The Fall Of France Yael Larios Summary

THE FALL OF FRANCE - By Yael Larios

World War II was a devastating event for both the Allies and Axis powers that cost millions of lives. Nazism was growing along with the tensions between the Allied and Axis powers. The Germans were trudging through battles, defeating large and strong French and Belgian resistance because the German army had developed a system called ‘Blitzkrieg’ which overwhelmed their opponents with heavy armor. This new concept eventually led to the Fall of France in the year 1940. The main debate of the Fall of France was whether it was caused by “strategic errors” or the “Nazi Blitzkrieg.”

Before the Fall of France of 1940, France offered military support to Poland in event Germany attacked. France was trying to create

alliances with countries in order to benefit itself in war. However, when Germany started pursuing into Poland, Britain and France declared war on them. On May 10th 1940, the Allied forces were overtaken by the German forces resulting in the conquering of France, Belgium and other countries. The Germans devised a plan for the conquest of France and split it into two operations. In the first operation, (Case Yellow) the German went through Ardennes to surround the Allied forces that had planned to meet in Belgium. In the second operation (Case Red) the Germans overcame the Maginot line by simply going around it. The Maginot line created by the French, was a long line of concrete barricades, that the French built which lined its borders. After this, the invasion of France occurred, and caused such a huge stir that the organized French military resistance ended. The Germans split up France taking the North and West part. Germany proved themselves even though they had weapons and tanks that weren't as advanced as the Allies weapons. It was their successful tactics and strategies even though they were less technologically advanced with their weaponry before 1940 while the Allied forces were more organized and advanced.
There are two beliefs you could have that would answer the question of “Was the Fall of France in 1940 a result of a collapse of will in the face of the Nazi Blitzkrieg, or a series of strategic errors?” The first author, William D.

Irvine who wrote “Domestic Politics and The Fall of France” agreed with one of these two. He agreed with the thesis that the Fall of France was due to the lack of strategy by France and the well thought out strategy by Germany called Blitzkrieg. He believed that the government of France and its problems prior to the fall of France and its decadence had nothing to do with the fall. It was all military related. The second author Julian Jackson, who wrote “The Fall of France” agreed with the thesis that the French, due to their inability to get out of their WWI thinking, which caused a breakdown in the political and the military system, were no match for the Germans. He said that the French weren’t strategically ready for Germany. It was strategic errors. When he wrote his book, he strongly expressed “antisemitism,” “procrastination” and how the administration did not understand the emergency of mobilizing every available resource. The French had the disadvantage at the time, considering they would not let the foreigner refugees fight in the war. For people who believed in the thesis that it was ‘surprise’ rather than ‘weaponry’ strongly felt that the French simply were not ready for the attacks coming from the Germans. But even after the

invasion, you can see how the strongly the French were affected. German High Command had to identify the site of the attack. They did not even know the site of the attack because it all came too quickly. Even after they realized that the Germans came through Ardennes, they still were not successful in telling the Germans intentions.The French army were having problems with their strategies and were slow with their reaction to the Germans. The third author Marc Bloch, who wrote the book “Strange Defeat” agreed with the thesis that the French government and its allies did not have trust in their generals which caused chaos and eventually the fall of France. He believed that the government did not have faith in the army. It was all mostly strategic errors. To conclude, all three authors mainly disagreed with their beliefs but however way you see it, it could go both ways.
Julian Jackson, a modern day historian from France, is one of the foremost leading historians.

After he published his book, “The Fall of France,” in 2003, he won The Wolfson History Prize award for it in 2004. His book contributed and strengthened the thesis stating “Consistent strategic errors was the main cause for the Fall of France.” For example, in his book, Mr. Jackson writes “The failure of the French to predict the locus of the German invasion must rank as a failure of intelligence.” (p. 219) He points out one person in particular, General Maurice Gamelin, a senior French officer who was especially remembered for his unsuccessful leadership in the Battle of France. He was an example of intelligence failure. He was hoping that the Belgians and the Dutch would come together to create strong allies. Also, Gamelin hoped that he could have an army between the British and the Sea. Julian Jackson added, that the problems of the French army went beyond Gamelin’s mistakes. It was strategic errors caused by the French army. In 1940, there was little time to coordinate, and everything was disorganized. For example, there were whole segments of regiments missing from the army ranks which caused even more of a drift within the French command. (p. 220) The French army had a hard time reading the “direction of the German attack.” (p. 221) The French were hoping that even after the German break through that it would get tired and collapse. However, the French fought with something

called the methodical warfare and were completely unprepared for the Blitzkrieg attack which was a new warfare designed by German command. “The fluidity of the battle between 15 May and 4 June was exactly the kind of warfare the French were least prepared to deal with.” (The Fall of France, Jackson, pg. 222) A quote from a soldier on the French front said “We felt we were moving in a kind of fog,” (The Fall of France, Jackson, p. 222, “Balbaud, Drôle de guerre, 96”) It was noted by the French command that the Germans were faster with their decisions and movements. The French and British were too busy trying to figure out the motives and the moves of the Germans. One British officer commented after the Fall of France, “Decisions had to be made so very quickly and so often could not be confirmed on the basis of the information coming in….The General moves the Germans made were so quick and where you may have a stable situation in the morning, by 7 o'clock or 8 o'clock in the evening, if you did not act and do something, the situation might be irretrievably lost.” (pg. 222, Jackson, French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 178) To conclude, Julian Jacksons’ book has a comprehensive outlook on the Fall of France and brought to light that it was overall strategic errors that caused the Fall of France.
The next historian, William D. Irvine wrote “Domestic Politics and the Fall of France” strongly supports the idea that it was the quickness of the German most successful strategy, “blitzkrieg” which helped Germany defeat France. Blitzkrieg is a method of warfare that uses speed and surprise to surprise the enemies. Irvine believed it was all military related. None of it had to do with the government or pre-invasion.
My third historian, Marc Bloch, had an interesting tie into the way he viewed the Fall of France. He was born into a jewish family, and served as a lieutenant in both world wars. After the fall of France, he joined the French resistance. Eventually in 1944, he was captured by the Gestapo, and was shot and killed. He had a firsthand experience at the way war works, and so it is logical to say that he had a unique way at looking at the Fall of France, which was different than all of the other historians. His book “Strange Defeat,” was published in 1946, after his death, which contributes his ideas as to how France fell. In a section of his book called “A Frenchman Examines His Conscience,” he talks about the thesis he arrives at, which is that the French government did not trust their generals which caused chaos among the French army, and eventually the fall of France. He believed that the government did not have faith in the army and that it was strategic errors. Bloch also believes that the cause of the fall was the “utter incompetence of the (French) High Command.” (p. 25) He writes how the French command were incapable of thinking in terms of a “new war.” He calls his German counterparts victory a “triumph of intellect.” (p. 25) The Germans simply carried out their new war tactics (Blitzkrieg) more successfully. Bloch describes that as a whole, the French were not militarily prepared for another war. Not enough airplanes, engines and tanks were being made to subdue the fast oncoming Germans. The French warfare wasn't even advanced enough to take out the Germans. The French were still stuck in the timeframe of World War I. The French were not quick in realizing the warfare “changed it’s tempo.” Bloch states that it wasn’t the idea that the people just didn’t rouse more feelings than the last war, it was mainly the French did not want another war to begin with anyway. To conclude, Marc Bloch’s ideas gives people insight as to what really transpired during the Fall of France.

After looking through all these thesis’ and analyzing the details, I believe it was Julian Jackson’s ideas that sparked an interest in me. Jackson agreed with the idea that it was strategic errors that France committed that ultimately led to the French defeat. It seemed like the French were clueless in organizing their next attack. They were too busy in trying to figure out the motives of the Germans and what they were trying to achieve initially. First off, the Germans were more involved in the war. The German commanders were typically at the front of the line while the French commanders were at the back maintaining the posts and sending out information. Although more French commanders lived, I could see how if higher commanders were more involved, it could have a mental effect on the soldiers and their fighting. Another key aspect I believed was a error was the French not having a significant strategy that the Germans fell to. The Germans used a very successful strategy called “Blitzkrieg” that would encircle their enemies and attack from there. It consisted of strong tanks and thoughtful tactics that the French were technologically not prepared for. Another military strategy that they used was combined arms tactic. The Germans used offensive units such as tanks, infantry, tank formations and relied heavily on those. From what I’ve read, I believe the French were too busy focusing on “what to do” instead of actually acting. They just kept getting stuck trying to concoct plans on what to do. Julian Jackson presented many well thought out points that I agreed with. Overall, I do believe that the Fall of France was caused by strategic errors and lack of strategy.
In conclusion to this, all thesis’ stated strong ideas and it’s hard to look at the situation and pinpoint the exact reason as to how France went down. Overall, whether it be “strategic errors” or the superior strategy of the Germans “Blitzkrieg,” all can agree with the fact that the French had a lot of mistakes. The French made false predictions as to what the Germans next move would be. This resulted in encounter attacks and strong pushes made by the Germans that the French could not prevail over. The French proved not to be strategically ready for the strong plans and blow that the Germans delivered and that is a fact as it shows how history played out. Overall, the Fall of France happened, and whatever the reason may be, the French fought a long battle that eventually led to it’s topple.