1. Critique the German Army Group G Commander’s efforts to balance the operational factors in achieving assigned objective(s) and protecting the German operational COG against the dual threat of the FFI and the anticipated Allied amphibious assault.
General Blaskowitz, Commander of German Army Group G had an extremely challenging task of balancing operational factors to achieve his organization’s assigned objectives. The German leader, Adolf Hitler, and his German armed forces high command OKW had a desired end state of German dominance of Europe. In order to achieve this desired end state the theater strategic objective for OB West, the German theater command was the defense of France, both from the ongoing Allied invasion in Normandy and an anticipated Allied amphibious assault in Southern France. General Blaskowitz’s operational objective, as directed from Hitler and the German high command, was to defend Southern France, with the mission of “holding the coast at all costs.” (pg. 16)
The operational Center of Gravity (COG) for the Germans in Southern France was Army Group G, almost by default. The German high command had few naval or air resources to dedicate to the defense of Southern France due to the competing requirements of the Eastern, Italian, and Northern France fronts. Therefore the responsibility of repulsing an Allied invasion would fall squarely on the ground troops. Under General Blaskowitz’s command, the majority of his combat strength resided in the troops of the Nineteenth Army. The Nineteenth Army, commanded by General Wiese, consisted of experienced troops commanded by veteran leaders.
In June of 1944, the Army Group G’s operational factor of force was a “reasonably strong and well balanced force...
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...he beachheads (Gen Wiese attempted top speed up the deployment of troops across the Rhone on the night of 14 August). If the Germans possessed the ability to maneuver their troops prior to the invasion and during D-Day the landing troops would have suffered significantly more casualties and may not have been successful establishing a beachhead. Finally, with better communication the Gen Wiese would have been able to quickly organize a counterattack against the Allies. The lack of casualties on D-Day and D+1 and the ability of the Allies to accomplish almost their entire D-Day objective highlight the importance of the efforts of the Allies to target the German critical vulnerabilities leading up to the invasion. Instead of countering the German COG (the Nineteenth Army) at full strength, the Allies were lightly opposed and achieved their operational objectives.
One of the reasons that Dieppe failed so miserably is that their leadership, Louis Mountbatten in particular, planned very poorly for the operation. Firstly, the attack failed to use strategies that had proved to be extremely effective, and that should have been logical. The attack took place in daylight, which was a product of the Allies woefully underestimating the German opposition. Mountbatten was quoted to calling Dieppe “a piece of cake” proving how aloof he was to the strength of the German opposition. On top of that, intelligence reports indicated that Dieppe was not heavily defended. They could not have been more mistaken. The Germans had copious advance notice about the raid, eliminating an...
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
Cameron, R. S. (2003). The army vision: The 4th AD in world war II. Military Review, 83(6), 59-68
War finds success and failure inescapably linked to how well the Combined, Joint, and Multinational Commander ensures the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment” planning is linked to strategic, operational and tactical objectives. General Eisenhower’s Operation OVERLORD, the Allied cross channel, air, and seaborne invasion of France during World War II provides an excellent case study to show successful integration of the principles and the spirit of the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment.” OVERLORD required synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the logistics capabilities of coalition forces, their equipment as well as civilian manufacturing capabilities to meet the strategic end state (e.g. the defeat of Germany). This article will review the purpose and definition of Joint Sustainment, its imperatives and logistics planning principles and examine how Eisenhower and his planners incorporated these imperatives and principles into Operation OVERLORD.
...ced to retreat or be cut off from their supplies. The German High Command, at this point, knew that they could no longer continue to fight and needed to surrender or face annihilation.
...did not exist.” However, when this information arrived the next morning, Haig told Rawlinson that “The enemy has undoubtedly been severely shaken and our correct course, therefore, is to press him hard with the least possible delay” . This military strategy was one which led, as Terraine argued, to long-term success. Primary source German Order of the Day from General Von Bulow on 3 July stated “the decisive issue of the war depends on… our victory on the Somme. We must win this battle…” . Furthermore, Haig’s strategy is shown to be perceptive and correct when we consider Ludendorff’s, German Chief of Staff, thoughts: “We were completely exhausted on the Western Front… If the war lasted our defeat seemed inevitable... I cannot see as I look back how the German G.H.Q. could have mastered the situation if the Allies had continued their blows as they did in 1916.”
The Battle of Normandy was a turning point in World War II. Canada, America, and Great Britain arrived at the beaches of Normandy and their main objective was to push the Nazi’s out of France. The Invasion at Normandy by the Allied Powers winning this battle lead to the liberation of France and Western Europe. Most importantly Hitler’s was being attacked from both the eastern and western front, and caused him to lose power. If the Allied Powers did not succeed in D-Day Hitler would’ve taken over all of Europe.In a document written by General Dwight Eisenhower he persuades the allied powers to invade Normandy. Dwight Eisenhower was born on October 14, 1890. Eisenhower became the 34th president of the United States. He served as the president from January 20, 1953 through January 20, 1961. Before his presidency Dwight participated in World War I and was moved up to captain. Dwight would then take part in World War II and work his way up to becoming a General.
The bombardment would effectively cut through the enemy’s barbed wire, while smashing fortified positions and dug-outs. Haig placed so much faith in the power of British guns, that he expected men to be capable of walking across no-man’s land, carrying heavy packs with provisions and trench repair equipment to rebuild the captured territory upon arrival. The final piece of the plan saw cavalry forces, kept in readiness, to charge through gaps in the German front line and cause a mass-retreat of enemy forces. In hindsight, we can see that the offensive very much failed to live up to expectations. Such terrible failure is possibly attributable to poor tactics and leadership on the part of Douglas Haig and his advisors.
The French Resistance (La Résistance française) was a collaboration of individual movements against the German occupation of France and the Vichy regime that complied with the Nazis during World War II. Starting in 1940 and ending with the liberation of France, French people from all ends of the economic and political spectrum united in different Résistance groups to perform guerilla attacks, run underground newspapers, provide intelligence to and from the allies, and manage escape networks to allied territory for political enemies and others persecuted by the Nazis (Aubrac, 3).
Von Der Porten, Edward P. The German Navy in World War II. New York: Thomas Y.
However in light of Hitler’s disclosure plans, most of Hitler’s Generals, especially General Von Runstedt who was one of the foremost generals assigned to the attack, did not believe that his goals were attainable and the general feeling was that the plan would eventually lead to the immediate submission of the German armies on the Western Front. Nevertheless, a meeting took place on September 16, 1944 with Hitler’s Generals and close associates. During this meeting, General Jodl presented to Hitler, and his staff, the current positions of American troops, and where their advancement would be in the Ardennes forest. The Ardennes sector was chosen due to the reduced number of American troops (60,000) in the immediate vicinity of the attack, and as was stated above previously, the Ardennes, despite the success the Germans had already enjoyed in 1940, was thought to be impassable. During the detailed planning phase with Hitler, Hitler made it clear that his goal was to destroy the British and Canadian Armies first, or at least, drive a wedge between the Americans in the South and the British in the North. The plan for Watch on the Rhine was presented on October 22, 1944 and was released to only a few associates. This plan would definitively add additional relief on the German Saar Basin and hopefully would, as mentioned drive a wedge between the Allied armies all the way to Antwerp if the goal could be attained. Hitler calculated and planned out that the Americans, and Allied troops, would come to the rescue by redirecting their men to confront Hitler’s aggressive plan from Normandy. The German Army would reshuffle its forces for the formulation of a US counter-offensive. All of the Germans major units were removed from defending other fronts and placed into their perspective positions for the implementation of
In the spring of 1940 Europe was enveloped in war. The German military machine had already conquered Poland, Denmark, and Norway. However, not content with northern and eastern expansion, Adolf Hitler wanted to control the western countries in Europe. Hitler had long been obsessed with attacking and controlling France. After their defeat in World War I, the German people, government, and military were humiliated by the enormous post war sanctions leveraged against them from the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler wanted to defeat and humiliate the French people in the same way that his country had to experience. For him, revenge was necessary. The German plan was to swing into France using a new tactic know as Blitzkrieg or “Lightning War”. Blitzkrieg used speed and surprise along with highly concentrated tank corps, supported by mechanized infantry and airplanes.
It began to emerge the differences in tactics. The question was whether to continue so far the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Forces Europe, General Eisenhower’s tactics attacking on a broad front, or due to problems of supply to take just one mighty blow. In that period Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery developed a new operation plan, which would include the use of 1st Airborne Army (Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton), actually 1st Airborne Corps (Lieutenant General Frederick Browning). The Corps comprised of 82nd US Airborne Division (Brigadier General James M. Gavin), 101st US Airborne Division (Major General Maxwell D. Taylor), and 1st British Airborne Division (Major General Robert “Roy” E. Urquhart) supported with, under his command, 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade (Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski). These units should be dropped along the roa...
Zink, Harold. (1957) The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 [online]. Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand [cited 12th September 2011]. Available from:
This essay thus includes the architects of the Iron Chancellor to isolate France before this war, his strategy to bring southern German states into war through French provocation, his superior planning during the invasion of French territory and his army’s advanced use of modern technology.