fear of striking out. In the study, Shepherd (2002) uses full deterrence, and found during the first two years of the law’s enactment, eight murders, 3,952 aggravated assaults, 10,672 robberies, and 384,488 burglaries had been deterred. Shepherd shows that three strikes legislation should not only be focused on an offender’s last strike, but as a deterrent for an offender committing their first offense. The study finds that an offender avoids their first or second strike and actually deters crime and lowers recidivism.
Similar to the findings by Shepherd was a study conducted in 2007. The study compared offenders released who were tried and convicted after two strikeable offenses to offenders who were tried for two strikeable offenses but only had one conviction. Researchers compared these results with states without three strike laws. Rather than comparing crime rates, Helland and Tabarrok (2007) looked at the offenders released from prison in California. It was found that offenders who are subject to a third strike for a felony conviction are more likely to be rearrested than those offenders with one strike. Since this study was based in California, the severity of the law may have had an influence on the deterrence effect. The researchers found that the three strike policy in California reduced felony arrests among those offenders with two strikes by 15-20 percent a year, which accounts for 12,712 crimes deterred and thus, lowering recidivism. Like Shepherd (2002), Helland and Tabarrok (2007) can conclude that those with an already strikeable offense stop offending out of fear of being caught.
A couple studies found reduction in crime, but found other unknown factors to be the influence of the lower crime, and not the three strikes laws. The two studies were conducted by James Austin, John Clark, Patricia Hardyman, and D. Alan Henry (1999) and Juan R. Ramirez and William D. Crano (2003). Austin et. all (1999) noted various forms of three strike legislations and elaborated on how each state has their own list of what constitutes a strike. Most of these offenses are violent felonies which can include murder, rape, robbery, arson, and assault. However, some states also include other non-violent charges. For instance, in Indiana, the sale of drugs would constitute a strikeable offense. This habitual offender law in Indiana was implemented in 1994. Also, each legislation in the states have different allotments of time an offender must be incarcerated. In Indiana, there is a mandatory life sentence with no possibility of parole when an offender has committed three strikes. Washington was the first to institute the three strikes initiative, but California’s law is one of the most severe. Like other legislation, the first two strikes are violent felonies, but the third strike constitutes any felony arrest. Also, California has a two strike provision, where if an offender commits a second strikeable offense, they are sentenced for double the term of that offense.
When determining crime control effects and recidivism in the study (Austin et. all 1999), it was found that violent crime rates decreased 18.5 percent in the six year period, but it was noted that other factors may have been the contributing factor in the reduction of the crime. California was compared to other states with similar violent crime rates, but to states without a three strike legislation, and found similar decreases in crime rates. This study showed that though California implemented a severe three strikes law, it “has shown no superior reductions in crime rates” (Austin et. all 1999). This study elaborated on the fact that regardless of a three strikes legislation, crime rates continued to decrease, lowering the rate of recidivism.
Ramirez and Crano (2003) found similar results. In the study, Ramirez and Crano included three central analyses to assess the impact of three strikes laws in California. In the first analysis, there was a time-series analytic approach looking at crime reports of instrumental, violent, minor, and drug related offenses. This analytic approach compared pre and post intervention data to look at the impact of three strikes laws and to see whether there was an increase or decrease in the types of crimes. The second analysis involved a time-series autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model, which followed the complexity of the law and determined whether deterrence and incapacitation showed abrupt or gradual effects on the crime rate. The third analysis looked at the three strikes laws impact on crime using an ordinary least squares (OLS) for immediate and gradual results. Analysis 1 revealed that the crime rate did not decrease after the implementation of the law and denied the idea of a deterrent effect. While looking at the gradual and delayed impact, Analysis 2 found only instrumental crime to be impacted by the three strike legislation. However, these crimes were not targeted by the law as felonies. Analysis 3 did find a decline in both serious and minor crimes, but found that another factor other than the three strikes law was the reasoning behind the decline of crime.
A couple studies found that the three strikes legislation failed to reduce crime. The studies were conducted by Lisa Stolzenberg and Stewart J. D’alessio (1997) and Tomislav V. Kovandzic, John J. Sloan III, and Lynne M. Vieraitis (2004). Stolzenberg and D’alessio (1997) study used a time-series design to assess the impact of California’s three strike legislation. It looked at 10 of the largest cities in California which included: Anaheim, Fresno, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Oakland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose, and Santa Ana. The data was used from the 1985-1995 years. Using statistical modeling, crime rates were then compared before and after the passage of the three strike laws and found no deterrent effect. Thus, the researchers found that the law failed to reduce crime.
Kovandzic et. all (2004) used a time series design, and looked at the effects of three strikes laws with regards to homicide rates, and whether there was a reduction in the crime rates. The data was collected from the UCR of 188 cities with populations of 100,000 or more from the years 1980 to 2000. A previous study by Kovandzic (2002) looked only on homicide in regards to three strike laws. This study prolonged the previous research by looking whether the law reduced violent felony offenses. Of the 188 cities with populations of 100,000 or more, there were 110 states that had three strikes laws initiated in the years 1993 and 1996. In this study, the 110 cities were the treatment group, and the 78 cities without three strikes laws were the control group. The findings in this study showed that homicide rates increased in cities with three strike laws by 10.4%. It is noted that three strikes laws do not reduce crime through either deterrence or incapacitation. This study found no statistical evidence in the reduction of crime through three strikes laws. Kovandzic et. all (2004) found 29 of the 147 tests indicating a reduction in crime in three strikes legislation, whereas 31 resulted in statistically significant increases in crime. The bad outweigh the good.
In reasoning of the increase in crime, Kovandzic et. all (2004) suggest that offenders are not concerned with the fact of being caught or are unaware of the law. Also, offenders may be under the influence at the time of the offense which lessens the concern of being apprehended. The researchers suggest that these law target offenders “beyond the peak age of offending, and thus, the impact on crime is minimal because they are already committing fewer crimes” (Kovandzic et. all 2004). In order to reduce future crime rates, one must identify potential high risk offenders before they commit several felony offenses. This would mean incarcerating youthful offenders since the peak age of offending is between 15 and 24. This would be difficult since it is almost impossible to predict a career criminal. Other consequences of initiating three strikes laws include: racial disparity, financial costs, prison staffing and building, and providing medical care for prisoners that are aging (Kovandzic et. all 2004). And of course, worst of all, is the potential for an increase in homicide in the attempt to avoid their third strike conviction. Kovandzic finds little evidence for a general deterrent effect on incriminating habitual offenders in order to reduce future crime.
As stated, there can be an unintended increase in crime as a means of avoiding a strikeable offense, and inertly murdering someone in their way. Two studies found an increase in homicides through the three strikes legislation. The studies were conducted by Thomas B. Marvell and Carlisle E. Moody (2001) and Tomislav V. Kovandzic, John J. Sloan III, and Lynne M. Vieraitis (2002). In the first study of its kind, Marvell and Moody (2001) find an increase in homicides with a three strikes law provision. The laws are based on the premise that an offender will think before committing a felony. Marvell and Moody (2001) state that it is thought that the law may prevent homicides by deterring other felonies where a homicide may occur, like a robbery. However, criminals may not be aware of the law, may displace their crime elsewhere, or may reduce their chances of apprehension by other means necessary. The multiple time-series design found an increase in homicides. The data used reflected 29 years, 1970-1998. The study found that three strike laws provided a 10-12 percent increase short term, and 23-29 percent long term increase of homicides. This translates to 1,400 homicides in the short term and 3,300 homicides in the long term. The researchers also found no crime reduction impacts through deterrence and incapacitation. Though set to reduce crime, three strikes laws may in fact increase homicide. This is a horrifying result of a policy with intentions of reducing recidivism.
Kovandzic et. all (2002) found similar results to the study conducted by Marvell and Moody (2001). As a replication of their 2001 study, this study found that the three strikes laws resulted in an increase in the most demeaning of all violent crimes, homicide. Three strikes laws were founded on the principle of incapacitation, the idea that a violent offender will not commit more crimes while incarcerated. Three strikes laws are also based on the premise that they will deter others from committing future crime in order to avoid the risk of apprehension. If the offender knows they already have two felony convictions, it would be in the best of their interest to eliminate the risk of apprehension and to avoid the conviction of their third felony strike.
Following the increase of violent crime rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s, an increase of laws targeted repeat offenders. In this study, researchers looked at the three strikes laws, which mandated longer prison terms for repeat violent offenders. The estimates of the average impact of three strikes laws on homicide rates showed that homicide rates have grown faster in three strikes cities compared to cities without the laws. It was found that there were both short (13% to 14%) and long (16% to 24%) term increases of homicide rates with cities in states with three strike laws. This means 880 homicides in the 110 three strike cities over the short term and 1,300 homicides for the long term. Researchers found the most severe laws initiated in cities had little impact on the rates of homicide. Despite the belief of reducing future crime of repeat offenders, three strikes laws increased the likelihood of future violent crime and provided unintended negative consequences. For instance, offenders who face the possibility of a three strikes offense, may kill any witnesses in order to avoid detection and persecution of their crime, thus inducing homicide and an unintended consequence. Not only does this not reduce crime, it causes crime, and the worst of all for that matter.
Directions for Future Research
After further research to the studies, it was found that three strikes laws do not correlate to the crime reduction rates in the years it was initiated for many reasons, however, one main reason being that it was rarely used. According to David Schultz (1999), since the adoption of the legislation for the federal government, the United States only had 35 convictions through August of 1998. According to Schultz (1999) the credibility of the law should be questioned as it is unevenly applied in different areas. This is apparent with the different connotations of what a strikeable offense is in each state. Not only do three strikes laws not reduce recidivism, they also question the constitutionality and discriminatory nature of the law. Iyengar (2008) found additional unintended consequences of three strikes legislation such as displacement. If the offender does know they will be punished for their crime, they may displace elsewhere and move to a state that does not have three strikes legislation. Iyengar (2008) also found an addition of 21,000 violent crimes a year after the three strikes laws.
The research findings for three strikes laws is typical for criminal justice policy with conflicting conclusions of either highly critical or highly accepting of such a policy.

However, it is absolutely horrifying to find a policy to actually increase crime, and one that is so demeaning to human life. Obviously, three strikes laws have only been enacted for a couple of decades, and research on empirical evidence is minimal, but the negatives outweigh any benefits to such a policy. This policy found minimal support of its main purposes—reducing crime through deterrence and incapacitation. Given a public safety standpoint, three strikes laws actually increase the likelihood of homicides, which should be the only factor in the demise of a policy. The results of three strikes laws are not supportive of the idea of reducing recidivism, and thus, I believe three strikes legislation should be

discontinued.
Policy Recommendations
Directions for future research could allow the use of more studies outside the state of California, where the laws are less severe. Perhaps to alleviate the dilemma of the offender’s unawareness of such laws, is to educate the community. Policy recommendations for repeat offenders must take into account statistically significant research on policies that actually work versus what sounds like being a good idea as being tough on crime. I believe the greatest policy for lowering recidivism of repeat offenders is rehabilitation treatment.
Conclusion
These laws more time than not, increase recidivism, and in fact, inhibit criminal behavior. I believe proponents of these laws should reevaluate the importance of a human life versus getting vengeance on someone you are frustrated with. Three strikes laws are politically appealing, and time and time again, these get tough on crime strategies are initiated. These views support the idea of harsher punishment for those habitual offenders. There is a holding grudge on those we are mad at in our society. Following the research on three strike law legislation, it is evident that this crime control policy not only does little, if nothing, in the reduction of recidivism, but also may cause unintended consequences. There needs to be a focus on the certainty rather than the severity of crime with habitual violent offenders. Obviously, severe incapacitation is not the solution. I believe there needs to be an alternative to incapacitation and go to the core of these offenders, such as rehabilitative measures, in order to prevent recidivism. However, as always with criminal justice policy, there needs to be more research in order to fully sustain such preventative measures. The reduction of recidivism is the million dollar question with regards to criminal justice policy.