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Criticisms of traditional approaches to war studies
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Recommended: Criticisms of traditional approaches to war studies
Robert Citino’swork, The German Way of War, offers an insightful analysis of what the author describes as the German way of war. Operational maneuver is used by Citino to describe the approach taken by the Germans in war. The author manages to trace the German approach to war to historical events and eras. Frederick William I’s 17th century engagements, the Great Elector, Hohenzollern Dynasty, and World War II are all incorporated in an attempt to understand the German way of war.
According to Citino(2005) historians should diverge away from analyzing what one ought to have done during military engagements. Instead, they should have an in-depth analysis of the reason why the parties did what they did (269).The author modifies certain generally acceptable aspects of German war operations. Germans are presented as a nation which takes war as a science rather than an art. Auftragstaktik refers to the intellectual approach taken by the Germans to analyze all their military engagements. Under this approach, Citino emphasizes that, the generals create which are geared towards enabling field officers win the war. The field officers are able to maximize flexibility
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and respond to any eventuality. Citino looks at certain elements of German warfare which were ahead of their time.
For instance, the Germans emphasized on staff balance and operational flexibility without necessarily having concrete coordination.This was not imaginable in an era where technology and communication was not advanced. The central position of Germany is also looked into while analyzing the German art of war. Like Persia, Germany’s central position, its scarcity of resourcesand its engagement in short wars also led to the success with its offensive approach. Citino notes that these short wars enabled the Germans to be agile and quick while attacking with fearlessness. While this tactic enabled the Germans to have operational maneuver, they had to act aggressively and take up the earliest opportunity to attack the opponent to
gain. The book succeeds in looking at an element of German military engagements which has been largely ignored in previous studies; offensive operations. Traditionally, Germans have been renowned for their preference for an offensive approach. This has not only led to success in numerous German wars but has also acted as a distinguishing feature which sets them apart from enemies.In the book, Citino gives specific examples where the Germans used this strategy successfully. Prussia’s and the earlier Brandenburg’s are cited as impressive use of the German offensive approach. Citino points out that the Germans would have lost most of these wars if it were not for their offensive operations. The book is a significant piece in understanding the German art of war. While the book has been successful in creating a historical masterpiece due to the factual references, the book is also easily readable. The language and chronology of the book does not only make it ideal for academic purposes but also for general layman reading. The author manages to translate most of the German terms to ease understanding of the book. Though descriptions such as those given about the Prussian commanders might distract the reader, the book has not lost its quality. The source citations and notes are an extra for the readers. The well-researched and written bibliography also provides a guide for the readers and researchers. The book managers to achieve its objective of describing the unique nature of German approach to war. Reference Citino, R. (2005). The German way of war: From the thirty years’ war to the third reich. University Press of Kansas. ISBN
Michael C. C. Adams' book, The Best War Ever: America and World War II, attempts to dispel the numerous misconceptions of the Second World War. As the title suggests, Americans came out of the war with a positive view of the preceding five turbulent years. This myth was born from several factors. Due to the overseas setting of both theaters of the war, intense government propaganda, Hollywood's glamorization, and widespread economic prosperity, Americans were largely sheltered form the brutal truth of World War II. Even to this day, the generation of World War II is viewed as being superior in morality and unity. The popular illusion held that 'there were no ethnic or gender problems, families were happy and united, and children worked hard in school and read a great number of books.' (115)
Von Clausewitz, Carl. Translated and edited by Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret. On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
In The Nazi Seizure of Power by William Sheridan Allen, the author is able to show the reader the support building strategy used by the Nazi party in Northeim and surrounding areas. Allen's thesis is that Nazi party was able to succeed the village of Northeim and else where because they were able to reach out the lower and middle class. Since these classes held the majority of the population, the Nazi party discovered what they wanted from government officials and then used that to persuade these classes to vote for them. To give you a background of the village of Northeim is vital to the understanding of how this party could have come in and take over the political scene so quickly.
The comparison of German forces in France in 1943 versus 1944 provides a compelling argument that allied forces should have transitioned from defense to offense at a decisive point in Western France. Clausewitz states that, “A sudden powerful transition to the offensive - the flashing sword of vengeance - is the greatest moment for the defense” (Clausewitz, 370). Handel also emphasizes “timing is everything” in relation to the optimal transition from defense to offense (Handel, 190). The Americans and British did transition in 1943 to the offensive with the invasion of Sicily and the Italian campaign (Murray, 375). However, they did not capitalize on the opportunity in 1943 to attack the weaker German forces in France to brandish the “flashing sword of vengeance” that Clausewitz advocates.
World War I is marked by its extraordinary brutality and violence due to the technological advancement in the late 18th century and early 19th century that made killing easier, more methodical and inhumane. It was a war that saw a transition from traditional warfare to a “modern” warfare. Calvary charges were replaced with tanks; swords were replaced with machine guns; strategic and decisive battles were r...
“The Spirit of 1914” gives a comprehensive examination of the opinions and feelings felt during the beginning of the Great War by the German people. This monograph goes into extensive detail on the complexity of the German nation’s reactions and response to the vast, “patriotic outbursts…which many contemporaries and historians categorized as “war enthusiasm.””(2) The content of the book also centers on how German unity was portrayed. “Conservative journals claimed that these crowds spoke for public opinion…what had transformed a materialistic, egotistical German “society” into an idealistic, fraternal, national German “community.””(231)Verhey challenges the myth that all Germans wanted to go to war in 1914 by methodically explaining each of the different regions, classes, and political parties’ reactions and responses. The argument of his work comes down to how well he is able to answer the questions of:
justification. The second theme is the Carthaginian settlement, which the victors virtually dismantled Germany of all of its power economically and military.
war went on, was that of encouraging at least some degree L&LL. At the same time they stoically maintained a toecap-to-toecap confrontation with the German Army whilst periodically energetically pursuing the High Command’s policy of continuous offensive action. This meant that when the German High Command in 1918 finally felt obliged by external factors to take the great gamble of their last great offensive on the Western Front, the German Army suffered increasingly unsustainable levels of attrition to their armies. Secondly, by thus steadfastly holding the Germans and their allies at bay in the trenches, the trench fighters enabled the twin pressures of the Allied land and sea blockade, and the failure of German State’s domestic production, to squeeze the fighting heart out the German nation and its autocratic rulers.
The invasion of Poland by Germany in September 1939 is regarded as the trigger that unleashed the Second World War. After an analysis and study of the causes of the conflict, from my point of view I consider that the depiction of hostilities that would trigger this great war were developed long before and were only a matter of time before this war began. I consider it this way, because Germany as the defeated nation of the World War I, in which the victorious nations, imposed conditions within which Germany ceded part of its territory and its colonies, reduce its army and pay annual compensation to the victorious nations.
The actual business of physical injury had added the more subtle process of slaughter of morale, a far more difficult, but none the less effective, method of warfare. The Germans have for a long time preached it. They practiced it from the first, 'frightfulness' being merely the German interpretation of the theory of the destruction of morale. Bernhardi lays as much stress upon it as upon perfection of maneuver. The Allies, perhaps keener students of psychology, substituted persuasion for brutality, and developed a system of military propaganda that has never before been equaled.
However, when confronted with a strict policy of appeasement, by both the French and the English, the stage was set for a second World War. Taylor constructs a powerful and effective argument by expelling certain dogmas that painted Hitler as a madman, and by evaluating historical events as a body of actions and reactions, disagreeing with the common idea that the Axis had a specific program from the start. The book begins with the conclusion of the First World War, by exploring the idea that critical mistakes made then made a second war likely, yet not inevitable. Taylor points out that although Germany was defeated on the Western front, “Russia fell out of Europe and ceased to exist, for the time being, as a Great Power. The constellation of Europe was profoundly changed—and to Germany’s advantage.”
It is interesting and even surprising that the two major strategies regarding war were developed by European contemporaries of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779-1869) approached his philosophy of war in a structured, scientific manner. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) took a more fluid, open-ended approach to his philosophy of war. The fact that they lived during the same time period in Europe is also fascinating in that they likely knew of each others’ writings as well as potentially influenced and were influenced by the philosophy of the other. Jomini’s scientific approach is more applicable to the tactical and operational levels of war while Clausewitz approaches war as more of an art or interaction between people that is more appropriate to the strategic and political levels of war. Although their two war strategies are presented as opposing strategies, by comparing concepts from each of the theorists to the other theorist’s work shows that they are actually more complementary than competing in that they are addressing different levels of war. The concepts to be evaluated are Clausewitz’s “Trinity of War”, “war as a continuation of politics”, and the “unpredictability of war” as well as Jomini’s definition of strategy and his “Fundamental Principle of War”.
Since the unification of Germany in the late 19th century, attitudes of nationalism, Prussian militarism and expansionism saturated German society. As one can clearly see in the writings of the influential German historian, Heinrich von Treitschke, war and territorial expansion were seen as being necessary to the preservation and advancement of German society. He states that, “War is for an afflicted people the only remedy… Those who preach the nonsense about everlasting peace do not understand the life of the Aryan race, the Aryans are before all brave.” The mobilization of the people and resources, for the purpose of making war, were believed to be the means of preservation and advancement of German society. These ultra-nationalistic attitudes and beliefs resulted in widespread German enthusiasm with the coming of war in 1914. As expressed in a German newspaper, The Post, “Another forty years of peace would be a national misfortune for Germany.”
Clausewitz's On War, first published in 1832, until now remains one of the most influential studies in understanding character, nature and conditions of warfare. In his book Clausewitz not only traced an interaction of intension and planning with the realities of combat, but by exploring the relationship of war to policy, politics and society gave a new philosophical justification to the art of war. (Heuser, 2002)
Because the leaders and commanders of WWI forever changed the nature of war, it influenced the later Nazi leaders decisions, and forced the next set of Allies to adapt to an entirely new concept of total war as i...