In military engagements, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) are intended to reduce the chance of friendly fire incidents and recognize international law regarding the conduct of war, particularly the need to protect civilians, but in Vietnam they became a political tool as well. President Lyndon Johnson had several issues he considered as he developed the rules of engagement for Vietnam. One of which was how he maintained tight control over the selection of targets for the air war, for fear that the bombing provoke the Chinese and the Soviets into a confrontation with the United States. (Moss 163). The other was how he counted on a reasonably quick and easy victory over the NLF and Hanoi. As a result President Johnson “did not confront the crucial …show more content…
General Westmoreland was the commander of US troops in Vietnam. Resulting from the decision of President Johnson to fight a limited war Westmoreland had to conduct the war in such a way that would achieve the goals that the US government wanted. Westmoreland came up with a strategy of attrition that was to unfold over three phases. Phase one, U.S. troops would protect developing American logistics systems, Phase two, U.S. forces would eliminate the enemy’s base camps and sanctuaries, Phase three, the pacification program would be extended throughout South Vietnam. (Moss 165). Consequentially, Westmoreland had to issue rules of engagement that would make life more difficult and more dangerous for the soldiers who actually had to do the …show more content…
However, were low enough to feel a larger connection to the men and the desire to preserve their lives and their desire for unlimited rules of engagement. Consequentially this resulted in combat units being only as effective as their methods at getting around the rules of engagement. Military commanders sought to modify the ROE to permit troops to pursue opposing forces to their destruction or until they surrendered. (Moss 177). Battalion commanders were responsible for knowing and acting in accord with the rules of engagement. It did however, depend on what kind of force they were leading and what operations they were carrying out to determine if they viewed the ROE’s as guidelines or just completely ignored them as essentially useless. Even though both the VC and the NVA forces repeatedly violated Cambodian neutrality, U.S. forces were never allowed to pursue their enemies into Cambodia or attack any Cambodian-populated areas. (Moss
One of the key strengths of this book is the author's first-hand knowledge of the people, places, and events that he is writing about. He also supplemented this first-hand knowledge with extensive interviews. In one example, he elaborated on the "chain of command" in Vietnam, which began with General Paul Harkins (and William C. Westmoreland) to the CINCPAC (Admiral Harry Felt) and from CINCPAC to Washington. "Not once in their four years of mutual agony in Vietnam did Harkins's successor, General Westmoreland, pick up the telephone and call his commander-in-chief, President Lyndon B. Johnson. Westmoreland did not have the authority, he told me."(169) This information came directly from an interview with Westmoreland. There are other anecdotes similar to this with each contributing to the extensive nature of the book's detail.
i. Difficulties faced by soldiers due to the nature of fighting in the Vietnam War - Personnel had difficulties with transportation supplied with adapted vehicles back seat faced rear to provide additional fire power (Source A) – It appears as if the government didn't worry enough to supply men with safe and capable equipment - Threat of traps led to fear as vehicles had to be parked on street at night (Source A) o Check for traps each morning became a daily ritual particularly in fuel tanks (Source A) o A request for a locking fuel cap was denied because weren’t entitled to one” (Source A) • What circumstances would have needed to arise for them to be entitled to one? The Offensive full guard was set up (24hrs a day), personnel got no sleep and were constantly on alert (Source A) – How significant would this have been in the personnel’s mental frame of mind?
The Vietnam War: A Concise International History is a strong book that portrays a vivid picture of both sides of the war. By getting access to new information and using valid sources, Lawrence’s study deserves credibility. After reading this book, a new light and understanding of the Vietnam war exists.
In August of 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the closest thing there was to declaring war on Vietnam. A war that resulted in millions of people dying, and the loss of liberties for a large number of people. The Resolution was passed because the government (and the American people) believed that the Vietnamese had fired torpedoes at a US destroyer on routine patrol in the Tonkin Gulf on August 2, 1964. It was also reported that a second deliberate attack happened against a pair of ships two days later on August 4, 1964. Based on this information, the President in a news conference announced to the U.S. that he was ordering air strikes against North Vietnam in retaliation for the attacks on US ships. But information now leads us to believe that President Johnson had ordered bombers to strike for an attack that never happened. It has even been reported that before the air strikes even began there was reason to believe that the attack on August 4th never happened. There are transmission reports from the commander in the Tonkin Gulf, Captain John J. Herrick stating that there was an overeager sonarman who "was hearing ship's own propeller beat" and freaky weather conditions. Also, Navy pilot, James Stockdale, who was flying in the area that night, stated that "our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets there were no boats there. There was nothing there but black water and American fire power."
Laws exist to protect life and property; however, they are only as effective as the forces that uphold them. War is a void that exists beyond the grasps of any law enforcing agency and It exemplifies humankind's most desperate situation. It is an ethical wilderness exempt from civilized practices. In all respects, war is a primitive extension of man. Caputo describes the ethical wilderness of Vietnam as a place "lacking restraints, sanctioned to kill, confronted by a hostile country and a relentless enemy, we sank into a brutish state." Without boundaries, there is only a biological moral c...
Fussell, Paul. "Vietnam." The Bloody Game: An Anthology of Modern War. Ed. Paul Fussell. London: Scribners, 1991. 651-6.
McNamara graduated Harvard with a master’s degree in business, served in the U.S. Army Air Corps, and was President of the Ford Motor Company. Given his background in analytics, President Kennedy asked McNamara to be his Secretary of Defense in 1960. The American military support of Southern Vietnamese forces gradually increased during Kennedy’s presidency. Early public opinion of the Vietnam wasn’t necessarily bad. The widespread American notion of the war was seen as a fight against communism. This paired with the preconceived idea of Northern Vietnam’s inferiority as a military power seemed like favorable odds for and easy American win given it’s reputation as a global hegemony. Because of this, Kennedy, with the advisement of McNamara, approached the conflict under the principles of limited war. However, the Kennedy administration did not anticipate was the unexpected tactic of guerrilla warfare paired with the unwavering dedication to the war effort. After President Kennedy’s assassination, Lyndon B. Johnson took over the role of President. Before Kennedy’s death, there had been talks between him and McNamara about withdrawing troops from the war. This strategy was not shared by Johnson. His primary strategy was to escalade and “Americanize” the war.[2] FACTS ABOUT VIETNAM BOOK. McNamara’s actions match this accordingly as Johnson’s Secretary of Defense until McNamara’s resignation in 1978. However, by evaluating
The Vietnam War was one of the most prolonged wars in US history. Although there were no exact dates, it is believed that US involvement lasted for around 20 years. The US went into this war hoping they could stop the spread of communism and defeat the northern Vietnamese. The battles were like nothing they had seen before and it was very difficult for the soldiers to differentiate between the enemies and civilians. To make it even more difficult for the soldiers, their “information was based on faulty intelligence”. Võ Nguyên Giáp, a northern Vietnamese general, believed that the US and the southern Vietnamese had an unstable relationship. He hoped that through the Tet Offensive the US would believe they were no longer worth defending. Fighting was done using guerrilla warfare which blurred the lines of legitimate and illegitimate killings and this had effect of bringing peoples morales down. Support for the war had always been split but this battle caused even the government to reconsider their involvement. The Tet offensive changed the US's attitude towards the Vietnam war by leading to further anti-war protests, a credibility gap in America, and for President Johnson to negotiate peace and not seek reelection.
The decision to aid Vietnam was a difficult one that all five Presidents struggled with but it was in 1961 when Kennedy sent a team to Vietnam to report on conditions in the South and to assess future American aid requirements (Rorak, 1,065). The problem was that this decision was like a snowball roiling down a hill, gaining size and momentum as it tore a path down the hill. While I agree with President Kennedy’s analysis that “this is their war and that they are the ones who have to win it or lose it” it does not spport the fact that the war lasted for MMM years. President Kennedy further states that, ”We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but t...
On August 2, 1964 an incident happened between the USS Maddox and a North Vietnamese torpedo ships. While the Maddox was doing a casual sweep through of the Tonkin Gulf, the North Vietnamese ships began to follow. Captain Herrick ordered his men to shoot while he radioed an aircraft carrier for assistance. After feeling threated, the North Vietnamese ships each fired one torpedo. Two missed and the third failed to launch. The Maddox was barely touched, as for the Vietnamese ships, two were in bad shape and the other had sunk. Meanwhile, over in Washington D.C., President Lyndon B. Johnson was frantic about the situation he had been informed of. At first, President Johnson had no desire to hold any reprisal against North Vietnam. He proceeded to tell Russia that he had no interest in extending the conflict. However, he did warn that there would be consequences for their action. This conflict had our stationed soldiers on high al...
So many things influenced our involvement in the Vietnam War, and Lawrence examines the decisions we made in a greater context than just our own. He argues that international pressures controlled the attitudes and ideas of the United States, for the most part.
This book details the discussion of government policy in the stages of the Vietnam crisis from 1961-July 1965. It examines the main characters of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert McNamara, in addition to the military, which included the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It began in the Kennedy era amidst the Bay of Pigs incident and how that led to mistrust of the military planning by advisors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It continues with Johnson and his administration making decisions over and over that continued to commit more and more involve...
“In July 1965, Lyndon Johnson chose to Americanize the war in Vietnam.” Although Johnson chose to enter America into the war, there were events previous that caused America to enter and take over the war. The South Vietnamese were losing the war against Communism – giving Johnson all the more reason to enter the war, and allowing strong American forces to help stop communism. There were other contributing factors leading up to the entrance of the war; America helped assist the French in the war, Johnson’s politics, the Tonkin Gulf Incident, and the 1954 Geneva Conference. President Johnson stated, “For 10 years three American Presidents-President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President--and the American people have been actively concerned with threats to the peace and security of the peoples of southeast Asia from the Communist government of North Viet-Nam.”
In Vietnam, friendly fire was common. The United States soldiers often shot innocent civilians. When the U.S viewed the brutality of the war and the torture of countless Vietnamese citizens through journalism, the President knew the public’s reaction was to such a point that he would never get re-elected, therefore he didn’t run, and his party lost the election.
President Johnson’s in-group avoided reconsidering its escalation policy when time and again the expectation on which they based their decisions turned out to be wrong. The policy-makers avoided the discussion of prior decisions and kept inventing new rationalizations to recommit themselves into defeating the North Vietnamese.