What happen the days before and day of the lunch?
It was a full year before Challenger was going to be launched; a major fault was discovered in the design of the solid rocket boosters (Stathopoulos, V. 2014). Did NASA use a flawed database in its decision to launch the Space Shuttle Challenger or did they mismanage the meeting with the Group Decision Support System (GDSS). NASA uses this system to make decisions when it comes to the space shuttles launches. The (GDSS) knew that the temperature was too low to launch (Forrest, J. 2005). Lawrence B. Mulloy, the NASA rockets engineer was one of few that were to blame for the loss of the Shuttle Challenger. Mulloy in conversations with Thiokol wanted the Challenger to take off. Mulloy told Thiokol '’My God, Thiokol, (Forrest, J. 2005)” “when do you want me to launch, next April? (Forrest, J. 2005).” Here are some of the NASA management team members that were in the meeting when that final decision to launch the challenger was made (Slideserve, n.d.).
• Marshall Space Flight Center - in charge of booster rocket development
• Larry Mulloy - challenged the engineers' decision not to launch
• Morton Thiokol - Contracted by NASA to build the Solid Rocket Booster
• Alan McDonald - Director of the Solid Rocket Motors Project
• Bob Lund - Engineering Vice President
• Robert Ebeling - Engineer who worked under McDonald
• Roger Boisjoly - Engineer who worked under McDonald
• Joe Kilminster - Engineer in a management position
• Jerald Mason - Senior Executive who encouraged Lund to reassess his decision not to launch.
During telephone conferences that were held with Thiokol, Marshall, and Kennedy Space Center to discuss whether the launch should be delayed, there were thirty-fo...
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...easier to blame the O-rings than to blame people for the disaster. There was a lack of communication and a sense of desperation from the managers to make sure the shuttle launched as they did not want any further delays. The challenger disaster was certainly avoidable, the warning signs were there but the people in charge did not heed them. Thiokol had an opportunity to steer clear of disaster during the meeting with (GDSS) before the launching of challenger. If the pressure to launch in combination with communication breakdowns had not occurred or had been managed better this disaster would not have happened. It seems that leadership was more concerned with public relations instead of being concerned with the problem of the O-ring. So, I believe that bad decision making on launching the Space Shuttle Challenger on the day of January 28 caused by human error.
Two tragic incidents, the Challenger Space Shuttle crash of 1986, and the Three Mile Island near meltdown of 1979, have greatly devastated our nation. Both these disasters involved failures of communication among ordinary professional people, working in largely bureaucratic companies. Two memos called the “Smoking Gun Memos,” authored by R. M. Boisjoly, of Morton Thiokol, and D. F. Hallman, of Babcook and Wilcox, will always be associated these two incidents. Unfortunately, neither of these memos were successful in preventing the accidents of the Challenger and the Three Mile Island near meltdown.
At this time, he set the tone for importance of effective communication which also set the tone and importance of effective communication for the success of the mission. He set his expectations and the seriousness of the issue for the team. He deliberately and consciously, empowered the teams to come up with the best solutions and then used those recommendations to make the best decisions when trying to save the space craft. He made it very clear how each person’s expertise was crucial for all of the others’
On a cold winter’s morning on the 28th day of January in the year 1986, America was profoundly shaken and sent to its knees as the space shuttle Challenger gruesomely exploded just seconds after launching. The seven members of its crew, including one civilian teacher, were all lost. This was a game changer, we had never lost a single astronaut in flight. The United States by this time had unfortunately grown accustomed to successful space missions, and this reality check was all too sudden, too brutal for a complacent and oblivious nation (“Space”). The outbreak of sympathy that poured from its citizens had not been seen since President John F. Kennedy’s assassination. The disturbing scenes were shown repeatedly on news networks which undeniably made it troublesome to keep it from haunting the nation’s cognizance (“Space”). The current president had more than situation to address, he had the problematic undertaking of gracefully picking America back up by its boot straps.
middle of paper ... ...2014. The 'Standard' of the 'Standard'. The "NASA History" Congressional Digest 90.7 (2011): 196-224. Academic Search Premier -. Web.
This tragic accident was preventable by not only the flight crew, but maintenance and air traffic control personnel as well. On December 29, 1972, ninety-nine of the one hundred and seventy-six people onboard lost their lives needlessly. As is the case with most accidents, this one was certainly preventable. This accident is unique because of the different people that could have prevented it from happening. The NTSB determined that “the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew.” This is true; the flight crew did fail, however, others share the responsibility for this accident. Equally responsible where maintenance personnel, an Air Traffic Controllers, the system, and a twenty cent light bulb. What continues is a discussion on, what happened, why it happened, what to do about it and what was done about it.
Through this national address Reagan hopes to reach out to the public and encourage them to keep their faith firm in the American space progra...
Even though there were many factors contributing to the Challenger disaster, the most important issue was the lack of an effective risk management plan. The factors leading to the Challenger disaster are:
The Challenger disaster of 1986 was a shock felt around the country. During liftoff, the shuttle exploded, creating a fireball in the sky. The seven astronauts on board were killed and the shuttle was obliterated. Immediately after the catastrophe, blame was spread to various people who were in charge of creating the shuttle and the parts of the shuttle itself. The Presidential Commission was decisive in blaming the disaster on a faulty O-ring, used to connect the pieces of the craft. On the other hand, Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, in The Golem at Large, believe that blame cannot be isolated to any person or reason of failure. The authors prove that there are too many factors to decide concretely as to why the Challenger exploded. Collins and Pinch do believe that it was the organizational culture of NASA and Morton Thiokol that allowed the disaster. While NASA and Thiokol were deciding whether to launch, there was not a concrete reason to postpone the mission.
Cuban Missile Crisis Memorandum of Meeting, October 17, 1962 (Avalon Project of Yale Law School)
The beginning of the FAM program can be attributed to one singular event. On May 1st 1961 an event would take place that would change the way the US would approach aviation security forever. “The flight for National Airlines was prepared for departure from Miami International Airport t...
... of the first Executive Committee Meeting, October 16th 1962, 11:50AM-12:57PM, in in Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh (eds), The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader, 99.
Thesis: Unites States should take military action and remove the missiles from cuba because some of President Kennedy advisers thinks that it would start a war.
The Apollo 7 mission was launched on October 11,1968. The prime objectives of the eleven-day mission were to reveal the command and service module and crew performance, space vehicle and mission support facilities performances. These objectives were met, as well as some of the equipment expectations. A major problem associated with the cabin and suit units the crew faced was condensation. This problem occurred because the cold coolant lines from the radiator and from the environment control unit to the inertial measurement unit were not insulated. When there was excessive condensation on the coolant lines or in a puddle on the aft bulkhead after service propulsion system maneuvers, the crew vacuumed the water overboard. Although the
The Space Ship Columbia is nothing short of a technical disaster on many parts of NASA. The Space Shuttle had a design flaw which caused a piece of foam to break of the Shuttle as it ascended into orbit. It was not the excess fuel the shuttle had, but a design flaw using foam. The foam had then stuck to the left wing of the shuttle which caused extensive damage to it causing the explosion. This damage allowed atmospheric gases into the shuttle that essentially destroyed the ship. The reaction to Columbia was similar to the reactions seen to the spaceship Challenger Disaster. NASA suspended all space shuttle missions for two years, just as they had with Challenger. The funding of NASA and the Space Exploration program were not drastically underfunded
At this point the Soviet Union was ahead in the space race. Not happy with that, President Eisenhower demanded that the Navy launch an American satellite as soon as possible. On December 6, 1957, the U.S. attempted to launch the Vanguard TV3. Unfortunately, two seconds after liftoff, the rocket fell back and exploded. Th...