The Coldest Winter Speech Analysis

In The Coldest Winter, Halberstam outlines the destructive route to ‘victory’ the U.S. military and government officials took. With great attention to detail, Halberstam interrogates our misconceptions of General Douglas MacArthur and the events which took place on November 25th through the 26th of 1950. It was on that day, Halberstam writes, that China joined the Korean War with the purpose of annihilating U.S. forces. This event is critical to Halberstam, because MacArthur had explicitly expressed his disbelief in a Chinese intervention. To his dismay, over three-hundred thousand Chinese troops crossed the border in what would become known as ‘The Catastrophe on the Yalu.’
Halberstam continues by illustrating the critical roles of the powerful men behind the war on both fronts. From the

U.N. and the U.S., Halberstam explains the crucial battle calls of General Edward Almond – whose first hand account of the war is used throughout. General Almond is a distinguished member of history, by Halberstam’s records, and during the Korean War it was him who commanded the U.S. X corps. Halberstam gives several accounts of soldiers on the battlefield, in an attempt to make an indelible mark in our minds to the true horror and yet heroism that pervaded the war on all fronts. In addition to Almond, Halberstam explores the stories of General Matthew Ridgway, or as his subordinates called him “Old Iron Tits.” Halberstam chronicles Ridgway’s most sensitive and critical duties. In light of General Walton Walker’s passing late in the year of 1950, Halberstam explains Ridgway’s re-positioning as commander of the 8th army. It was Ridgway’s battalion that was assigned to maintaining and restoring stability in the South Korean city of Seoul – a critical city throughout the war’s duration, as it was South Korea’s capital.
David Halberstam, outside of accounts from military personnel, outlines the nuanced roles of the most powerful men at the time.

Including, but not limited to, President Harry S. Truman, who was succeeded by the 35th President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower. In tandem with his political analysis of these Presidents, Halberstam explores Dean Gooderham Acheson’s speech given to the National Press Club in the early winter of 1950. It was this speech, Halberstam writes, that acted as the ‘go-ahead’ for the North to invade the South in Korea. For the speech given did not indicate any high level of U.S. commitment to the protection of its South Korean allies. Furthermore, in keeping with his theme of exploring the influence on all fronts, Halberstam recounts the military and politically strategic workings of the power figures in North Korea and China. Including, but not limited to, then leader of the Communist Party of China Mao Zedong, and then leader of North Korea Kim Il-sung. Halberstam spares no cost in elucidating the true nature of this often forgotten war, through the eyes of the men who fought it and with an incredible dedication to exposing history from all

angles.
Anaylsis: Although both books will have largely similar overlap, as these are historical events afterall, it’s the style in which they overlap that is of interest here. That is, we are not merely interested in the writing style, as this is not a literary criticism, but rather, an investigation into the potential possibilities of curtailing the Korean War through the lenses of these two novels. I’d like to begin by addressing some military and tactical strategic moves that could’ve been used to prevent the Korean War.
As Bruce Cumings writes in The Korean War: A History, the South Korean state was vastly under prepared for the North’s invasion in the summer of 1950. The reason for their ill-equipped state is a direct consequence of U.S. troops being removed from their occupation in South Korea in the summer of 1949. At first glance, we might say the presence of U.S. military power would act as a deterrent to Kim Il-sung’s plans to invade, and this is an understandable conclusion to be making. However, in light of recovered Soviet Intelligence, Cumings teaches, the choice to remove U.S. troops was actually misinterpreted as a threat. That is, Joesph Stalin – then governing leader of the Soviet Union – saw the removal of troops as a charade. Stalin thought the U.S. wanted to appear as non-violent, or as disinterested in the South Korean people, in order to allow a South Korean invasion on the North.