Sir Arthur Tedder's Air Superiority

“Air superiority was the pre-requisite to all winning operations, whether at sea, on land or in the air.”1 This belief was what Air Marshall Sir Arthur Tedder used as his guide during the Second World War, and when able to be fully implemented, allowed his air forces to dominate the skies. This complete air superiority would provide the Allied forces significant and decisive advantages throughout the course of the war.

Air Marshall Sir Arthur Tedder was not always an Air Marshall, nor was he always a knight of the British Empire. Born in Glenguin, Scotland in 1890, he received an education at Magdalene College in Cambridge before enlisting in the Royal Army in 1913 at the age of 23. He quickly transitioned to the Royal Flying Corps in 1916, serving in France and Egypt for two years each. After carrying out many bombing and reconnaissance missions, he was given command of his own squadron, 70 squadron. With the formation of the Royal Air Force, he found himself charged with the duty of director of training from 1934 to 1936. Promoted to Vice Marshall in 1938,

Tedder was appointed director general of Research and Development in the Air Ministry. He held this post before becoming air commander of forces in the Mediterranean and North Africa in 1940, where he played an important role in the eventual winning of the Desert War.2
When the Allies were forced to evacuate from Greece in April 1941 and then again from the island of Crete in May of the same year, Tedder found himself charged with protecting the withdrawing ships from the relentless German attackers. For the most part the operation was a success, allowing around 18,000 men, over half the garrison at Crete, to escape. The British suffered tremendous losses nonetheless, including the complete loss of three cruisers, and six destroyers. Another three cruisers, and an aircraft carrier were badly damaged, and six destroyers, four cruisers, and a battle ship required extensive repairs. These losses were due in large part to a lack of coordination between the Navy and Air Force, with many ships departing from port without even notifying fighter squadrons of their intentions. This led to many ships being constantly bombarded by German fighter bombers during their escape.3 The Royal Air Force sustained heavy losses due to the evacuation not only in planes, but in territory as well. This is emphasized in Tedder’s own diary as he writes: “…we have been put out of commission because the Army have lost all our air bases for us, and without bases once cannot do much.”4 Tedder makes a critical observation on reflection of the evacuation: air superiority is the key to winning battles. He will use this knowledge to his advantage in future engagements.5
Tedder’s field of battle had moved from Greece to North Africa, and the British soon embarked on Operation Crusader, their third attempt to break the siege of Tobruk.6 Before the start of this operation, General Auchinleck, who had just replaced General Wavell as Commander-in-Chief Middle East, decided to postpone long enough to allow for a sufficient buildup of airpower that would enable the British to gain air superiority.7 This reflects the wisdom gained from previous engagements, including the evacuation of Crete. The airpower that arrived and participated in Crusader helped to sink forty-seven percent of the 270,000 tons of Axis shipping destroyed by the Allies during the operation. This severely limited the amount of supplies General Rommel’s already short-supplied forces were able to receive. However, because they lacked sufficient air bases, they could not completely cut off Rommel’s supply lifeline. This excellent coordination between the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force allowed the Navy a greater sense of security, and also strongly reflects lessons learned in Crete.8
As the Allied offensive proceeded, Tedder’s air forces hit enemy supplies on the sea, at ports, on roads, and in supply dumps. One of the goals of this operation was to immobilize Rommel’s forces by destroying fuel dumps.9 To do this, he would assemble the “greatest striking force which could be operated” from the bases at Malta.10 Indeed, he committed nearly all able fighters and bombers in the Middle East to this operation, leaving only token forces to defend other Allied territories.11 Also a high priority was the destruction of the German fighter force, which General Ritchie said went “like France, only the other way round.”12 While Tedder’s forces had managed to gain the crucial element of air superiority over their German counterparts, Rommel’s seemingly infinite ability to keep his forces mobile precluded the destruction of his Afrika Korps at this time.
While Crusader allowed for the much needed breakout from Tobruk, the decisive battle in the Middle East was still yet to come. With the Russians being pushed back by Operation Barbarossa and Britain’s shipping being significantly reduced by U-boats in the Atlantic, the war in North Africa was pivotal. Thus, the battle of El Alamein was the most important battle in the Middle East. 13 During preparation for the upcoming encounter with Rommel’s forces, General Montgomery ordered the mining of a vast area of desert with anti-tank mines. This proved a good plan, as Rommel’s tanks were caught in the minefield during their attack and picked off by Tedder’s fighters, whose intensity of air operations were greater than ever before.14 Continuous attacks on enemy transport columns and concentrations by fighter and bomber squadrons doing up to seven sorties per day, with some pilots doing five sorties each, weakened Rommel’s already desperate supply situation. Tedder had stretched his air force to the limit, with the RAF flying bombing missions day and night.15 Tedder was later interested to read that even Rommel himself later recognized the effect of the “continuous, round the clock bombing.”16
Perhaps Tedder’s greatest achievements, however, were in the European theater during the invasion of Normandy.

His plan for the invasion involved three phases: strategic bombing of Germany, focusing on the aircraft industry; bombing of railway centers17, coastal defenses, harbors, and air fields, and providing assistance to the invading ground forces.18 Once again, Tedder’s insistence on air superiority allowed the Allies to carry out Operation Overlord without interference by German fighters or bombers. Overlord involved the largest single operation of aircraft during the war, with 11,000 aircraft flying 14,000 sorties on June 5th and on D-Day. 19 As Tedder wrote in his memoirs, “Air superiority is the difference between the unhindered passage of our shipping across the Channel to the beaches of Normandy and the continual harassment our coastal shipping had suffered in the early days of the

War.”20
Throughout the course of the war, Air Marshall Tedder recognized, and led others to recognize as well, the importance of airpower, but more importantly the importance of air superiority. The results of this knowledge allowed the Allies to gain control of the battlefield, and eventually led to the collapse of the German war machine. However, it took the heavy losses during the evacuation of Crete for him to gain this knowledge, and because of this I can only assign him the grade of B for his performance during World War II. This is not to say that he was not an excellent commander, for many officers in charge never appreciated the implications of air domination.21 Faults notwithstanding, his importance in the Second World War can be seen by his promotion to Deputy Supreme Commander22 before the invasion of Normandy and his presence in Eisenhower’s place at the signing of the German surrender in Berlin.23 Certainly, without Tedder’s constant battle for domination of the skies, the Allied victory would certainly have been delayed, if not extended indefinitely. Truly, Tedder was “Lord of the Skies.”