1. Summary: On 17 April 2018, I was ordered by COL O’Connor to conduct further analysis during the active investigation process for FLIPL #102. My conclusion remains unchanged in which, to recommend financial liability is assessed to SFC Picart for the loss of $78K worth of USG equipment. Ultimately, this investigation reveals that SFC Picart’s actions of simple negligence, caused by his failure to enforce effective accountability and safekeeping practices to include, key witness sworn statements further corroborates that SFC Picart failed to follow CPT Reid’s directives (instructions). Hence, SFC Picart’s substandard leadership skills, as a Senior NCO (by soliciting assistance from untrained personnel) his actions were contrary to the commander’s directives (instructions) for this task to be performed by the 67th Rear Detachment Supply Team (trained 92A NCOs/Soldiers) were contributing factors that have likely resulted in the loss of USG equipment.
1. Overview:
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According to DA 735-5, to initiate a turn-in into the appropriate supporting activity; therefore, the equipment must be maintained (carried) on the commander hand receipt (property book), to be processed for removal from company commander (CPT Reid) property book. Therefore, this also corroborates why CPT Reid did not sub-hand receipt this equipment to either SFC Picart or to any other members of the 67th Supply Team. As the commander, CPT Reid had exclusive access and control of the sole keys for the storage facilities, which contained the itemized missing equipment as shown on the DD Form
The book Black Hearts by Jim Frederick is an in-depth narrative about the 1st platoon, Bravo Company 1-502nd Infantry 101st Airborne Division deployed to Iraq in 2005. The leadership failures documented in this book range all the way from the general officer level down to the lowest private. LT general Ricardo Sanchez failed to understand the climate his command group was entering as they were deployed into Iraq. From then on the entire leadership failures continued to compound upon each other with improper time to plan. It is customary to have a six month lead time to have a proper battle hand off when preparing to take over an AO from another unit. To compound this problem, the entire time the 502nd was in pre-deployment training, they were preparing for the rigors of urban combat. In reality, they were given six weeks to recon their new area of responsibility and were going to a countryside crafted by the heavens for guerilla warfare. As Colonel Ebel said in the book, “It is not going to be an easy road. They are not even sure of what they have in the area. It just feels bad. We can expect a real fight.”
There were certain items or supplies that each soldier needed to possess that aided in their survival. Other items were discretionary or optional, not entirely important for the survival of the soldier. The optional items carried or possessed were like a crutch. They were not necessarily important to the remainder of the platoon but helpful to the individual soldier attempting to cope with the realities of the conflict. Two of these soldiers were: Kiowa and Ted Lavender.
This whole battalion was at a disadvantage before they left the states, given the mission of replacing the 48th Infantry brigade in south Baghdad. Unlike the usual five to six months that a unit would typically get to conduct recons and gather intel on the AO that they would be occupying, 1st battalion was to gather all they could in 6 weeks. LTC Kunk was chosen by Col Ebel to head the fight in the population centers for the reason that he thought he would be engaging and capable of communicating others. This proved to be the first major problem in the chain of command that would hinder the efficiency of operations. While at JRTC preparing for the deployment 1st platoon, Bravo company made a tactical error resulting in the capture of 9 soldiers. Even with this information Kunk had developed a plan with no input from any of his company commanders, and he wouldn't accept any kind of input or use the assets that he had at his disposal. LTC had little to no bearing communicating with his subordinates, destroying the confidence in his commanders and ruining his communication lines. If th...
Due to Jones’ entry, the military brought charges against him under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for, “releasing classified information and conduct detrimental to military security.” At the hearing Corporal Jones’ attorney argued that the content of his client’s blog was, “protected by the First Amendment because it dealt with his own impressions and ideas on a matter of public interest.” He also claimed that, “it was not Jones’ intent to undermine military security but that his account of the firefight and its consequences was an act of by his comm...
Smart, J., & Kropp, C. (2005, Winter). Waves of Change: Army Transformation at Aberdeen Proving Ground Reaches Technical Escort Unit. Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, 6(1), pp. Cover, 12-14. Retrieved from http://www.hdiac.org/islandora/object/hdjournal%3A38/datastream/OBJ/view
When your team is tasked to take at an enemy control point the need of that accountability is to carry out the mission and to ensure the task at hand is completed with that team of soliders. With that security of ensuring the team isn’t missing a solider or stranded away from one another , it’s almost the strongest means of confirmation especially in this situation. The failure in this task is that following example, if that solider was missing and the team was in need of that manpower the control point could not be taken due one indiviso solider missing.. That member is nowhere to be found and could be considered missing in action or captured without any trace of evidence. Team leaders again represent that commanding leadership of their troops and will have to report that to his commander and so on and so
After more than ten years of persistent counterinsurgency (COIN) conflict and multiple simultaneous responses to several natural disasters, the United States Army is at a crossroads regarding professional education for its officers and enlisted force. Considering overseas contingency operations in Iraq are due to conclude in December 2011 and by 2014 for Afghanistan, it is plausible that strategic planners are considering the future make-up of what will constitute the Total Army Force to include new educational criteria for what could be a smaller force than was needed for present day operations. While this may be “peace dividend” speculation, there is precedence for the Army to reevaluate its force structure and personal qualification requirements after every major conflict over the last century. . Even though defense budget reductions should redoubt army equipment priorities, training deferrals because of persistent contingency operations have inhibited enlisted professional development despite that counterinsurgency operations require refocused soldiers training to improve their sense of situational understanding and application of observable operational ethics through conceptual enlisted leadership evaluation efforts.
On 2/8/18 at approximately 1845 hrs a fight was called over the radio, Sgt Barrett, Kyle responded. When Sgt Barrett arrived at D Bldg, Sgt Barrett saw I/M Hills, William (GDC 524378 W/M STG: Aryan Brotherhood) outside next to the D1 window bleeding from his head. Sgt Barrett then went to D1 cell 24 to check on I/M Swann, Stacy (GDC 820663 W/M No STG) was his room extremely agitated. While Sgt Barrett was talking to I/M Swann Sgt Barrett noticed that there were lacerations to his head, blood on the floor and on his hands. Sgt Barrett then instructed I/M Swann to come to the door to be handcuffed, I/M Swann complied. No force was used. I/M Hills was escorted by Sgt James from D yard to Medical for evaluation. After I/M Hills left the yard Sgt Barrett then escorted I/M Swann from D Bldg to Medical for evaluation.
...f it.” (Sharp, 1993) Truer words have never been spoken. As Senior Noncommissioned Officers in the United States Air Force, we need to follow suit and act in the same manner.
turn reported it to military officials. Major Jesse A. Marcel was shown some of the debris by Brazel. Marcel returned to the base to consult with his superiors and is quoted
Junior officers rank from Ensign to Lieutenant Commander, O-1 to O-4. Within the first 10 years of their career, junior officers will make thousands of decisions. Because of this, an important part of their duty is to understand that all of their decisions must be made with the highest level of integrity and ethics. Though some situ...
On September 15th at 2000, I had a counseling session with MIDN 2/C Jones (he asked that I not use his name) regarding his occasional absence from Morning Quarters Formation. I started the sit down session by first addressing the reason why I had asked to talk to 2/C Jones and why I thought it was important. I then asked 2/C Jones what his reasons were for sometimes not showing up to Morning Quarters Formation. 2/C Jones explained that he usually goes, but when he does not it is normally because he was up late working on homework the night before and needed rest. He brought up a supporting fact about how the Commandant keeps insisting that the Midshipmen need more sleep, which I agreed with him is true. I then asked him if he felt that formation was important or not. He began to explain why it was not that important to him, and then after he finished, I gave the reasons why it is important, especially as a significant leader to the 4/C in the Company
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
Since the Army puts everything down on paper, from how to perform maintenance on an M4 weapon (“Rifle…”, 2003, para. 1.4) to how to write a letter to your commander (“Preparing…”, 2001, p. 30), a good NCO must know and follow the rules and instructions that apply to him or her on a regular basis. For example, a good NCO must be able to correct a soldier’s uniform to the exact standard. In order to order a soldier to tuck in his or he...
There are many types of technological developments in the military happening at all times. They range from new aircraft to sophisticated guidance systems. Teams of specialists work for years to develop some of our simplest equipment. These people’s everyday lives are devoted to the safety and protection of the citizens of the U.S.