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Strategic management in a global environment
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The global strategic environment continues to present the US with increasingly complex threats and opportunities. Although all of the 20 Army Warfighting Challenges (AWfC) provide enduring first order problems, only the challenge to integrate joint, inter-organizational, and multinational (JIM) partner capabilities to ensure unity of effort and mission accomplishment (AWfC #14) nests directly with the top priorities of our current national and defense strategies. The 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2015 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Army Operating Concept (AOC) collectively agree that the United States cannot solve strategic problems alone. All of these documents discuss, in their opening paragraphs, the importance
of strengthening our inter-organization and global network of partners and allies to protect US interests. Furthermore, the AOC states, “Except for an immediate response to a national emergency, the Army will conduct operations as part of JIM teams.” To ensure compliance with this constraint, the Army must do the following across the DOTMLPF1 domain: (1) Ensure Army mission command systems are interoperable with JIM teams (Organization) (2) Develop a means to share information with both Joint forces, and multinational partners while still protecting state secrets (Organization/Facilities) (3) Develop long term sustainment capabilities that synchronizes JIM resources and infrastructure (Materiel/Facilities) (4) Train to conduct JIM operations in close coordination with SOF (Training) The JIM AWfC (#14) is the most important problem because it enables Joint combined arms operations and maneuver. This allows the Army, as part of a JIM team, to present our enemies with multiple, simultaneous dilemmas, ensuring US strategic advantage across the range of military operations.
As the incoming brigade commander, LTC (P) Owens, I see the critical leadership problem facing the 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) is the inability or unwillingness of Colonel Cutler to lead and manage change effectively. In initial talks with Col Cutler and in reviewing the brigade’s historical unit status reports, the 4th ABCT performed as well as can be expected in Afghanistan, but as the onion was peeled back there are numerous organizational issues that were brought to the surface while I walked around and listened to the soldiers of the 4th ABCT, in addition to reviewing the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report. One of the most formidable tasks of a leader is to improve the organization while simultaneously accomplishing
Compare and Contrast the National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States of America with the Nation...
War finds success and failure inescapably linked to how well the Combined, Joint, and Multinational Commander ensures the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment” planning is linked to strategic, operational and tactical objectives. General Eisenhower’s Operation OVERLORD, the Allied cross channel, air, and seaborne invasion of France during World War II provides an excellent case study to show successful integration of the principles and the spirit of the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment.” OVERLORD required synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the logistics capabilities of coalition forces, their equipment as well as civilian manufacturing capabilities to meet the strategic end state (e.g. the defeat of Germany). This article will review the purpose and definition of Joint Sustainment, its imperatives and logistics planning principles and examine how Eisenhower and his planners incorporated these imperatives and principles into Operation OVERLORD.
This paper will not bore with the definition of a profession. The United States Army is about more than words, it is about action. The action of over 238 years of tradition and service. The Army is a profession. A profession requires its members to adhere to prolonged training and learn specialized skills. A member of a profession must wholly commit himself and his skills to a calling which is entrusted by the public. A profession provides its members with intrinsic value which motivates beyond financial gain. The Army is a higher calling which demands all of these qualities and more.
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations
Recent technological advancements on show in the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have indicated, to some, that there is a new American way of war. Scholars, however, do not seem to have reached consensus on what a new way of war for the United States would embody. Depending on the scholar, their beliefs are underwritten by the American ability to wage war with highly interconnected, agile, precise, and extremely damaging methods or because the United States is capable of waging war with a small, Special Forces centered footprint. Other scholars argue that there is not a new American way of war because traditional methods are still necessary in many kinds of conflict. Scholars who address this question focus on conflicts that they believe to be important indicators of how the United States will act in the future, but miss the forest for the trees. The choice of a particular method of combat in any given war is not the result of some national tendency, but rather the result of the political object desired. The political object is the ultimate arbiter of the choice of strategy in war, and that is certainly not new to how the United States wages war.
By the end of the war, about 5,000 men and 500 women had been charged
To be a successful teacher not only in physical education but in all classroom settings you must be able to fully stimulate your students to think critically about the problem at hand. In sports thinking critically and making split second decisions can be the difference between winning and losing; through repetition students will be able to better identify which situations call for which moves. This ability to identify one's current situation in a given activity and react appropriately is referred to as tactical awareness; this is the basis for the tactical games model. Through implementing the tactical games model in your classroom your students will better understand not only the games being played but the tactics that are universal to all sports.
Leaders today need to have an appreciation for the operation process, understand a situation, envision a desired future, and to lay out an approach that will achieve that future (Flynn & Schrankel, 2013). Plans need to be created that can be modified to changes in any factors considered. However, plans should not be dependent on specific information being precise or that require things to go exactly according to schedule. Instead, the staff NCO should be flexible where they can and always be prepared for the unexpected. Today’s military members are fighting an unconventional war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy constantly changes their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) to counter the United States technological advances, making planning very difficult for leaders. There are multiple tools at a staff NCO’s disposal to try to anticipate an outcome of a current operation, but also assist with the development of concepts in follow-on missions. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is just one tool a staff NCO can utilize. In order to stay ahead of the enemy, create effective plans and orders, it is critical for a staff NCO to assist the commander, and understand that the MDMP and planning are essential in defeating the enemy and conserving the fighting force.
“Operational design is a journey of discovery, not a destination.” Operational design provides a framework, with the guidance of the Joint Force Commander (JFC), that staffs and planning groups can use to give political leaders, commanders, and warfighters a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the problems and objectives for which military forces will be committed, or are planned to be committed. Furthermore, operational design supports commanders and planners to make sense of complicated operational environments (often with ill-structured or wicked problems), helps to analyze wicked problem, and devise an operational approach to solve the problem in the context of the operational environment.
Current military leadership should comprehend the nature of war in which they are engaged within a given political frame in order to develop plans that are coherent with the desired political end state. According to Clausewitz, war is an act of politics that forces an enemy to comply with certain conditions or to destroy him through the use of violence. A nation determines its vital interests, which drives national strategy to obtain or protect those interests. A country achieves those goals though the execution of one of the four elements of power, which are diplomatic, informational, military and economical means. The use of military force...
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
In modern military theory, the highest level is the strategic level, in which activities at the strategic level focus directly on policy objectives, both during peace and warfare. In the study of modern military strategy, there is a distinction between military strategy and national strategy, in which the former is the use of military objective to secure political objectives and the latter coordinates and concentrates all the elements of national...
It is characterised by trust and confidence, mutual respect for each other’s capability and synergy rather than competition. It must be appreciated that war and associated operational issues as stated above are primarily the concern of the Armed Forces as a whole and not of individual Services. War is not, and must not be a zero-sum game amongst the Services, because no individual service by itself can achieve the objectives or be a gainer or loser. The only criteria must be the optimising of the combat potential of the joint
Rotfeld, Adam D. 1998. “Prescriptions for Improving OSCE Effectiveness in Responding to the Risks and Challenges of the 21st Century” Presented to the 3rd International Security Forum and 1st Conference of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/3isf/Online_Publications/WS5/WS_5B/Rotfeld.htm