At the background of Hilary Putnam’s externalism is the opposing philosophical descriptive assumption that meaning in the sense of extension is determined by intension. This contention comes out clearly in the typical example of finding out the meaning of natural kind in which the compound terms ‘creatures with a heart’ and ‘creatures with a kidney’ differ considerably though having the same extensions because there is in another sense in which the meaning of these terms is not its extensions but something other that it, what is normally referred to as intension of the term. The two terms have different intensions (Carnap, 1974) or sense (Frege, 1872). One can understand this intension as the descriptions associated with a term. It is under this purview that traditional philosophers such as Frege and Carnap have come to see the meaning of terms (hence intensions or concepts) not in the sense of psychologism as mental entities but in terms of ‘abstract entities’ which after all did not escape the psychological act it rebelled against. …show more content…
He imagines a doppelgänger for the Earth, a Twin Earth as exact duplicates – to the last molecules and same behavioural constitutions - for both the Earthlings and the Twin Earthlings. By the time a space ship landed in the Twin Earth (and subsequently on Earth) there is a difference in the term ‘water’ on earth and Twin Earth, consisting of H2O and XYZ respectively and thereby applying to different things. This difference did not affect the usage of this liquids in the two planets, despite their different hidden structure. Right even at the time in 1750 when there was no expertise and specialist knowledge of chemical properties of water and the hidden structure of water in earth and Twin earth, when the inhabitants of both earth use the term water in both planets, they referred still differently to the liquid made of H20 and XYZ
Back when I was a little girl, I always fascinated over water. I remember that I loved to be able to go down to Lake Chatuge, which is directly behind my house, and sit there, thinking about how my wonderful God is to make such a beautiful thing that we do not appreciate like we should. According to Oxford Dictionary, water is “a colorless, transparent, odorless, tasteless liquid that forms the seas, lakes, rivers, and rain and is the basis of the fluids of living organisms.” Ron Rash used symbolism, which is “something that represents something else” (Mays 205), in his book One Foot in Eden drastically in many different aspects of water. The symbolism of water in One Foot in Eden has many various meanings that are vividly expressed within
In this paper I shall consider Spinoza’s argument offered in the second Scholium to Proposition 8, which argues for the impossibility of two substances sharing the same nature. I shall first begin by explaining, in detail, the two-step structure of the argument and proceed accordingly by offering a structured account of its relation to the main claim. Consequently I shall point out what I reasonably judge to be a mistake in Spinoza’s line of reasoning; that is, that the definition of a thing does not express a fixed number of individuals under that definition. By contrast, I hope to motivate the claim that a true definition of a thing does in fact express a fixed number of individuals that fall under that definition. I shall then present a difficulty against my view and concede in its insufficiency to block Spinoza’s conclusion. Finally, I shall resort to a second objection in the attempt to prove an instance by which two substances contain a similar attribute, yet differ in nature. Under these considerations, I conclude that Spinoza’s thesis is mistaken.
There is perhaps no idea in the history of western ontology with a more powerful legacy than Aristotle’s conception of ousia. Traditionally construed, "ousia" stands for the primary, foundational principle of being. It can be said that ontology has historically been ousiology – the search for ultimate foundations. In this quest for ultimates, the ousia names the absolute arche, the foundational principle that reigns over and orders all being. The political tone of this formulation is intentional; it is designed to frame the ontological question concerning the meaning of ousia in ethico-political terms. The impetus behind this strategy is to suggest that western ontology has been largely determined by an authoritarian tendency that seeks to establish a single ultimate principle in order to secure a firm and certain foundation. On the one hand, this authoritarian tendency may be traced back to Aristotle, for ousia is precisely such a hegemonic principle; on the other hand, Aristotle also suggests another conception of ousia, one that can be drawn upon in the attempt to resist this authoritarian tendency. In what follows, I trace both the authoritarian and this resistant conception ousia in Aristotle.
In chapter three there is a somewhat disparate side of the ontological argument. It centers on the nature of God than the meaning of him. Particularly, this chapter centers on the early quality of God that is the fact that he needs to exist. Inanimate things, supplementary living things, and humans are ...
ABSTRACT: Many philosophers have lost their enthusiasm for the concept of supervenience in the philosophy of mind. This is largely due to the fact that, as Jaegwon Kim has shown, familiar versions of supervenience describe relations of mere property covariation without capturing the idea of dependence. Since the dependence of the mental on the physical is a necessary requirement for even the weakest version of physicalism, it would seem that existing forms of supervenience cannot achieve that for which they were designed. My aim is to revive the concept of supervenience. I argue that if we construe supervenience along Davidsonian lines — as a relation connecting predicates rather than properties — then it avoids the shortcomings of the more familiar varieties.
This leaves a particularly large hole in identity theory. From neural dependence and the causal problem, it is almost impractical to endorse any type of dualism. But multiple realizability makes identity theory suspect as well. Also emotional additives, and the fact that epiphenomenalism is self undermining but not impossible, lead to slight suspicion of physicalism in general. Basically, this paper set out to endorse and defend identity theory but has concluded nothing definitively.
John Locke wrote An Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1689. He strongly defends empiricism in this essay and states his views on human knowledge and true understanding. In Book II, Locke offers his theory of personal identity; namely the mind theory, also known as ‘the psychological criterion’, in the middle of his accounts of general identity where he draws lines between inert objects, living things and persons.
Leibniz’s conception of infinitely many simple substances and denial of mind/body interaction was developed in response to Spinoza’s claim that there is only one substance and his idea of parallelism, which states that thought and extension express the sa...
ABSTRACT: At issue is the reliability of Heidegger’s contention that Greek thinking, especially Plato’s, was constricted by an unthought "pre-ontology." "The meaning of being" supposedly guiding and controlling Greek ontology is "Being = presence." This made "the question of the meaning of ousia itself" inaccessible to the Greeks. Heidegger’s Plato’s Sophist is his most extensive treatment of a single dialogue. To test his own reliability, he proposes "to demonstrate, by the success of an actual interpretation of [the Gigantomachia], that this sense of Being [as presence] in fact guided [Plato’s] ontological questioning . . .". I will show Heidegger’s strategy in connecting what he takes to be Plato’s naive pre-ontology — Being = Presence — to the ontology of the Gigantomachia — Being = Power. I will show that Heidegger blatantly misreads the text to make the connection: he completely misses the distinction between bodies and bodiless things. The text makes sense, I will show, if and only if its explicit ontology — Being = Power — is its implicit pre-ontology. Plato wrote his text not to discuss, but to exemplify, Heidegger’s ontology-preontology distinction. He wrote the Gigantomachia for Heidegger, but Heidegger missed it.
After reading Berkeley’s work on the Introduction of Principles of Human Knowledge, he explains that the mental ideas that we possess can only resemble other ideas and that the external world does not consist of physical form or reality but yet they are just ideas. Berkeley claimed abstract ideas as the source of philosophy perplexity and illusion. In the introduction of Principles of Human Knowledge,
In what is widely considered his most important work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke establishes the principles of modern Empiricism. In this book he dismisses the rationalist concept of innate ideas and argues instead that the mind is a tabula rasa. Locke believed that the mind was a tabula rasa that was marked by experience and reject the Rationalist notion that the mind could perceive some truths directly, without sensory experience. The concept of tabula
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
Since the body of the paper will be distinctly critical, I would like to begin by paying tribute to Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (EPM) as one of the seminal works of twentieth century philosophy. I still remember the growing excitement with which I read it when it first came out in Volume I of the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (1956), in the Detroit Airport, of all places. (My colleague, Tamar Gendler, remarked to me that I was probably the only person there reading Wilfrid Sellars, the others, no doubt, reading best sellers.) Over the ensuing decades the excitement, though never wholly extinguished, has been adulterated by numerous second thoughts, some of which will be expounded here.
life as we know it would not have been possible. This essay will examine the water molecule
In David Hume’s “An Enquiring Concerning Human Understanding” he explains that our basic knowledge or the contents of the mind and the things we become immediately aware of are called perceptions. Hume uses the examples of pains, happiness, the feeling of anger and our imagination to give us a better understanding of perceptions. He then divides perceptions into two categories, ideas and impressions, which are differentiated by force and vivacity. In this sense impressions relate more to having feeling whereas ideas relate to thinking. Both impressions and ideas are then broken down into those of sensation and reflection, which relates back to feeling and thinking. In this paper, I will be going into detail to give a better understanding of