Summary Of The Foundation Of Strategic Thinking By Paul Van Riper

In 2012, LTG (RET) Paul Van Riper wrote an article called, “The Foundation of Strategic Thinking” in the Infinity Journal with a purpose of educating national leaders and defense officials on the need to understand how nonlinear systems work if they are to effectively implement military strategy. Van Riper explores the possibility of why system theory connects Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity, operational art and operational design, making these subjects the foundation of strategic thinking. Van Riper’s article is not persuasive as he neglects to provide readers a viable argument and counterargument to prove the benefits of incorporating operational art and design into strategic planning, educate readers on the potential risks associated with

Van Riper describes linear systems as structured and predictable and nonlinear systems unstructured and unpredictable. He asserts, “Good Strategists know and understand how nonlinear systems work and use this knowledge consider strategic questions or recommended strategies.” He supports this claim by citing quotes from historic individuals such as Colin Gary, Williamson Murray, John Lewis Gaddis, Carl von Clausewitz, and Brigadier General Shimon Naveh. Van Riper specifically cites Clausewitz by stating, “War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.”1 Additionally, Van Riper discusses the Vietnam War as an example of how linear systems were unsuccessful and World War II as an example of how nonlinear systems through operational art and design were successful. Key terms the Author uses throughout this article is operational design whose purpose is to arrange campaigns and major operations in time and space to fulfill the aims of strategy, and operational art which is the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or operations. Lastly, he criticizes the joint community for creating doctrinal publications that are confusing and, in some cases, unintelligible to readers. In the end, Van Riper stresses the

The author offered the Vietnam War as “tragic” because of and blames the lack of incorporating operational art as the primary reason for political and strategic failures.1 He further mentions after the war, the US attempted to incorporate operational art into doctrine as a needed activity to tie together strategy and tactics, but this construct failed because “too many officers focused on mundane issues like what types of units were to deal with the operational and tactical levels and the creation of new and more complicated planning techniques based on formal analyses.”1 Van Sniper offered his strongest argument when he mentioned a version Operational Design was incorporated during the second world war but failed to provide details on how operational design was successful and quickly dismissed the argument by offering the approach atrophied in the years after the