Sherbert V. Verner Case Analysis

In Sherbert v. Verner (1963), Ms. Adeil Sherbert challenged the South Carolina Employment Security Commission’s denial of her unemployment benefits. South Carolina refused to grant her assistance because she violated the Unemployment Compensation Act (UCA) by refusing to work on Saturday (the Sabbath Day of her faith). The Commission deemed this too weak a reason for her to avoid employment. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled on First Amendment Free Exercise grounds in the appellant’s favor when reviewed. Critically, the Court writes, “[The] appellant’s conscientious objection to Saturday work constitutes no conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach of state legislation.” Moreover, Justice Brennan continues, “The

The Court has never ventured to circumscribe the bounds of religion, nor set any threshold for its elasticity. Indeed, in cases like Davis v. Beason (1890), Torcaso v. Watkins (1961), and United States v. Seeger (1965), the Court expressed that religion should relate to some sort of belief in God. But the Supreme Court has never laid out the facets of religious organizations that merit exemption status. It has standards for “truly private” organizations—which maintain firm privacy and free speech rights, exempt from most antidiscrimination laws—that includes a list of characteristics. "Private clubs" must generally fulfill five basic requirements: selectivity in acceptance (i.e. all-female stamp collectors, or all-male racquetball clubs), exclusivity (not open to the public), controlled membership, non-profit status, and no marketing. Oftentimes, local district laws introduce a sixth criterion related to the size of the organization. Stakes in the ground creating a perimeter for religions are needed for cases like Sherbert v. Verner. If the Court finds established religions important and intends to protect them, it should claw back the latitude of potentially ill-intentioned

Smith (1990) deals with a similar issue applying religious exemptions to existing statutes, but rules in stark contrast from Sherbert v. Verner. Here, a private drug rehabilitation organization fired Mr. Smith because he (and another, Mr. Black) ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug. The Native American Church utilizes peyote for sacramental purposes, so Smith appealed based on First Amendment, free exercise grounds. The Court ruled against Mr. Smith, explaining that the free exercise clause leaves room for the State’s universal application of the drug’s prohibition. Rather than singling out a particular religion, Justice Scalia argues that the law “incidentally” affects the Native Americans’ religious practice. Moreover, the majority finds that the precedent established by Sherbert is not applicable because the relevant law in Smith is an “across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct.” In short, neither the Federal Controlled Substances Act, nor the Unemployment Compensation Act, constituted invidious