The Pros And Cons Of The First Crusades

“As long as there are sovereign nations possessing great power, war is inevitable.”

It is useful to examine the past in order to craft salient policy and effective strategy today. Once a state determines that more is to be gained by “going to war than by remaining at peace,” the resulting war is shaped by the goals of the states involved, the constraints with which they must contend, and their strategic options available. However, as both the First Crusade and the Spanish Empire’s failed invasion of England in 1588 demonstrate, a war’s outcome is as subject to chance as it is to rational statecraft and the enmity that sparked the conflict.

Before addressing the strategic choices of these conflicts, it is interesting to note the number of similar contexts despite the 500 years that separate them. The social structure of late 11th century Western Europe had a great

deal in common with late 16th century Spain and England. The nobility were a “violent warrior class, fighting for survival amid bloodthirsty lawlessness” and they “regarded personal violence as a prerogative of their status.” Notwithstanding their belligerent nature, both societies were inseparably intertwined with religion. The clergy gave divine legitimacy to the ruling aristocracy and the aristocracy afforded the power to the church to make decisions. As Kaiser noted, “[r]eligious change did not undermine the social order; it generally reinforced it.” These two foundations undergirded primarily localized, unprofessional militia. While it is true Philip II employed armies outfitted with full-time soldiers, these armies were often subject to nobility selected for their rank in court, not military aptitude. Despite his desire to raise a “reliable and effective armed force,” Philip II was unable to achieve it. Finally, while both armies were regularly exposed to battle, their experiences were not directly applicable to the wars upon which they embarked.
The goals of Urban II and Philip II were also similar and could be summarized as Realpolitik significantly reinforced with religious fervor. In the case of the First Crusade, Urban II was looking to strengthen papal power while addressing the threat Islamic expansion posed. The request from the Byzantine Empire for assistance from the west afforded the opportunity to expand Urban II’s influence in the Levant while regaining the Holy Land and freeing the eastern Churches. According to Asbridge, however, the nobility’s choice to answer Urban II’s call is a more complex combination of factors that includes pursuit of wealth and territory, but primarily rests in an “authentic Christian devotion” to wage a sanctified war and achieve a “form of ‘super’ penance.” Similar to Urban II, Philip II wanted to increase his own power while strengthening the Catholic influence across Western Europe. Although he claimed he wished only to protect the land he already had and eschewed any claims for expansion, the vastness of the empire meant something was always threatened. Furthermore, many of Philip II’s ministers often referred to a “world monarchy,” belying his aspirations and hinting at his desire to not only keep what he already had attained, but to also acquire more. Philip II’s inability to incorporate diplomatic options, win decisive victories, and moderate his religious mandates protracted his military involvement in the Netherlands uprising for 30 years. To counter England’s support of the uprising, stop the marauding of his ships by English privateers, and reestablish his influence over Great Britain, Philip approved the invasion of England in 1588. He called for England’s “simple withdrawal of support from the Dutch, respect for the Spanish rights at sea, and toleration of the Catholic religion,” comparatively more limited than Urban II’s aims, but just as religiously fueled. Although one could argue the degree to which state interests influenced the choice to go to war, it is clear that both wars could be called “messianic imperialism,” with the deadly result that divinely motivated soldiers are a difficult lot to stop.
Unlike the similar context and the objectives, the enemies of the Crusades and the Spanish Armada were markedly different. The Muslims the Crusaders engaged were neither unified in religion or leadership. By the ninth century the Muslims had exhausted their expansionist ideals for the time being, so they primarily focused on fighting other Muslims in the area and “lacked energy and visionary unity.” Conversely, England was very effective at offshore balancing and had already engaged in counter-Habsburg maneuvers beginning in 1585. While England was not as advanced militarily as Spain, Queen Elizabeth’s precarious power position required a pragmatic approach and allowed for more military ingenuity and military ownership of operations. Furthermore, although England had no significant land army, their geographic location offered protection and their Navy was experienced. The growth of their Navy was more a factor of the new economic opportunity afforded by maritime merchant ships rather than strategic forethought. Their ships were lighter and more maneuverable, a stark contrast to the large Spanish galleons outfitted to carry soldiers and sail in the Mediterranean.
With these circumstances in mind, the leaders had to deal with a number of constraints, the most significant of which was a lack of money to fund the wars. The Crusades required the average knight to “raise five times his annual income.” This task was especially daunting for the People’s Crusade, but both nobility and peasant crusaders preyed upon the Jews of Europe to gain the capital required for the grueling crusade ahead. Although Spain did not resort to another Holocaust to fund their war, it was similarly difficult to finance a war in the 16th century due to lack of inflation control and exorbitant sovereign administration costs. This financial turmoil was exacerbated by a failing nobility and their inability to maintain a solid economic state. Although Philip II attempted to stabilize the economy when he inherited a bankrupt empire, he undermined his own efforts through cronyism and nepotism, after which he never recovered. Philip II was plagued by the same trouble of other members of the aristocracy, who could only increase their authority “by raising armies…, but their revenues rarely sufficed to keep their armies in the field long enough to achieve their objectives.”
Another shared constraint was a lack of unified, professional military leadership. Although Urban II instigated the Crusades, there was no secular leader designated to direct the military maneuvers. After this was recognized as an operational constraint, they agreed to have the highest-ranking nobles lead communally, known as the council of princes. The long duration of attrition warfare encountered at Antioch again highlighted the need for a singular commander, but despite their differences the princes were able to come together when it mattered most. Perhaps the freedom Urban II gave for the execution of the Crusades allowed for successful flexibility. In contrast, Philip II was a micromanager in the highest degree, not allowing for any mission command or interpretations of commander’s intent. This lack of trust led to poor selections for military command based on rank in the aristocracy and likely an assurance of their allegiance. In the case of the English invasion, he chose the duke of Medina Sidonia to lead the armada, a man who neither believed in the possibility of success nor desired to participate. Furthermore, he had no military or even naval experience, claiming seasickness as one of the many reasons he should not be tasked to even participate let alone lead the expedition.
Neither Urban II nor Philip II had a cohesive strategy. Although the ultimate objective of taking Jerusalem seems like an unambiguous end, the means and ways were never clearly determined nor were the priorities clearly delineated between the princes’ personal conquests and that which would return to the church. What resulted was a brutal conquest and sometimes splintered advances. Surprisingly enough, although not always intentionally contrived, the brutal manner of their fighting paved the way for negotiations between Antioch and Jerusalem and their splintered maneuvers allowed for better subsistence foraging and tactically sound military advances. Even more surprising was the fact their “communal approach to leadership actually worked.” Their success gives some credibility to the idea that a council mixed with ruthless determination has the potential to succeed. Regardless of the circumstances, it is clear the Crusaders would never have surrendered in order to “overcome their desperate fear of damnation and emerge, purified, at the gates of heaven.”
Like the Crusades, the difficult realities of Spain’s strategic environment were swept underneath their perceived divine right to proceed.

Contrary to the Crusades, however, there was no Spanish strategic supervision outside of Philip II himself. He suffered from severe cognitive dissonance and was inexperienced at every level of strategy, and therefore was unable to change with the shifting needs of the war. When faced with inconsistent plans and a delay that would push the invasion into winter, he chose rather to amalgamate the plans disjointedly and leave the weather to God. The military leaders were forced to follow tactical-level edicts without clear timelines, military objectives, or alternative options. Philip II’s armada had neither a clear strategy nor a military objective and set sail with only an operational plan to meet up with the Flanders army and invade England. By the time he attempted the invasion, Philip II’s inability to prioritize his conflicts in a failing economic state stretched his commitments to three simultaneous fronts, including the Netherlands and the Ottoman

Empire.
The reality of war is that once unleashed it becomes entirely susceptible to chance. As Clausewitz aptly wrote, “No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance.” This is even more so when a lack of cohesive strategy minimizes the fog and friction. The Crusaders and the Spanish Armada approached this reality with very different methods. When met with unexpected Muslim reinforcements, the Crusaders responded with decisive action. Whether it was impressive generalship and defensive discipline at Dorylaeum or going on the offensive despite numerical disadvantages, the Crusaders were determined and able to make decisions quickly and locally. The Spanish Armada was just the opposite and was crippled by their inability to react decisively. Unfortunate winds kept the English fleet initially frozen in their harbor, unable to meet the incoming armada. Restrained by Philip II’s order to avoid battle with the English fleet until after rendezvousing with the Flanders army, Medina Sidonia overruled the advice from his more experienced naval officers and did not capitalize on this prime opportunity to decimate the English fleet before they even set sail. This kept the English safe to conduct multiple attacks on the Spanish armada with the advantage of both tide and more agile formations. Although the multiple attacks did not exact significant damage or losses on the armada, Drake seized upon the prevailing winds and tricky English tides and was able to divert the armada from their last opportunity to make harbor. This mistake mixed with the lack of a real strategy left the armada with no other option than to circle the British Isles to the north and return home to Spain, the trip alone costing almost half of their ships.
Despite the similar contexts, goals, constraints, and lack of cohesive strategy, the First Crusade and the attempted invasion of England in 1588 had different outcomes. Although the lack of a unified Muslim enemy contributed to the success of the Crusades, the decisive action of the council of princes in the face of chance seems to have tipped the scales in their favor. Conversely, Philip II’s micromanagement and indecisiveness combined with his military leader’s inability to react as the strategic environment shifted left them on the wrong side of chance. By crafting a clear strategy, selecting experienced military leaders, and enabling them to act with clear political guiding principles, a statesman can more effectively minimize the fog and friction encountered in every war. Then, perhaps, chance will favor the prepared mind.