The Pros And Cons Of UN Peacekeeping

Introduction

In this essay I will examine when UN peacekeepers should be permitted to use force, who authorised the use of such force and to what degree use of force should be necessary to carry out their objective of peacekeeping. I will look at UN peacekeeping missions where a more robust mandate was justified and may have prevented an escalation of violence thus expediting a resolution and saving many lives in the process. I will also analyse UN peacekeeping missions when a more robust mandate was not implemented to protect civilians such as the Balkan’s and Rwanda. These grossly inadequate mandates in these UN missions failed in their mission objectives to protect civilians and restore peace and security. During the 1990’s the UN failed

General Dallaire, frustrated with the lack of action from New York with the escalation of violence found himself concerned with the poorly trained and equipped UN peacekeepers under his command. This became all too apparent when Belgian soldiers sent to act as bodyguards for the new Prime Minister, were found dead, and suspected of being murdered by Hutu

UNIFIL was given initially a strength of 400 peacekeepers and mandated for six months, 37 years later UNIFIL is currently still operating in Lebanon. Although classed as a classic peacekeeping operation, UNIFIL were permitted to have 120 mortars available, however the first force commander Lieutenant-General Emmanuel Erskine was against their use citing possible collateral damage on civilian populations should the weapon be employed. Irish UNIFIL troops however employed the 120 mortar to great effect during various incidents where illumination at night was required (Dooley, 1997). Dutch peacekeepers were also permitted to employ TOW anti-tank wire guided missiles, citing the threat of tanks from the Israeli Defence forces and their proxy, the Cristian militia or South Lebanese Army who also employed old US era M50