Stan The Strangler Analysis

In a world where determinism is absolutely certain I will investigate the credence of free will and the ramifications of crime and punishment in the case of Stan the Strangler. To do this I will consider Harry Frankfurt’s argument in favor of compatibilism and Thomas Nagel’s argument in favor of skepticism. Based on the arguments given by these two philosophers I will decide whether or not Stan actually had free will and what should be done with him. I will ultimately agree with Nagel’s approach to free will deeming it most plausible in relation to the case.

Harry Frankfurt’s view is essentially this; we are able to have free will even if we lack the actual ability to do otherwise. By actual ability to do otherwise or as Frankfurt calls it

I will now present Thomas Nagel’s argument that states Stan did not act upon his own free will but instead had no other choice given certain conditions. Nagel uses a term described as moral luck where in an agents actions are dependent on factors outside their control but we continue to treat them as objects of moral judgment. To better understand why Nagel believes Stan the strangler did not act upon his own free will I will explain what Nagel calls broad excusing conditions. Broad excusing conditions are essentially reasons that aren’t usually considered to excuse someone from blame although they should be. I will explain three out of four conditions that I think best suit this particular case. The first condition Nagel brings about is constitutional luck which fits well into the scientific realm and into the deterministic world. It states whoever, or whatever we are, is a product of our genes, environment, character, desires and beliefs. The second is constitutional luck which is based on how we act/react in any given situation. From these actions/reactions we are morally

I believe this for two reasons, the first being that his arguments seem to be fundamentally rooted in science and human intuition. His view is based on genes, environment, and how we are conditioned to judge based on results. The second reason I is simple, his views fit perfectly into a deterministic world. At first glance Frankfurt’s argument rejecting the ability to do otherwise using the Jones and Black case is seemingly plausible, however, this argument is faulty proven by one major objection. The objection stating that Jones had the ability to decide otherwise also known as the “flicker of freedom.” This objection renders Frankfurt’s entire argument illegitimate. As I said before the whole argument takes us in a circle without any real closure. I and many others conclude that the Jones and Black case does not in fact succeed in establishing that an agent does not need the ATDO in order to have free will. Based on my own evaluations of the two competing philosopher’s views I believe that Stan the strangler did not act of his own free will. I’ve come to this determination by investing most of my reasoning in Nagel’s constitutional and circumstantial theories of