Shoemaker's Argumentative Analysis

Time is an abstract entity that people use in ordinary discourse to express many experiences, such as change. We intuitively think we know what it is, and that it is flowing, until we contemplate it more carefully. When examining the nature of time, it can be immediately noted that there are two ways of expressing temporal properties and relations. Firstly, one may describe an event as in the past, present or future. This way is otherwise known as the a-series. The a-series ascribes a particular property to an event. For example, I may ascribe the property ‘present’ to writing this essay. The properties are all tensed, one place properties that relate to the present. Consequently, one can put events in a timeline from past to future and capture

For example, it seems coherent to be able to imagine a world in which time passes but nothing changes. Sydney Shoemaker develops an argument to demonstrate such a view. Imagine we can divide the world into three distinct regions, they are separated by natural boundaries however it is possible for the inhabitants of the world to move between the regions. Let’s name the three regions A, B and C. In A, the inhabitant observes that things are changing within the region for three years but then don’t change in the fourth year. Meanwhile, they perceive in B that things are changing for two years then don’t change in the third year. Finally, they notice in C things change for one year and then don’t change the following year. Consequently, during the 12th year they discover nothing is changing in all three regions. Prior to the 12th year we had good reason to believe that time is passing informally all the time because in each point where nothing is changing, else where in the world things were changing. Although in the 12th year all the regions are stationary at the same time for the same period of time, the simplest explanation seems to be that time is still passing in the 12th year. Therefore, it seems it ought to be possible for time to pass without any change at all. (Shoemaker, 1969, pgs. 369-370). Nonetheless, it may be argued that McTaggart needs only the premise that the possibility of change is essential to time for his argument to