In Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility (CITE pg249-258), Harry Frankfurt presents his seminal argument to challenge traditional ideas that the “Principle of Alternate Possibilities” (The ability to do otherwise) is a necessary condition for free will and moral responsibility. This essay outlines why the Principle of Alternate Possibilities has been so widely accepted, outlines Frankfurt's challenge to the Principle. Ultimately, I argue that Frankfurt cases can show that the Principle of Alternate possibilities (PAP) is not a necessary condition for free will and moral responsibility. This analysis follows the conditions of the Incompatibilism Restricted Rule (IRR) Principle presented by Widerker. However, this is only true of Frankfurt cases without an intervener, where the limitation of alternatives is a consequence of your own neurology. …show more content…
An individual acted freely only if they could have done otherwise. P2. Free action implies moral responsibility. 3) I freely ’d. 3) I could have acted other than. I am morally responsible for ’ing This can be formulated into the principle. (PAP) A person is morally responsible for what they have done, only if they could have done otherwise. CITE - a. Frankfurt noticed that PAP is inconsistent with his compatibilist ideology that causal determinism (all events in the universe, including human decisions, are inevitable (CITE). ) and moral responsibility can be compatible. This is because: P1 If causal determinism is true, no one can act otherwise. P2. If no one can act otherwise, then (following PAP) no one is morally responsible. (C) Therefore, if causal determinism is true, then no one can ever be held morally responsible for any action. CITE para 5 - "The 'Cite' -find a new citation This conclusion highlights the tension between PAP and compatibility. To overcome this, an argument must be presented that states either Premise 1, or Premise 2 is false to entail the conclusion as
''Why blameworthiness is the wrong question'' is an informative article that exposes the reasons why the concept blameworthiness is the wrong word to ask in the legal argot. Eagleman proposes to replace the term with the word modifiability, which is a forward-looking term that will help build a social policy based on evidence. The relationship between human biology and the concept of free will, the reasons why blameworthiness is not the correct question and a forward-looking, brain-compatible legal system are the main points the author arguments on. I. Human biology and the concept of free will. Legal systems rest on the assumption that human beings have free will and are completely capable of making their own decisions.
In this essay, I will argue that though Strawson’s Basic Argument is sound, society has constructed a more applicable version of the term “acting morally responsible” which holds us all accountable for our actions. Firstly, I will provide a brief overview of the Basic Argument as well as distinguish between Strawson’s and society’s definitions of being morally responsible. Secondly, I will justify Strawson’s first premise. Finally, I will raise and refute the response of author Ian McEwan. In short, Strawson’s Basic Argument proves that we cannot ultimately be morally responsible for what we do.
Rossian Pluralism claims that there are multiple things that we have basic, intrinsic moral reason to do, which he names as the prima facie duties. These duties are not real, obligatory duties that one must follow under all circumstances, but are “conditional duties” (Ross 754) that one should decide to follow or reject upon reflection of their circumstances. This moral theory has faced criticisms, most strongly in the form of the problem of trade-offs. However, I will demonstrate that the problem of trade-offs is an issue that can be neglected as a valid objection to Rossian Pluralism because it is applicable to other theories as well and it is a factor that makes a moral theory more valuable than not.
Since laws put certain restrictions on a human’s free will, it should not stop humans from doing what he or she wants to do. He also expresses how society and nature should not determine one’s own free will, because it can never be taken away from humans. This, roughly speaking, is the principle of transfer of nonresponsibility. Now, an argument can be generated to show that causal determinism rules out moral responsibility.
In this essay, I shall argue that Frankfurt’s account of free will is unsuccessful. I shall begin by outlining Frankfurt’s account of free will before highlighting an objection and showing that despite it’s attractions Frankfurt’s account of free will is ultimately unsuccessful.
The proper response to an autonomy-exercising choice is one of respect, and this respect seems to counsel non-interference with the agent's choice even if we believe the consequences of interfering would be superior for the agent. Preference-evincing choices often give us reason for non-interference as well, but only because we think the consequences of doing so will be better in some respect for the agent. (Zwolinski,
Furthermore, free will has been closely connected to the moral responsibility, in that one acts knowing they will be res for their own actions. There should be philosophical conditions regarding responsibility such like the alternatives that one has for action and moral significance of those alternatives. Nevertheless, moral responsibility does not exhaust the implication of free will.
In “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, Harry Frankfurt attempts to falsify the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. The Principle of Alternate Possibilities is the principle where a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. A person would be morally responsible for their own actions if done by themselves. If someone else had forced that person to do the action, then the person doing the action is not morally responsible. Frankfurt does not believe this to be true and that the person doing the action is morally responsible. Frankfurt’s objections towards the Principle of Alternate Possibilities shows the refutation of natural intuition and places moral responsibility upon those who deserve it.
In respect to the arguments of Ayer and Holbach, the dilemma of determinism and its compatibility with that of free will are found to be in question. Holbach makes a strong case for hard determinism in his System of Nature, in which he defines determinism to be a doctrine that everything and most importantly human actions are caused, and it follows that we are not free and therefore haven’t any moral responsibility in regard to our actions. For Ayer, a compatibilist believing that free will is compatible with determinism, it is the reconciliation and dissolution of the problem of determinism and moral responsibility with free willing that is argued. Ayer believes that this problem can be dissolved by the clarification of language usage and the clarification of what freedom is in relationship to those things that oppose freedom or restrain it. In either case, what is at stake is the free will of an agent, and whether or not that agent is morally responsible. What is to be seen from a discussion of these arguments is the applicability and validity of these two philosophies to situations where one must make a choice, and whether or not that person is acting freely and is thus responsible given his current situation. In this vein, the case of Socrates’ imprisonment and whether or not he acted freely in respect to his decision to leave or stay in prison can be evaluated by the discussion of the arguments presented in respect to the nature of free will in its reconciliation with determinism in the compatibilist vein and its absence in the causality of hard determinism.
...reserving the principle of autonomous decisions could be considered somewhat more plausible. Essentially the only fault being addressed is the conflicting action, as a conflict no longer occurs. Objections remain based on the inclusion of moral agents exclusively and the promoting of individual’s goals, while introducing the additional problem of self-interest that accompanies prominent autonomy. The theory remains at fault, as it cannot be adequately amended by a single change. Sally’s prescriptive moral theory “picks and choses” from other existing theories and combines them to make a hybrid theory. Doing so creates difficulties as the overlap reduces clarity and limits the strength of any individual argument. This is a challenge that cannot be overlooked; Sally’s theory fails to show structural reliability and is hence too problematic to have sound moral worth.
Frankfurtean compatibilism provides a more refined model than Humean compatibilism. Humean compatibilism has denied the deterministic notion of freedom-the ability to have chosen otherwise. Hume then provides a new definition of freedom, as “a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will” (“Of Liberty and Necessity”, 23). In Hume’s view, as long as we act according to our desires and belief, we are exercising freedom of will and freedom of action. Frankfurt adds a further distinction within our desires, and concludes that our will is free if and only if we act on a first-order desire determined by our second-order desire. An agent’s will, defined by Frankfurt, is “the notion of an effective desire-one that moves (or will or would move) a ...
As a result, this essay will prove that one is held morally responsible for any act that was performed or chosen by them, which qualifies as a human act. The Libertarian view consists of one’s actions not being determined; however, have free will, which is a precondition for moral responsibility. Basically put, human acts are not determined by precedent causes. Libertarianism is one of the views under incompatibilism along with Hard Determinism. The opposite of these views is Compatibilism.
Kane, Robert. "Free Will: Ancient Dispute, New Themes." Feinberg, Joel and Russ Safer-Landau. Reason and Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy. Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2013. 425-437. Print.
What determines whether an action undertaken by any agent is right or wrong? Lon L. Fuller's 1949 article, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, provides a situation whereby the ethical definitions of right action are evaluated. The ethical study of right action consists of two major moral theories being de-ontological (backward looking/origin) and teleological (forward looking/ends). Both also have religious and non-religious strands. The de-ontological theory consists of the divine-command theory (religious) and Kantianism (non-religious), while the teleological theory is composed of natural-law theory (religious) and utilitarianism (non-religious). In this paper, all four strands of moral theory will be used to evaluate the Fuller article and decipher which moral theory best serves the argument whether the actions of the four defendants were ethically permissible given the situation. At the end of this paper, sufficient proof will be given to prove that the application of Kantian ethical theory regarding right action—the categorical imperative—with Christine Korsgaard's double-level theories is pertinent in bringing about a moral conclusion to the case involved.
needs which have been dammed up to a high degree, and it is from its nature only